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~~To Charles Sumner Nash~~
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~~Christmas, 1915.~~

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THE OLD TESTAMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY



THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY

A STUDY IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

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BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge

1915

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Published November 1915

INSCRIBED TO
THE MEMORY OF MY WIFE
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• • •

*We came to know
The master-lesson and the riddle's key:
Unending love unending growth shall be*



PREFACE

THE one thing of supreme importance in the Old Testament, actually and historically, is the idea of God — the focal point of its significance for humanity. That idea did not come in full feather, nor fall as a bolt from the blue. In a long history of progress, it presents the necessity of choice between the higher and the lower, the better and the worse. The advance of Biblical scholarship, and the change from an instructional to an educational view of revelation, have made the choice easier, so that a rich heritage need no longer prove a poor possession. The helpful teacher of the Old Testament now employs the higher achievements of Israel's religion as grave-diggers for the defunct moral crudities that have dropped by the way. The usual procedure has been to embalm them with a "Thus saith the Lord," and to carry them along until the living expire under the dead.

I cherish the modest hope that this book may help students and teachers of the Old Testament to find a new and securer place for it in the religious thought of our time. Although it embodies results of ten years of special study and practical experience in teaching, it still falls so far short of its simple purpose that I shall be the last to consider it blamed unduly if it meets with evil as well as good report.

The first draft of its contents was delivered eight years ago, at the Berkeley Summer School of Religion, as a series of lectures under the title, "The Idea of God in the Old Testament." Since then the scope of the book has been greatly amplified. If it comes as a tardy fulfilment of the expectations of my students and friends, I hope the maturer work which it embodies will prove a partial compensation for the delay.

It has been my constant endeavor to meet, as untechnically as possible, the difficulties of men and women to whom the Old Testament is still a valuable part of the Bible, but who find it an indigestible element in the Biblical rationale of their beliefs. In my own case, as in that of others who were brought up under the traditional view of the Scriptures, a frank evaluation of the morals of the Old Testament in the light of historical criticism has proved the only effective solvent. For this reason I have not been content merely to record facts, but have applied to them the moral judgments which lie implicit in the thought of moral progress. Not to make within the Bible those moral distinctions by which men now live their daily lives, is to cut it off from further participation in the vital concerns of mankind.

I have tried to keep the footnotes within as small a compass as possible, and yet to give the most essential evidence and references to literature. H. P. Smith's *Religion of Israel*, and J. P. Peters's *Religion of the Hebrews*, did not appear in time to be included among

the citations of literature. A selected bibliography covering the entire field of my investigations is in contemplation for the second volume. My original plan, to cover the whole period of Hebrew religious development in one volume, had to be abandoned in the interest of a fuller and more adequate treatment. The exilic and post-exilic period will, therefore, be treated separately.

More than ordinary attention has been devoted in this volume to a study of the decalogue. A first draft of my tentative conclusions was published in the *University of California Chronicle*, a little over a year ago, under the title, "The Decalogue a Problem in Ethical Development." Reprints of the article were sent to Old Testament scholars in all parts of the world with a request for an expression of opinion. There was a most generous response, which might have been even more complete had it not been for the outbreak of the great European war. The chapter on the decalogue has been rewritten and amplified in the light of this correspondence.

Now that a part, at least, of my task is completed, my grateful acknowledgments are due to John Wells Morss, of Boston, whose more than friendly interest and encouragement have been unfailing; to my colleagues, President Charles Sumner Nash and John Wright Buckham, for wise counsel which has ever been at my service; to Karl Marti, of the University of Berne, for many helpful suggestions; to Charles F.

Aked, Winston Churchill, and Charles Mills Gayley, for the advantage derived from friendly discussions of problems broached in my study; and to Miss Clara Lyford Smith for valuable suggestions in the last stages of my manuscript, for a verification of the Scripture references, and for the preparation of an index.

I feel prompted, also, to acknowledge a long-standing debt of gratitude to my former teachers at Yale: Professor Frank C. Porter, Frank Knight Sanders, and Edward L. Curtis. The last-named has passed on, but his well-remembered kindnesses and the charm of his spirit abide.

To her whose pure and radiant self is wrought into all this book contains of strength and truth and hope, I dedicate it with infinite regret that she was not destined to see finished what we planned together.

WILLIAM FREDERIC BADÈ.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA,
June, 1915.

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INTRODUCTION

Two views of the Old Testament still contend for mastery among the adherents of Christianity. The one regards it as a sort of talisman, miraculously given and divinely authoritative on the subject of God, religion, and morals, in every part. The other regards it as a growth, in which the moral sanctions of each stage of development were succeeded and displaced by the next higher one.

A former generation called into question chiefly the historical difficulties presented by the traditional view. The present generation is troubled by the crudity of its moral implications, and by what Matthew Arnold rather severely characterized as "its insane license of affirmation about God." Even the late Henry Drummond, who came close to the thinking youth of his day, observed that the difficulty which young men had in accepting the Old Testament was no longer intellectual, but moral.

Under the traditional scheme of the Bible its moral content is all of one piece. To quote one of its defenders, "The Bible itself knows of but one kind of inspiration, and that is an inspiration which extends to every chapter, verse, word, and syllable of the original Scriptures, using the mind and mouth, the heart and hand of the writers, guiding them in the least particu-

lar, guarding them against the least blunder, and making their utterance the very word of God to our souls. . . . The Scripture and the entire Scripture, claims to be, and is in fact, altogether exempt from errors or mistakes of any sort.”¹

A certain well-known Bible Institute, recently incorporated under the laws of California, contains the following item in its statement of doctrine: “The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are without error or misstatement in their moral and spiritual teachings and record of historical facts. They are without error or defect of any kind.” To this statement of belief “every officer, teacher, and worker must subscribe once a year,” and “failure to insist upon the promulgation of these doctrines . . . constitutes ground for suit for the reversion of money contributed for the erection of the building and the return of same to the original donors or their heirs.”

While he believes with the same intensity in the high mission of the Bible, the modern historical student cannot subscribe to any such view of its contents. He feels called of God to start with the facts, not with a dogma. Where the traditionalist sees one unbroken plain of heaven-descended perfect morality, the thoughtful man of to-day finds “a land of hills and valleys,” as the Deuteronomist said of Palestine. It is one thing to have a strong faith in the inspiration of the Bible; quite another, to make it serve in the place

¹ J. H. Brookes, *Anti-Higher Criticism*, p. 334.

of man's equally God-given intelligence. Jesus taught, and human history illustrates, the fact that men must struggle for the truths which they hope to possess. This was as true of the Israelites as of those who study the record of their struggle to-day. Refusal to recognize the obvious stages of moral progress by which Israel, under divine guidance, wrought out its high destiny, is not only to rob the Old Testament of its human interest and dramatic appeal, but to make it a serious stumbling-block to those who need its passion for righteousness in their own lives.

The real source of disorder in our religious education is this artificial doctrinal coördination of different stages of moral development, contained within the Bible. For while in most universities and theological seminaries the substance and spirit of Old Testament scholarship find expression in terms adequate to the intelligence and needs of our time, the great mass of religious instruction outside exhibits little more than forced accommodation to the new standards. The result is moral confusion, anguish of soul, and ultimate indifference. Granting that distinctions of fact underlie distinctions of worth, it scarcely is necessary to enlarge upon the viciousness of a method that ignores not only stages of religious development within the Old Testament, but loses sight also of essential differences between the Old and the New.

Until a substantial *moral* inequality between the Old and the New Testament is recognized in Biblical in-

struction, the student will have difficulty in seeing that the former is developmentally as well as historically subordinate to the latter. The differences between successive periods of Old Testament religion, and between the Old Testament as a whole and the New Testament as a whole, are differences of growth, and consequently of moral authoritativeness. With respect to much in Hebrew religion the student has done his full duty when he has traced its origin and assigned it a place in the development of human thought. There are intellectual conceptions, moral ideals, motives, and rites, which, in spite of their divine sanctions, have fortunately forever fallen below our moral horizon. With respect to still other areas of Old Testament thought, historical study will leave men disinclined to attempt any spiritual appropriation of what belongs so completely to the past. The process of discrimination involved in such study will free them from the false obligation to justify the unjustifiable, and in the language of Job, to "speak unrighteously for God." Their moral no less than their intellectual difficulties with the Bible will vanish in direct proportion to their willingness to make room for *the cancellations of development* in matters religious as well as scientific.

For a just appreciation of the facts of moral development in Hebrew religion, it is necessary to realize at the outset that religion and general culture were practically inseparable in antiquity. In their reactions upon each other this is true to-day. But the further one goes

back into the beginnings of human history, the more the different forms of authority which regulate men's actions are seen to merge into one. What we now call morals is in the earliest times represented by a body of tribal customs rigidly enforced upon all members of the community by discipline and habit. What we now call civil law is represented by a series of prohibitions and punishments unsparingly enforced by all members of the tribe upon the refractory. What we now call science is represented by a series of myths and legends, giving supernatural reasons for tribal customs and the fierceness with which any infractions of those customs were to be punished. What we now call religion was a part of all three sets of facts, and its chief practical manifestation was a disposition to provide existing practices with divine sanctions. Since religion in primitive times was not a body of abstract beliefs, but concretely a part of almost all that we would class as general culture in the form of tribal institutions and customs, and since primitive culture undeniably has, by a long process of evolution, developed into modern civilization, it follows inevitably that religion has shared with civilization this process of progressive development. It passed by stages from the crudest expressions of the religious instinct, in nature, ancestor, and fetish worship, to the exalted form in which it has expressed itself in the teachings of Jesus.

When, therefore, we speak of the development of morals and religion, or of the moral content of religion,

we are using an elliptical term and really mean the development of the morally religious man. The truth of this is obvious, and it implies that the development of the morally religious man is at the same time the development of the rational man, the artistic man, the civilized man. No less is the history of moral ideals in Hebrew religion a history of human growth, which exhibits on the one hand a process in man; on the other, a progress in idea and institution. The process is the growing fitness of the vehicle of revelation. The progress is the growing moral perfection of the religion. Needless to say, the conception of revelation that underlies this study regards it as an illumination from within, not as a communication from without; as an educative, not as an instructional, process.

The materials which must form the basis of our study lie embedded in the literature of the Old Testament. They are in the form of religious ideas, hopes, and rites, set forth in terms of Hebrew history, life, and institutions. This mass of ideas cannot, of course, be reduced to a systematic theology such as was formerly in fashion. One can trace the course of a river, but one may not treat it as a lake. So the religious progress of Israel may be traced like a river through the highlands and lowlands of Israel's literature. It may be described in order, but not set forth systematically as a unified theology. Obviously we must know the historical sequence in which that literature grew up, and the political and cultural environment which determined its changing social ideals, for

“ . . . every fiery prophet of old time,
And all the sacred madness of the bard,
When God made music through them, could but speak
His music by the framework and the chord.”

An enormous amount of critical acumen has been expended upon the literary analysis of the writings of the Old Testament with a view to determining the age, or relative chronology, of its several parts. That task may now be said to be accomplished; for the uncertainties that remain do not affect large issues. As a result of this analysis, verified by linguistics, by the history of laws and institutions, by the testimony of the monuments, and by our knowledge of the history of contemporary nations, the actual and approximate dates of the various books, and of literary strata within composite books, of the Old Testament, are now known with a remarkable degree of precision. This knowledge naturally has become the basis for a reinterpretation of Hebrew morals and religion in terms of development. It is unfortunate that the Psalms cannot be used with the same assurance as other parts of the Old Testament. Their individual dates are on the whole quite uncertain, and the evidence of religious experience, or doctrine, which they contain must, therefore, be adduced as auxiliary, rather than as fundamental. The reader may occasionally find advantage in getting his chronological bearings by reference to the following table. No attempt has been made to give analytical details. These will be found in various modern treatises on Old Testament Introduction.

Literary Chronology of the Old Testament

	B.C.
Moses (no authentic literary remains)	c. 1300-1200
Early traditions and songs	1200-1000
*J Document (Jahvist). Materials scattered through the Pentateuch and Joshua.	850
*E Document (Elohlist). Materials scattered through the Pentateuch and Joshua.	† 750
Amos and Hosea.	750- 735
Isaiah (authentic materials in chaps. 1-39).	740- 700
Micah, chaps. 1-3.	725- 690
J and E compiled into a single document.	c. 650
Nahum.	c. 650
Zephaniah	c. 630
*Deuteronomy (D) written about 650, published . .	† 621
Jeremiah (a great part consisting of later additions).	626- 586
Habakkuk	c. 600
<i>Babylonian Exile</i>	597- 538
Ezekiel.	592- 570
Lamentations.	586
Historical books up to Kings edited in the spirit of Deuteronomy.	600- 570
JE combined with D.	c. 560
Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah, chaps. 40-55).	c. 540
Haggai and Zechariah.	520
Trito-Isaiah (Isaiah, chaps. 56-66), mostly	500- 460
Job (containing later additions).	c. 450 or later
Psalms (collected, edited, in large part composed). .	520- 150
*Priests' Code (P), Leviticus, etc.	550-† 450
Malachi, Ruth, Joel, Jonah, Obadiah.	460- 350
Pentateuch completed (JEDP) by addition of P. .	c. 420
Chronicles and Ezra-Nehemiah.	350- 250
Song of Songs.	c. 350
Book of Proverbs (containing older materials). . . .	300
Ecclesiastes.	c. 250
Daniel.	c. 165
Esther.	c. 150

c. *circa*, about.

* Principal documents.

† Legal codes.

THE OLD TESTAMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJT = American Journal of Theology.
AOTB = Altorientalische Texte und Bilder.
AS = Alttestamentliche Studien.
HSAT = Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
LXX = The Septuagint, or Greek Version of the Old Testament.
OTSS = Old Testament and Semitic Studies.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
RGG = Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the Old Testament (Polychrome).
ThSK = Theologische Studien und Kritiken.
ZAW = Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY

CHAPTER I

THE OLD TESTAMENT UNDER SENTENCE OF LIFE

DURING the past generation there have been numerous proposals to eliminate the Old Testament from the religious education of the young. It is one of the ways in which the modern defection from traditionalism and authority in religion has manifested itself. The reasons most commonly urged for this step have been the following:—

1. That Christianity has no exclusive connection with Israelitish history and with Judaism. That the Jewish descent of Jesus in no way proves the dependence of the New Testament upon the Old. That in the realm of thought, Christianity was something entirely new and independent, having been prepared for quite as much by the great thinkers of Greece, Rome, and the non-Semitic Orient, as by the Hebrew prophets. That therefore it is both needless and useless to educate our youth into Christianity by the roundabout way of the Old Testament. That Paul's address at Athens, spoken to hearers who were not Jews, blazed the way for a more direct approach to the desired end.

2. That there is an element of danger in obliging the

youth of our day to hold ideal intercourse with men and women whose attitude toward life was totally different from ours, and whose social ethics stood upon a moral plane far beneath that of our time. That even the most persistent and violent exegetical and homiletical torture cannot make the Old Testament stories confess to moral standards which their writers did not know. That, in any case, it is mischievous to mingle without discrimination material from the Old and New Testaments because serious confusion of moral standards in the mind of the student is liable to ensue.

Let us concede at once that there is much truth in these objections. But they also contain a subtle admixture of error. It is true that we have ceased to regard the Old Testament as the only source of New Testament Christianity. Many other currents of thought and history have poured their contents into its channel. It is true that a considerable part of the Hebrew Scriptures, as will be seen, has not only ceased to exert a positive influence upon Christian thought, but is fraught with harm where it is set forth as possessing, or ever having possessed, divine sanction. In its fundamental conception of divine requirements the legal religion of the Old Testament is irreconcilably at variance with that of the pre-exilic prophets. The priestly ritual of Leviticus has no more right to be heard upon the moral questions of our age than the book of Esther, whose ethical standards are condemned outright by the teaching of Jesus.

But when these and similar deductions have been made, the fact remains that the Old Testament is the best introduction to the New. Christian doctrines can be fully understood and fairly judged only when seen in their historical perspective, and the Old Testament alone enables us to trace their origin and growth. In order to furnish this approach, however, the Old Testament cannot be used as a fixed body of truth standing *beside* the New Testament. It is the record of a moral struggle that lies *behind* the teaching of Jesus and the apostles, and even in its best parts it rarely rose above transient statements of moral truths and principles. The doctrinal coördination of the Old and New Testaments which still holds the ground in popular religious education, is the real grievance of objectors to the Old Testament. But their proffered remedy, to drop the Old Testament out of religious education, is worse than the disorder. It would break the bond of historical continuity. Doctrinal coördination should give place to historical subordination in which the principle of development, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear," receives adequate recognition. With the adoption of this attitude toward the Bible as a whole, and the Old Testament in particular, the objections mentioned above are vacated. *For the harm lies not in dealing with imperfect moral standards, but in failure to recognize them as imperfect.*

It would be both unscientific and unreasonable to expect on the part of Israel's religious leaders knowl-

edge of the laws of evolution in advance of man's scientific study of the facts of nature and of life. It does not seem to be God's way anywhere to endow men miraculously with information which the exercise of faculties he has given them is sufficient to secure. Still, the fact that religion has shared with other interests of the human spirit the struggle from lower to higher levels did not altogether escape the attention of Biblical writers.

The unknown author of the Epistle to the Hebrews declared that "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets, in many fragments and in many fashions, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son." What is fragmentary is not perfect. What is varied in fashion is not the result of divine experiment, but expresses the diversified abilities of God's spokesmen in different times and different cultural environments. They differed among themselves because each man had to answer according to his ability the particular questions which his own times were putting. The statement implies a progressive revelation, the growth of the knowledge of God among men.

The example and the teaching of the Christ determined the moral level upon which the gains of the future were to be made. The founders of Christianity recognized in his coming the culmination of the historical process, but not its ending. The writer of the Gospel of John was far along upon the stream of events,

but he still saw it flowing directly out of the thought of Jesus, for he attributed to him the statement: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth." There were human limits to a divine revelation, and the barriers were destined to fall only before the larger knowledge that answers a deeper need. Nineteen centuries of Christian thought and experience have become tributary to this ampler knowledge of God, and still the stream is widening on its way through broader valleys of human experience.

A study of what are held to be genuine sayings of Jesus shows that he regarded the Jewish Scriptures of his time as a preparation for himself. In other words, they were transitory in relation to himself — subject to the cancellations of development. New Testament scholars are beginning to doubt the genuineness of the saying: "Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law until all be accomplished." It is in flat contradiction with the general tenor of Jesus' teaching. But even if it were accepted, it would have to be read in the light of his definition of what he meant by the Law, as when he said: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." Again: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy

neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments the whole Law hangeth, and the Prophets." Reference to the chapter entitled "The Social Ethics of Deuteronomy" will show how little the real Law had in common with this lofty evaluation of its essence. It was a virtual rejection, as wrong or irrelevant, of more than seventy-five per cent of what the Jewish doctors understood by the Law. In the face of such a fact it is superfluous to inquire what becomes of the jot and the tittle of ritual punctiliousness, or of that Bible letter-worship in the interest of which the passage is often quoted.

There were other occasions on which Jesus rejected parts of the Law. Some of its precepts He interpreted far beyond their literal and original meaning, in order to bring them up to his loftier moral standard. And there were times when he directed his conduct in superb indifference to its most explicit demands. He abrogated the commandment "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." In substituting unqualified non-resistance and forgiveness he was replacing revenge with redemptive justice, which differs more in kind than in degree. When he declared that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath, he disavowed what was most characteristic in the Old Testament conception of the Sabbath. In regard to divorce, he boldly challenged the provision of the Mosaic Law, saying that it was a half-measure accommodated to the moral capacity of the people; that it

could not claim to be an expression of the will of God, — and this notwithstanding the fact that it is found among precepts for which Deuteronomy claims divine authority.

Finally, nothing could be more revolutionary than his opposition to the cleansing ordinances of the Law, when he declared, "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him."¹ This statement strikes hard at the regulations of ritual purity that form so large a part of the priestly religion of the Old Testament. It is not surprising that One who maintained such utter moral independence of the Mosaic Law should on one occasion have ascribed the character of transitoriness to the entire Scriptures of his time: "The Law and the Prophets were until John: from that time the gospel of the kingdom of God is preached."² The occasional obedience which the synoptic tradition reports him to have rendered to some formal rules, must be accounted for on the ground of expediency, not of principle. Since expediency derives its warrant from circumstances, it is relative and transient, and must alter with changes of time and place.

The liberty and duty of moral criticism of the Old Testament, therefore, has been bequeathed to the Church by Jesus himself. By his supreme indifference to many observances of the Old Testament, by his deliberate transgression of others, by his criticism of its ethics and morality as inadequate, by his recognition

¹ Mark 7: 15.

² Luke 16: 16.

of its transitory character, as also by his failure to bequeath commands about circumcision, sacrifice, or temple-worship, Jesus inaugurated that higher life of the spirit to which the Old Testament could serve only as a stepping-stone. To the assumption and exhibition of the idea of development, as applied to the Old Testament, we, therefore, have a right to add its assertion by One who could correct with final principles what "was said to them of old time." It should be noted, however, that his denial of finality to the Old Testament was combined with an attitude of reverence toward it as the record of a splendid struggle after God which he had come to fulfil. He looked not back but forward, and putting his hand to the plough, drove it deep through the hardened crust of barren tradition, and placed the Old Testament under sentence of life.

Passing to the apostles one finds, strangely enough, that they narrowed the scope of criticism, if they did not deny it altogether. They apparently accepted the moral criticism applied to the Old Testament by Jesus, but they also believed in the literal inspiration of the text. A thorough comprehension and acceptance of Jesus' principles would have prevented the apostles from binding themselves and their converts once more to the letter of the Jewish Scriptures. They did not, could not, fully comprehend. They accepted their Master's moral appraisal of Old Testament teaching and institutions, but with it accepted also the rigid

letter-worship of the Jewish doctors of their time. Two things so absolutely at variance with each other could not long coexist without conflict. So it came about that what at first tended to silence critical inquiry eventually raised critical questions even more acute than those of the Old Testament itself. The moral criticism applied to the Old Testament by Jesus implies our right to employ textual, historical, and philosophical criticism. On the other hand, modern historical criticism of the Old Testament has furnished new warrant for his moral criticism, by relegating to the realm of historical fiction many a story and incident formerly quoted by literalists in support of ethically questionable doctrines and beliefs.

The Old Testament, no less than the New, contains a record of religious experience. Men have called it a revelation. It will be apparent that under a modern world-view, and in the light of the considerations adduced above, the word "revelation" requires a new interpretation. There is no authoritative definition of the word by the Church. Were we to follow John Stuart Mill's prescription for such cases our definition ought to come at the end and not at the beginning of our study. Bishop Butler's observation, that men are not competent judges beforehand of what may be expected in the content of a revelation, applies equally to the method of revelation. Considerable light will be thrown upon the method of revelation in the course of our discussions, especially in the chapter on Isaiah,

though this is not the end toward which the work is directed. But there are reasons why it is desirable to come to an understanding at this point concerning the meaning of a term which, for want of a less ambiguous substitute, we shall occasionally be forced to employ.

The word "revelation" carries a fairly definite meaning in popular usage. According to this meaning, which formerly expressed accurately enough the prevailing thought, "Revelation is the communication to men, by some external agency, of truths which they could not arrive at by internal processes of their own minds." This, substantially, is Trench's definition in his "Study of Words": "God's revelation of himself is a drawing back of the veil or curtain which concealed him from men; not man finding out God, but God discovering himself to man." It is tantamount to saying, revelation is instruction, not education, or experience.

Against the word "revelation" so understood we wish to enter an early protest. Thoughtful men everywhere are abandoning this old conception, which came in as a correlate to the transcendent idea of God, and to a world-view that has been outgrown. A God apart from the world was necessarily believed to reveal himself from without, objectively. The older apologists also identified revelation with the entire contents of the Bible, sought external supports for revelation in miracle and prediction, and depreciated the function of reason as an organ of knowledge. This interpretation of revelation in terms of information about ritual

requirements, and relatively petty matters, by means of divination, dreams, and prediction, can no longer hold the attention of serious-minded men. It was part of a framework of thought about a world created by fiat, recent in origin, small in extent, corrupt in nature, degenerative in its history, and subject to miraculous interferences with its laws.

It is a different world of thought in which men are now living. There are no limits to our universe, no anticipated end to its duration. It is "dynamic in all its elements, law-abiding in all its forces and areas, developing through an immanent process of evolution by resident forces, and moving on to a far-off divine event when the purposes of God will be realized in a perfected humanity."¹ The change from transcendence to immanence in our thought of God has involved the corresponding transition from an objective to a subjective theory of revelation. Hence for our time and for our purposes the word "revelation" is used to describe a process almost the reverse of what is commonly understood by it. Not through the medium of external agencies, but in and through personality does God reveal himself to men. The divine Reason within man "is the candle of the Lord." Conscience and intellect are God's prophets to the soul. Formerly credited with a secondary, or even antagonistic, function, they are now seen to be of supreme importance. Hegel, with a

¹ Daniel Evans, *Divine Revelation and the Christian Religion*. Dudleian Lecture, Harvard University, 1912.

close approximation to the Apostle Paul, said: "The spirit of man whereby he knows God is simply the Spirit of God himself." With less of Hegelian pantheism, John Caird writes: "Reason, following in the wake of faith, grasps the great conception that the religious life is at once human and divine — the conception that God is a self-revealing God, . . . and that the highest revelation of God is the life of God in the soul of man." In the words of Daniel Evans, "The ultimate reality registers itself in the human consciousness. Revelation is not in the outer realm, but in the inner through the outer. . . . The religious progress of the race means an ever-deepening experience of the incoming of this divine reality into its life, an increasingly higher level of interests on which the divine and human meet, a constantly growing spiritualization of the media through which the divine comes, and a progressively larger interpretation of the meaning of this experience."¹ Different thinkers state their view of the process somewhat differently, but they are agreed in saying that revelation is a divine illumination from within, and not a communication from without; that while the religious experience which we call revelation may come in a great variety of forms, it must own brotherhood with other experiences, and come to the mind in conformity with the normal functioning of its powers.

¹ Daniel Evans, *Divine Revelation and the Christian Religion*. Dudleian Lecture, Harvard University, 1912.

Did the limits which we have set ourselves for this discussion permit a further pursuit of this subject, it would be easy to show that this is precisely the view of revelation implied in the teaching of Jesus. Besides, it is the only theory that is compatible with unity, with continuity, and with the idea of development. What is still more striking, it will become perfectly clear in the course of our investigation that even the Old Testament, though seemingly supporting the older, external view of revelation, implicitly compels us to abandon the same. For again and again it will be found that the thing represented as an event, or phenomenon, in the natural world, was really in its origin an inner fact of consciousness, externalized and interpreted as a fact of the phenomenal world — an inevitable concession to primitive modes of thought and to the unconscious demand for concreteness during the earlier stages of religion. The voice in the garden, the divine visitors at Mamre, the burning bush, the physical manifestations and thunderous deliverances on Mount Sinai, the tables of stone themselves, belong to the poetry, to the religious psychology, of Israel's religion, not to the historical facts of its history. As an incidental proof of this statement it may be remarked that in the course of centuries the content of prophetic preaching changed, and the prophets gradually modified their view of the manner in which God was thought to reveal his will to them. In other words, the Hebrew conception of revelation itself underwent a development which was

conditioned by the advance of Israel's culture. Discussion of details of this development will be more appropriate in connection with the work of Isaiah.

That the laws which are found to have controlled the growth of Israel's moral and religious ideals are essentially the same as those with whose operation we are acquainted elsewhere should occasion no surprise. Just as the occurrence of some elements of the Mosaic Law in the Code of Hammurabi, older than Moses by a thousand years, shows that Hebrew codifiers founded their legislative system upon the proved experience of past generations, so the study of Semitic origins has shown that a number of religious practices and institutions, once believed to be the peculiar possession of the Hebrews, were known and practised centuries before this gifted people made them a part of their own religious economy. It is precisely what our belief in the genetic unity of all religion, and in the continuity of its development, would lead us to expect. Nor does this fact furnish cause for fear lest the discovery of such genetic relationships undermine faith in the objects of religion and in the reality of revelation. What it does undermine is a theory of revelation which an appeal to the facts of experience does not sustain, and which in the interest of sound religious progress should no longer be suffered to go unchallenged.

It is a common observation that people will cling to a religious belief even though the reasons urged for it have been abandoned as unsound. It may be that the

belief is true and that the real reasons for it are different from those which have been alleged. But while it is not logical to conclude that a belief cannot be true because it has been believed for mistaken reasons, in actual experience distrust always spreads from the reasons to the belief. It will be seen that this is a fact of sinister aspect. The defence of truth by means of untruth is one of the most serious obstacles which the Church of our day has to overcome. If the reason alleged for one's faith is unreason to the common intelligence, or a denial of generally accepted facts, the cause of truth is served with something like the famous wooden horse which the Trojans dragged as a palladium into their city — to find it filled with enemies.

CHAPTER II

MORAL BEGINNINGS OF HEBREW RELIGION

CONTEMPORARY literature is the only reliable source for the study of morals and religion in any age that is past. Inquiry for the religion of Moses, therefore, resolves itself at once into the question whether we possess authentic Mosaic documents, or even traditions of contemporary origin. Probably few Old Testament scholars would now venture to claim a genuinely Mosaic origin for even the smallest literary fragments of the Pentateuch. It is quite unlikely, too, that any non-Mosaic traditions have come down unchanged from the time of the desert wanderings. Of Hebrew literature earlier than the ninth or tenth century B.C. only small fragments survive, and these are almost entirely in the form of songs. Such fragments are the Song of Deborah, in part; David's lament over Saul and Jonathan; the Song of the Well; parts of Jacob's Blessing; Jotham's Fable, and the speeches of Balaam.

If it is impossible to get back to the time of Moses by means of authentic writings, our historical information about the religion of the patriarchal period is even more nebulous, because it deals with a past still more remote. The fact is that the earliest cycles of tradition about the patriarchs, the exodus, and Moses were collected and edited for the first time during the ninth and

eighth centuries B.C., about five hundred years after the time of Moses. The collection of traditions made in Judah is known as J; the one made in the north, in Ephraim, is designated by the symbol E, and their compilers are known as the Jahvist and Elohist respectively. Both exhibit to some extent the point of view of the earlier prophets and are, therefore, known as the prophetic documents. About 650 B.C. they were compiled into a single document (JE) and suffered considerably in the process, from expurgation, editing, and harmonizing. A hundred years later they were subjected to a still more thorough revision at the hands of Deuteronomic editors. After two more centuries had rolled by they were incorporated into the framework of the Priests' Code, and received the most radical — perhaps one should say most distorting — revision of all.

This obviously is an extremely condensed statement of the very complex literary history of the two earliest cycles of Hebrew tradition. Reference to the chronological table in the Introduction will help to fix the relation of this history to the origin of other Old Testament books. During the intervals between the successive revisions new generations of prophets and religious leaders arose, delivered their messages, and departed; but not without contributing something to the cause of Israel's advancement in morals and religion. The various revisers of the old traditions sought to bring them up to date, to adapt them to the religious needs and

understanding of their own times. This, be it observed, was done several times.

The purpose of the redactors was laudable, but it has added greatly to the confusion and uncertainties that confront the student of the Old Testament. Does he want to find out what Moses said and believed? The earliest traditions about him were written down by men who lived half a millennium after his time. These collectors were no historians. The art of writing history, like every other art, was itself the product of subsequent ages of growing culture. To what extent did they naïvely attribute to Abraham and Moses the religious ideas of their own time? It is a deep-seated conviction of Old Testament scholars that the JE traditions are direct sources for the religion of Israel only as it was at the time of the writers and collectors. The next question is how much remains unaltered even of these traditions after so many successive editings? The answer may be found in most modern works on Old Testament Introduction, or in such a work as Kent's "Student's Old Testament." Thanks to the method pursued by the ancient compilers it has been possible by careful critical analysis to identify extensive fragments of the JE traditions embedded in later compilations of the historical Old Testament books.

During the oral transmission of traditions the adaptive changes were made constantly and almost automatically, for the folk-mind does not transmit anything that has ceased to reflect living interests. Fix-

ation in writing stopped this process, except in so far as it was continued by editors and compilers. But even the work of selection and omission on the part of compilers becomes tendentious and interpretative. What was omitted probably was as important for our knowledge of the times as what was preserved. Indeed, the expurgations probably included the more valuable data regarding earlier times — motives, customs, actions, beliefs that had grown out of joint with the national hopes and religious feeling of a new age. We must be content to indicate here in only the briefest way what is meant.

Two fragments of tradition, one that the ancient social-religious groups of shepherds, musicians, and smiths traced their descent through Lamech, and the other, that the giants whom the spies found in Palestine were the off-spring of angel marriages mentioned in the sixth chapter of Genesis, are of course irreconcilable with the tradition according to which Noah and his family were the only survivors of the flood. Yet the editors selected, expurgated, and harmonized these traditions into a superficial unity. But there remain these telltale chips from blocks of primitive tradition rejected by compilers. It was a compiler who identified the Noah of the flood with the Noah of viticulture. In the original traditions they undoubtedly were two entirely different persons. The story of Cain and Abel is only a torso. Why did the compilers not preserve it in its original form? Was it Deuteronomic editors who

suppressed the story of Shiloh's destruction? In Jeremiah's time it still was so well known that he could point a moral for his enemies with an allusion to the disaster. But not a word of it has come down to us in the historical books. These and many similar facts are significant.

We have said that the fragmentary traditions of J and E can be used as *direct* sources only for the time when they were first fixed in writing. It would be more correct to say that they are direct sources of information only for that side of their religion and traditional history which the early bibliographers permit us to see. One scarcely dares to guess how important a part of the literary record is gone forever.

But the extant traditions can fortunately be used as *indirect* sources of information about the religion and customs of Israel in pre-Davidic, and even pre-Mosaic times. It is a well-known fact, illustrated in the history of different religions, that primitive conceptions of God and duty survive in their effects and often in their original form in later stages of religious development. We may feel certain that by the aid of such data, corroborated by evidence derived from the ideas of kindred peoples in similar political conditions, we can obtain at least inferential knowledge of Israel's moral beginnings before the time of Moses.

Such sifting is delicate work and the conclusions which the investigator reaches cannot be advanced with the same assurance as when the testimony of the sources

is direct. The most useful and reliable distinguishing mark between earlier and later elements of tradition in J and E is afforded by the unanimous testimony of Hebrew tradition that the Israelite tribes were nomads and half-nomads when they entered Palestine. Since our sources belong to the period when the bulk of Israel's population dwelt in cities and pursued agricultural occupations, evidence of nomadic customs and points of view must be a survival from an earlier period. The line between nomadism and agriculture, between Bedawin and Fellahin, was sharply drawn in antiquity. They differed in social customs and in religion. Nomads scorned intermarriage with farmers and half-nomads, and there were never-ending feuds between them. What chiefly characterized the nomad was intense regard for the bonds of blood kinship, for the ceremonies and rights of hospitality, and a ruthless Ishmaelitism toward all strangers. The gradual transition from the nomadic to the agricultural mode of life, and the profound changes which it entailed for the religion of Israel, are discussed in a more appropriate connection in the chapter on "The Monojahvism of Deuteronomy." We shall here consider established the conclusions set forth in that chapter.

We shall have to pause a moment, however, to make sure that we are on the right road to the true meaning of early Hebrew institutions and beliefs. A modern explorer, faced with the same task in the case of a newly discovered tribe, or people, would immedi-

ately proceed to acquaint himself with the social organization in all its forms. Only by studying the externals of the life of man in society is it possible to get at the corresponding subjective states which we call beliefs. One must work up to the beliefs by way of the customs.

Close scrutiny of the forms of social organization shows that physical necessity and intelligent purpose have been interpenetrating factors in their production. Besides, one must not overlook the fact that the physical necessities which determine the desert nomad's life are different from those which enter into the life of any other kind of nomad. To ignore this fact is to confuse the truly unique Bedawin nomads with the pastoral nomads found in other parts of the world. The life of pastoral nomads corresponds more nearly to that of Semitic half-nomads. The Semitic desert nomads were a very different people. It is important, therefore, to consider at this point the leading social characteristics of the three classes of persons described as nomads (Bedawin), half-nomads, and farmers (Fellahin).

Bedawin or desert nomads. The Arabian and Syro-Arabian deserts still furnish examples of the pure Bedawi nomad. On the arid steppes over which he roams conditions of climate and country determine his mode of life as inevitably now as they did three thousand years ago. The camel is his chief, if not his only, dependence. Dates and camel's milk are his staple diet. Such were the nomads whom Schumacher en-

countered in the region east of the Jordan and described as follows: "The Bedawin distinguish sharply between *Arab* and *Bedu*. The former live partly in fixed abodes and incline toward agriculture. The latter are the real inhabitants of the desert who regard the pursuit of agriculture as a disgrace. They breed only camels and live on dates and camel's milk. They scarcely know what bread is." Scarcity of water and pastures prevent the typical nomad from keeping donkeys, cattle, sheep, and goats. A good part of his living is obtained by raids into cultivated territory, and by the exaction of tribute from farmers, herdsmen, and caravans.¹ Under these conditions he must be prepared to move rapidly from place to place. The tent becomes his characteristic shelter and the camel his only reliance in forced marches between distant oases, or on marauding expeditions.

Under the nomadic ideal of life the drinking of wine was strongly tabooed. Wine was an agricultural product whose uses and effects, unfamiliar to the Bedawin, excited their disgust. A native inscription on an altar erected by a Nabataean in Palmyra is dedicated to "The good and rewarding god who drinks no wine."² This agrees with the observation of Hieronymus of Cardia, made in 312 B.C., that the Nabataeans "live

¹ Egyptian inscriptions speak of "sand-dwellers," "sand-rovers," or simply of "robbers." Similarly the ideogram SA.GAZ of the Amarna letters, standing for a people now certainly identified with the *Habiru*, is rendered by *habbatum*, a "plunderer," "robber," or "nomad." Cf. Böhl, *Kanaanäer u. Hebräer*.

² Littman, *Journal Asiatique*, ser. IX, vol. 18, p. 382 ff.

under the open sky . . . and it is a matter of law among them not to sow grain, nor to cultivate fruit-bearing plants, nor to drink wine, nor to build a house. Failure to conform to this law is punished with death.”¹

Mohammed’s imposition of entire abstinence from wine upon the adherents of Islam was probably the revival of an ancient and deep-seated Bedawi aversion, and not a reaction, as some have claimed, against Judaism and early Christianity. It is an act which must be judged in the light of general Semitic nomad customs and feeling. Sir Richard Burton, in describing his pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Mecca, observed that “in the Desert spirituous liquors excite only disgust.”

The following pertinent observations on nomadism and agriculture have been made by P. Antonin Jausen, active for many years as missionary among the Arabs in the land of Moab: —

“The distinction between *fellah* and *bedawi* is rigidly maintained among the tribes which we are discussing. The former is attached to the soil; he plows it with his own hands, cultivates it, and watches over it; that is his occupation, his profession; he is an agriculturist. The *bedawi*, or inhabitant of the desert, does not put his hand to the plow; that is not work worthy of his person, nor of his independence. He pretends to be a free man, master of his movements, going and coming

¹ Diod. xix, 94.

after his manner on his noble courser. He conducts predatory raids and makes war; he raises herds of sheep, and especially of camels. As for driving animals in harness along a furrow — he will not lower himself to that extent. Such is the Bedawin estimate of work in the fields. They regard it as employment fit for slaves, or for persons of inferior rank.”¹

There are marked characteristics which distinguish Semitic nomads in their social organization. The most salient fact about this social organization is its practical identity with kinship organization. But kinship, as here used, must be distinguished from consanguinity. Under the latter reckoning a man's kin includes both his father's and his mother's people. But the type of kinship with which we are here dealing includes one side only — that of the father. The bonds of this patrilineal blood-kinship are very closely drawn, and the obligation of blood-feud for murderous attacks made by outsiders against a member of the kinship group are inescapable and inexorable. “A Bedawi will take his blood-revenge after forty years,” says an Arabic proverb. Although it was anciently customary to pay and accept a hundred camels in composition of a murder, it was considered more honorable not to accept “the price of blood,” but to retaliate by taking the life of the murderer, or of one of his kinsmen. Among modern Bedawin the obligation to avenge a murder descends to the fifth generation, and the “debt

¹ *Coutumes des Arabes* (1908), p. 240.

of blood" is inherited by the murderer's clan for the same number of generations.

Among themselves the Bedawin are rigidly just and entertain romantic conceptions of honor. But any stranger may be ruthlessly robbed and slain if he has not been received as a guest or a client. "If thou meetest a stranger, strike him to the heart. If he were worth anything, he would have remained at home"; so runs another Arabic proverb. It is the counterpart of exiled Cain's complaint that whosoever finds him will slay him. In fact a man who had quit his clan and country was almost always one who had been banished for a misdeed.

We possess but scanty knowledge of the religion of the Bedawin of pre-Islamic Arabia. It is known, however, that tree-worship existed among them. The tree-cult which survives in Syria and Arabia to the present day, therefore, originated in remote antiquity. The pre-Islamic goddess Uzzah, for instance, was worshipped in the form of three trees.

But the most characteristic feature of the cultus of ancient Arabia was the worship of sacred stones. Herodotus is our earliest witness for the Arab custom of establishing blood-brotherhood by smearing sacred stones with blood drawn from the hands of the contracting parties.¹ Upright slabs of stone called *nuṣub*, or *manṣab*, formed an essential part of the religion of the Arabs. These steles evidently corresponded to the

¹ Herodotus, III, 3.

Hebrew *maššebas*, or pillars. They served as a kind of altar, and the blood of the sacrificial victim was smeared upon them. Like the Hebrews, the Arabs were accustomed to sacrifice the firstlings of their flocks and herds, and to pour the blood over sacred stones.¹ The black stone in the wall of the Kaaba, adopted by Islam, is only a survival of numerous sacred stones of ancient Arabia that served as fetishes or dwelling places for a divine power.²

Half-nomads. This term is not strictly accurate, but has been much used of late to describe classes of persons who occupy a transitional stage of development between pure nomadism and agriculture. They are chiefly shepherds and herdsmen who occasionally combine a little farming with their stock-breeding. They are found chiefly along the edges of the desert and cannot always be sharply distinguished from pure nomads, since they sometimes keep camels as well as cattle and sheep. The tradition which makes Jabal the "father of such as dwell in tents and have cattle" apparently saw in him the ancestor of nomads as well as of half-nomads. Failure to distinguish between the two may, indeed, indicate that the writer was acquainted only with half-nomads.

The conditions of pasturage in many parts of Palestine were such that half-nomads, also, had to move

¹ Cf. I Sam. 14: 32-35, where it is deemed a grievous thing to slaughter "on the ground," and "a great stone" is provided by Saul for the proper disposition of the blood.

² Cf. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*, p. 102.

from place to place. Since flocks and herds have to be watered every day, springs and wells were of supreme importance. Hebrew tradition pictures the patriarchs and the sons of Jacob as half-nomads. Abraham and Lot, Jacob and Laban, had their quarrels about pastures and watering-places. Certain pasture lands with their wells belonged to particular tribal groups, and compacts were made between neighboring clans to safeguard against encroachment upon each other's territory. As a rule half-nomads are disposed to yield a point in the interest of peace, for they hazard all their possessions in a feud. Hebrew tradition accords with this fact in that it represents the patriarchs as peace-loving men.

For their living half-nomads, as a rule, were dependent upon the milk obtained from their sheep and goats. There was very little slaughtering of animals for food. Only for the celebration of religious feast-days, or for the entertainment of guests, were animals slaughtered. Every such killing of an animal was a religious act, a sacrifice. The firstlings of the flock were invariably devoted to this purpose. Where the conditions were favorable, half-nomads engaged in a little agriculture and established temporarily fixed abodes. As a rule they lived in tents. In common with farmers, half-nomads were exposed to the raids of nomadic Bedawin and lived at enmity with them.

Fellahin or farmers. During the historical period covered by the Old Testament the great mass of the

Israelites were agriculturists. A certain amount of stock-breeding probably was practised in connection with farming in most parts of Palestine. Only in those parts of the land which were unsuited to agriculture did the raising of sheep and cattle maintain itself as a distinct occupation. Even the earliest traditions and laws of Israel testify to a time when agriculture was the normal occupation of an Israelite. If Jahveh¹ ever was the tribal deity of nomadic Bedawin who despised farmers and farming, shunned settled abodes, and abhorred wine, that period is no longer within the memory of Hebrew tradition. Half-nomadism is the only stage of previous development which is postulated, as in the case of the patriarchs. The first man is put into a garden "to dress it and to guard it." His expulsion from Eden still leaves him a farmer under aggravated conditions. Even Cain is assumed to have been a farmer before the curse of Jahveh made him a nomad.

The earliest collections of laws, both in J and in E, are replete with agricultural sanctions and regulations. The Book of the Covenant (Ex. 20:22-23:33) contains much that is applicable to the life of half-nomads, a fact which is quite intelligible if this group of laws was collected in the grazing regions of the northern kingdom among men like Amos of Tekoa. But the code was not intended for shepherds and herdsmen only. The numerous regulations about fields, har-

¹ For use of "Jahveh" instead of "Jehovah" see Note A, Appendix.

vests, vineyards, and olive yards reveal an unmistakable background of agricultural life.

The belief that Jahveh himself furnished instruction in husbandry,¹ or could appear as the planter of a vineyard,² or require wine as a constant item of the sacrificial offerings, is utterly incongruous with nomadic ideas and ideals. But the Jahvist, in the story of Noah's discovery of wine, regards the products of viticulture as a source of comfort "from the ground which Jahveh hath cursed."³ The feast of tabernacles was the greatest and most joyous of the three agricultural festivals. It was celebrated in the vineyards, about the wine-presses, in autumn. The feast of unleavened bread, and the feast of weeks, marking respectively the beginning of the barley, and the end of the wheat harvest, were the other two festivals. The fact that every Israelite was solemnly enjoined "to appear before Jahveh" on these three agricultural *haggim* (sacrificial feasts) shows how far Jahvism had developed away from the life and religious ideals of the steppes. Jahveh had become the patron of agriculture, and if he ever was the patron of nomadism the fact had grown so dim in tradition that even Moses is naïvely made into a promulgator of agricultural sanctions.

Bearing in mind the social differences, pet aversions, and religious tendencies of the three classes described above, we may now take up the question of nomadic survivals in Hebrew tradition. We must assume that

¹ Is. 28: 26.

² Is. 5: 1-7.

³ Gen. 5: 29; cf. 9: 20-27.

at some point in their history the Hebrews or their ancestors were nomads and possessed a religion suited to their condition, though the vestiges of that religion are neither sufficient in number nor distinct enough in character to enable us to describe it with any assurance. It will be sufficient to point out the most probable survivals, grouping them for convenience under the following heads: —

1. *Objects of worship and forms of ritual*

There are remnants of polydemonism in the Old Testament which are best explained as survivals from a pre-Mosaic clan life in the desert and on the steppes. The oak of the oracle beside Joseph's grave at Shechem, the terebinths at Hebron, and the tamarisk at Beersheba, are examples of sacred trees in which divinities were believed to reside. We have noted that this tree-cult survives to the present day in Syria and Arabia, and probably differs in no essential particulars from that of antiquity. Analogous developments in other religions suggest that during the pre-Deuteronomic period the *baals* of famous sacred trees were frequently individualized as local Jahvehs, or as the numina of venerated ancestors. The sacred pole known as the *asherah* probably was in its origin a conventionalized sacred tree.

Holy stones constitute another class of natural objects that play a prominent part in the religion of the Semites. One interesting passage of E mentions such a

stone as having been erected under a sacred oak in the sanctuary of Jahveh at Shechem. Joshua there said to the people, "Behold, this stone shall be a witness against us; for *it hath heard* all the words of Jahveh which he spake unto us."¹ The stone was conceived to be the abode of a spirit. A similar thought probably prompted the libation of oil poured by Jacob upon the stone which he calls Beth-El, "house of a divinity." "This stone, which I have set up for a *masseba*, shall be God's house"² (Beth-Elohim). The common use of the appellation "Rock"³ in the sense of "God," even in later Hebrew literature, finds its explanation in these early beliefs. Since the same usage and beliefs are attested for the Aramæans and for the Arabs of southern Arabia it is reasonable to assume for them a common origin among nomadic Semites.

Holy mountains play a large part in the religion of the Semites. Since in Hebrew the same word, *Sur*, is used as an appellative for God and for rocky mountain heights we may assume that holy stones and holy mountains were kindred objects in popular religious thought. Hebrew tradition locates the cradle of Jahvism on Sinai-Horeb, and in the Song of Deborah Jahveh comes marching from Mount Sinai to aid the hosts of Israel. Tabor, Hermon, Carmel, and especially Mount Zion, figure as holy mountains in the religion of

¹ Josh. 24: 26, 27.

² Gen. 28: 22. The El(=divinity) is identified with Elohim (God).

³ Dt. 32: 15; Ps. 62: 2. *Sur* is compounded with *Shaddai* in Num. 1: 6, *Sur-shaddai*, "My Rock is Shaddai." Greek writers mention "stones with souls" (*lithoi empsychoi*) as playing a part in Syrian cults.

Israel. It was not an inappropriate observation, therefore, when the Syrians said, "Jahveh is a God of the mountains."¹ Since in the religion of the Semites gods have from the earliest times been owners and residents of mountains, this feature of Jahvism may be a survival.

The importance of springs to nomads and half-nomads has already been mentioned. As a natural consequence they, too, were brought into relation to the deity. The Old Testament mentions a valley called Yiphtach-El, "God opens," which doubtless refers to the potency of a sacred spring believed to be a cure for childlessness.² The Fountain of Judgment at Kadesh Barnea was the seat of an oracle of Jahveh.³ The leading characteristics of the sanctuaries of Beersheba and Beer-lahai-roi were their sacred springs, as the names indicate. Among curious old superstitious customs, surviving among the priestly laws of the Pentateuch, is an ordeal prescribed for the detection of adultery in a woman.⁴ She is required to drink a potion of sacred water, presumably taken from a spring like those mentioned. The potency of the water is increased by the addition of dust from the floor of the sanctuary and the ink in which the curse has been written. This mode of detecting guilt through sacred water magic is so common among Arab nomads

¹ I Kings 20:28; cf. vs. 23.

² Josh. 19:14, 27. Cf. Bertholet, *Schweiz. Archiv f. Volkskunde*, vol. XVII.

³ Gen. 14:7.

⁴ Num. 5:11-31.

to the present day that we are doubtless dealing here with a custom dating from nomadic times. In the light of these facts it is significant that Hebrew tradition brings Moses into connection with two places near the *Fountain of Judgment*, known respectively as the *Place of Testing* and the *Place of Litigation* — Massah and Meribah.¹

The origin of the ark of Jahveh is shrouded in mystery. But Gressmann's careful analysis of the Mosaic traditions increases the probability of its nomadic origin. The elaborate cultus, tabernacle, and rules of "holiness," with which P surrounds the ark, are now generally regarded as the product of later ritual theories projected back into the Mosaic past. But E's account of a plain tent with its portable shrine, guarded by Joshua in person, corresponds to the circumstances of nomadic times. The oldest references to its use represent it as a kind of fetish which was employed to seek out a camping-site for the Israelites in the desert.² The presence of Jahveh was identified with it, for Moses invoked it in the morning with the words: "Arise, O Jahveh, and let thine enemies be scattered, and let them that hate thee flee before thee." When it came to rest at night he said: "Return, O Jahveh, to the myriads of Israel."³ The Books of Samuel furnish other striking evidence of the identification of the ark with Jahveh's actual presence.⁴ The Israelite use of

¹ Ex. 17:2, 7.

² Num. 10:35, 36.

³ Num. 10:33.

⁴ I Sam. 4:7; II Sam. 6:2, 5, 16.

the ark in battle strongly resembles a practice which survives in Arabia to-day. What seem to be remnants of former shrines are mounted upon camels and taken into action as an incitement for the warriors.¹

2. *Survivals of family institutions*

We have established the fact that the social organization of Semitic nomads was a family organization based on patrilineal descent. The same kind of family is found to constitute the religious and social unit of early Hebrew society. It included, besides the women and the children, also the slaves of both sexes. The functions of worship could be discharged only by the male head of the family, who was known as the *baal*. Being regarded as property, women had no independent recognition in the cultus and no right of inheritance. Unless a trusted male slave could be put forward to stop the gap, the family ceased as a religious and civic unit when the last male representative died.² The horror with which such an event was regarded had its roots in the ancestor worship of Semitic kinship religion. To die without a male descendant was to imperil the comfort of one's own shade as well as the comfort of the ancestral dead, whose tendance by rites at the family tomb was a religious obligation resting only

¹ Burkhardt, J. L., *Bedouins and Wahabys* (London, 1831), vol. I, p. 144.

Blunt, Anna, *Bedouin Tribes*, vol. II, p. 146.

Doughty, C. M., *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, vol. I, p. 61; vol. II, p. 304.

² Gen. 15:2.

upon male members of the same family. Hebrew levirate marriage was a survival of means adopted to forestall such a calamity. If a man died without having left a son, his brother was expected to marry the widow, and the first son born of this union was counted the son of the deceased, "that his name be not blotted out of Israel." Deuteronomy enacted this old custom of family religion into a law.¹

It should be added that the ancient Arab-Hebrew custom according to which the nearest male relative of the deceased fell heir to his wife or wives, plays a part here. But the fundamental reason for it, as indicated above, had reference to the dead as well as the living. When a man died he was "gathered unto his fathers,"² or "slept with his fathers."³ Even a phrase like "the god of their fathers" remains as a monument of the time when the family and its religion found continuity only through the *baal*, the male head of the family. It is in family religion that "the fathers," the dead ancestors, play such a prominent part. In common with other early peoples the ancient Israelites practised ancestor worship, as numerous survivals conclusively show. But the Deuteronomists⁴ proscribed it as an idolatrous practice, and this in spite of the fact that they sanctioned levirate marriage, which derived its own sanction originally from ancestor worship. The

¹ Dt. 25: 5 f.; cf. the Book of Ruth.

² Judg. 2: 10.

³ I Kings 2: 10.

⁴ Dt. 14: 1; cf. 26: 14. For the best discussion of ancestor worship among the Hebrews consult A. Lods, *La croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts* (1906).

connection between the two had apparently been lost in the seventh century before Christ. But there can be no doubt that ancestor worship, and the customs and beliefs connected with it, reach back at least to the nomadic period among the Israelites.

Of nomadic festivals only traces survive. The Pass-over, some of whose features mark it as an old atonement rite, is the one which has most strikingly preserved its original family character. A lamb is to be eaten by each family indoors, and no flesh is to be carried outside. Only where a family is too small to consume the lamb alone may it unite in the ritual with a neighboring family. A comparative study of ritual custom tends to show that several prescriptions of the Passover ritual, though preserved in the late P document,¹ are of great antiquity. As such may be instanced the following requirements: the lamb must be eaten entrails and all, but no bones are to be broken; it must be roasted, not boiled; it must be slain in the evening after sunset; some of the blood must be smeared on the lintel and door-posts of the house, as upon entrance *maššebas* of a sanctuary; the meat must be consumed during the night and nothing left until the morning. The latter requirement even points to an origin outside of Jahvism. In other words this family festival probably had originally nothing to do with the religion of Jahveh, but was carried over out of the pre-Mosaic family cults of the Israelite clans, and domesti-

¹ Ex. 12:3-11.

cated in Jahvism by connecting its origin with the exodus, just as Roman customs were domesticated in Christian tradition and provided with Christian origins. Some features of the ritual mentioned above survive as family observances among Arab nomads to the present day.

Another fundamental institution of family and clan organization among desert nomads is the practice of blood-revenge, as we have already pointed out. The custom is widely diffused in the world, especially where tribes are still in a primitive stage of civilization. In fact, only under a clan-system can such a practice originate or have utility. Where no central authority protects families or individuals in their rights, clan-sentiment invests private revenge with all the sacredness of a religious duty. It was so among the Hebrews. When a murder had been committed, the nearest kinsman, called the *go'el*, had to carry out the duty of blood-revenge. It was an obligation which the tribal god was believed to enforce and share, especially in default of a human avenger. The blood of Abel cried to Jahveh from the ground, and Cain saw the worst consequences of his banishment in the fact that in a foreign land there was neither a divine nor a human *go'el* to avenge him if he was slain. In other words, the tribal god himself was a member of the clan, and as such became the avenger who declared "Surely your blood . . . will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it and at the hand of man."¹

¹ Gen. 9:5.

Hence throughout their history the Israelites called Jahveh their *go'el*.

It may be remarked that from one point of view this made Jahveh guardian of justice, the protector of the clansman's life. But this must not be pressed in a modern sense. The form of retributive justice which he sanctioned was so primitive and partisan that justice really was outraged under its own name. For under the ancient view of the family's or clan's collective responsibility any kinsman of the guilty man could be slain in expiation of a murder. Nor were the ends of justice served by the common brutal exaction of excessive revenge. Tradition put into Jahveh's own mouth the typical Bedawi brag that "whosoever slayeth Cain vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold,"¹ and in the Song of Lamech has been preserved the preposterous boast of a rival clan that

"If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold,
Truly Lamech seventy and sevenfold."²

There can be no doubt whatever that the practice of blood-revenge was already highly developed among the Israelites during the earliest nomadic period. So ingrained was it, in habit and religion, that even during the period of the monarchy the excesses of private revenge were checked only with difficulty. One of the earliest means adopted has come down to us in the *Lex talionis*, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Applied to the practice of blood-revenge, this

¹ Gen. 4:15.

² Gen. 4:24.

rule prohibited the taking of more than one life for a life. The appointment of asylums for the manslayer was another palliative.

3. *Nomadic reactions against the religion and practices of an agricultural society*

The most striking illustration of religious nomadism in revolt against agrarian culture is furnished by the clan of the Rechabites. During the period between Jehu and the fall of Jerusalem they led a pastoral, or half-nomadic, life in Palestine. The conditions of life in Palestine were so different from those of the desert that even pure nomads, who chose to live there, had to adopt the habits of half-nomads. The Rechabites, however, had preserved and invested with strict religious sanctions the most characteristic aversions of desert nomads. These aversions are recited in the thirty-fifth chapter of Jeremiah. The Rechabites had bound themselves not to engage in agriculture; not to drink wine; not to plant or to own a vineyard; not to build houses, but to dwell in tents.

It is not difficult to discover the sources of this reaction. The invading nomad Israelites found the agricultural life of Canaan under the patronage of local divinities called *baals*, and sometimes generically, *the Baal*. The Rechabites were of the Kenites, whom Hebrew tradition counts among the original worshippers of Jahveh. What could be more natural than that they should identify their devotion to Jahvism with

adherence to the simple life and manners of the desert. The complex agricultural life of Canaan stood under the sanction of rival divinities and, therefore, its characteristic features and products were declared taboo among the strictest of the nomad groups.

Since the bloody rebellion under Jehu had the support of the reputed founder of the religious order of the Rechabites, there is good reason to think that it was a reaction against Canaanite civilization which brought the dynasty of Jehu into power. Besides the Rechabites, the Nazirite devotees were representatives of nomadic ideals, for like the former they abstained from the use of wine. Their vows, it seems, were assumed for limited periods only, during which their hair had to remain unshorn. There is reason to think that some of the earlier prophets, like Elijah, Elisha, and Amos, also were anticultural campaigners for the simpler and purer Jahvism of nomadic times. Amos, for instance, inveighs against houses of hewn stone, and the giving of wine to Nazirites.

The pre-exilic prophets looked back upon the desert period of Israel's religion as the golden age of happiness and high ideals, destined to return once more at the end of days. "I remember concerning thee," writes Jeremiah, "the affection of thy youth, the love of thy bridal days, when thou didst follow me through unsown land." And Hosea makes Jahveh say: "I will allure her and lead her into the desert [again] and speak to her heart . . . that she may become respon-

sive there as in the days of her youth.”¹ These prophets deplored the change which had come over the religion of Israel since their fathers had exchanged the desert for the sown.

A trace of nomadic reaction is perceptible even in Deuteronomy. The Deuteronomists' watchword, implied in every part of their work as clearly as if they had stated it, is “Back to the religion of Moses!” For this reason they made Moses the representative of prophetic, and Aaron of priestly, ideals. From the days of Amos onward the prophets had accused the priests at Israelite sanctuaries of having appropriated the Canaanite cultus for the worship of Jahveh. In blaming Aaron for making a bull-image (“golden calf”) as a likeness of Jahveh, and proclaiming a sacrificial feast to him in connection with its worship, they were charging the Hebrew priesthood of their time, the Aaronites, with complicity in the evils that were to be abolished. “Jahveh was very angry with Aaron to destroy him: and I [Moses] prayed for Aaron.”²

It remains now to gather up the loose ends of this discussion, to show the effect of these early institutions and customs in the direction which they gave to the development of morals. Since Jahveh was held to be the guardian of customary morality the moral aspects of the idea of God are involved too. There were few if any customs of the Hebrews' tribal and family

¹ Jer. 2: 2, and Hos. 2: 14, 15.

² Dt. 9: 20, 21; cf. Ex. 32: 1-8.

life, as the Old Testament shows, which they did not invest with divine sanctions. Since it is not to be supposed for a moment that a people will put a "Thus saith the Lord" behind customs which the contemporary social conscience does not approve, an appraisal of such sanctions is an appraisal of the culture of the time. Religion and civilization stand and fall together in our judgment of the practices and beliefs of society.

We have pointed out one or two by-products of ancestor cult. There are many others. Let us consider for a moment the privileges of the first-born. They were grounded in the family religion and family morality. But they had in them elements of injustice which, as time went on, no divine sanctions could hide. The first-born son was, next to the father, the foremost bearer of the obligations of ancestor cult, which by its very nature was restricted to the family. The very existence of the family was believed to depend upon the proper discharge of these obligations. In this fact were founded the first-born's superior rights of inheritance, and they continued to be his, without a challenge of their justice, long after their attendant obligations and origin had been forgotten. We are dealing with the products of a communal conception of religion, and they must be judged from the point of view of communal ethics and psychology.

From the same level of ideas arose the ancient belief in the sanctity of the parent and in the great potency of parental curses and blessings. They had

behind them the mysterious power which the endorsement of the clan-deity could give. The stories of Noah and his sons, and of Jacob and Esau, make dramatic capital of this sinister power of the father, as the religious head of the family, to influence the destiny of his offspring by his curses and his blessings. The unique authority of the father and the solidarity of the family are presupposed in such beliefs.

From a sense of the unity of that life which was believed to animate all the members of a family sprang the idea of the collective responsibility of the kinship group. The feeling of solidarity bred within the ancient family, as the primary unit of human society, gradually transcended actual, though not theoretical, kinship until, with the growing complexity of social organization, it included successively the clan, the tribe, and finally the nation. Religion based upon such a concept of kinship necessarily develops a type of social morality peculiar to itself. Injury, guilt, or innocence, are not matters of the individual, but of the group. "Our blood has been shed" was the Arab's mode of referring to the murder of a tribesman. It was a tribal injury and involved tribal responsibility, for the murder rested not upon the murderer alone but upon his entire family, or clan, and might be avenged in the persons of any of its members. Unless atoned for by the reprisals of the blood-avenger, the *go'el*, such blood-guiltiness was inherited by the children and the children's children. In other words it remained upon

the clan even though there was a complete change of its constituent individuals. It was this law of blood-revenge, and its satisfaction, which furnished the most striking illustration of the guilt of the fathers being visited upon the children. Among modern Bedawin, as we have noted, such an inheritance descends to the fifth generation.

This moral economy of their tribal life was transferred by the ancient Hebrews, as by members of similar primitive societies, to their theology. The sin of one member of the clan, or tribe, spread as by infection to the whole, and the punishment inflicted must be suffered by representative individuals, or by all. And one must be careful not to import the modern idea of sin into this period. More often than not the offence consisted in the breaking of some taboo like that of the tree in the garden of Eden; in the handling of some "holy" or "unclean" thing, or in failure to observe some ritual requirement — all matters that have vanished from the modern idea of sin. Guilt thus incurred was believed, in the eyes of God, also, to descend from generation to generation. Therefore the Hebrew sage scrupled not to make Jahveh speak of "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children."¹

To a society whose institutions were based upon the supposed solidarity of kinship groups, whether large or small, this doctrine of collective guilt and punishment

¹ Ex. 34:7.

was as natural and inevitable as it seems shocking to the moral feeling of civilized communities of our day. Having once found lodgment in religious thought, religious conservatism kept it there as a principle of God's retributive justice even after Deuteronomy had eliminated it from the Hebrew civil code by providing that the fathers were not to be put to death for the children, nor the children for the fathers.¹ The incongruity of making God condemn as unjust in their conduct what they believed he himself continued to do, did not seem to trouble Hebrew thinkers until the time of Ezekiel.

The character of the marriage relation, the status of women, and the treatment of slaves, where the institution of slavery exists, are other indices of a people's moral and cultural advancement. The subject of slavery calls for detailed discussion in another connection. We can note here only the fact that slavery existed among the Hebrews from the earliest period, and was invested with divine sanctions in the Mosaic Law. What does concern us here is the moral status of a family which included female slaves as part of the harem.

The marriage relation among the Hebrews was established by the purchase of a wife. There was no betrothal in the modern sense. The English version of the Old Testament tries to cover with this word the period between the payment of the *mohar*, or purchase

¹ Dt. 24: 16.

price, to the father, and the transfer of the daughter to the husband's abode. Sometimes, as in the case of Leah and Rachel, the equivalent of the price was paid in work. In consequence of the purchase, a wife was regarded as part of a man's property, and was enumerated among his possessions with slaves and domestic animals.

Marriage by purchase was a very ancient Semitic institution. It underlies some of the family regulations in the Code of Hammurabi twenty-two centuries before the Christian era. But in some important respects the Babylonian family stood upon a higher level than that of Israel. The Babylonian husband's power over his wife as his property had been checked by the state, and her social and economic status was consequently more assured. For instance, a husband's reasons for desiring to divorce his wife had to be well founded. Otherwise the step involved for him the payment to her of considerable indemnity, and the children remained with her. Among the Hebrews divorce was surprisingly easy, and the disadvantages appear to have been wholly borne by the woman. Her father, uncles, and brothers were her only protection against her husband. Burkhardt's account of the easy and frequent divorces among Bedawin of the desert furnishes another point of resemblance between customs of desert nomads and those of ancient Israel.

Characteristic of the more advanced culture of Babylon is the important fact that the Code of Ham-

murabi allows a man to have only one wife.¹ Chronic illness or childlessness are the only circumstances under which a secondary wife is permitted. Even these exceptions prove adherence to the monogamic principle, since the rights of the first wife are safeguarded, and she takes precedence over the second wife. But in ancient Israel monogamy, though sometimes assumed as an ideal, was neither a civil nor a religious requirement. On the contrary polygamy was so normal and habitual that the Talmudists attempted to regulate it by prescribing a limit of four wives for the average Jew, and eighteen for a king. During the earlier period, it seems, the number of a man's wives was limited only by his ability to buy and support them. This may explain why bigamy, in the Old Testament, appears to have been the normal practice among half-nomads and farmers. The prohibition of the right of divorce by the Mosaic Law under special circumstances, becomes significant in the light of these facts. Does it mean that under ordinary circumstances divorce might be employed to preserve the balance between a man's ability to support and his desire for new additions to his harem? In any case monogamy did not come to full recognition among the Jews until the ninth century A.D., and then under Christian influences emanating from Spain.²

Concubinage was an institution that existed among

¹ Cf. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi* (1903), chap. v.

² Cf. RGG, *Ehe und Familie*, Steffen.

the Hebrews as well as among neighboring Semites. It was common enough to require regulation by customary law, and was obviously a heavy drag upon family morality. A group of such regulations has been preserved in the book of Exodus: "If a man [an Israelite] sell his daughter as a bondwoman, she shall not be set free [in the seventh year] as the bondmen are. If she please not her master after he hath known her, he may allow her to be redeemed; but into a strange family he shall not have the right to sell her, when he hath dealt deceitfully with her. If, however, he turn her over to his son he shall deal with her according to the rights of daughters. If he take [still] another [concubine, and keep the former] he shall not diminish her portion of flesh, her raiment, and her duty of marriage. And if he do not any of these three things for her, then shall she go free for nothing, without indemnity." ¹

This passage shows that a Hebrew father had the legal right to sell his daughter as a slave, and that female slaves were customarily taken as concubines by their masters. This afforded opportunities to libidinous creditors which early Hebrew society must have found it difficult to tolerate. The fact that these regulations temporize with the evil shows how well established the practice was among those who exercised control over custom. If a purchaser tired of a young

¹ Ex. 21: 7-11 (E). The English rendering, even of the R.V., is inaccurate; cf. Holzinger's rendering in HSAT. The portion of flesh (vs. 10) refers to the meat distributed on festal occasions at the sacrificial feasts (I Sam. 1:4-5).

woman he might afterwards, on the authority of the law, allow her to be redeemed, probably by taking back a part of the purchase money, or he could turn her over to his son. If he did not fulfil these conditions, and yet wished to take another concubine, he had to let the first one go free rather than shorten her in her rights of maintenance.

If a man other than her master had intercourse with a concubine it was apparently not considered adultery, but a breach of property rights. The case is stated thus in the Law of Holiness [H]: "If a man have carnal intercourse with a woman who is a slave, betrothed to another man [her master], but who was not at all redeemed nor given her freedom, a punishment shall be imposed, but they shall not be put to death, because she was not free."¹ The odalisk at least could hope for humaner treatment than a wife when caught.

We cannot deal here with the origin of this wretched by-product of Semitic life. The fact that the foreign word *pilēgēsh* is used in Hebrew, besides the native word for concubine, *'āmāh*, shows that girls were imported from Phoenicia to meet a demand that exceeded the native supply. Since the institution was permitted and regulated in the Old Testament with a "Jahveh said unto Moses," early Christianity, bound by its literal interpretation of Scripture, found it difficult to

¹ Lev. 19:20. Priestly redactors of a later period added two verses which established their claim to a ram in the form of a trespass-offering, by means of which the offender was absolved from guilt. Cf. Lev. 19:20-21, and Ezek. 44:29.

abolish it. Concubinage was actually sanctioned by the Synod of Toledo in 400 A.D., and was not actively suppressed as social impurity until the fifth Lateran Council in 1516.

The institution of slavery among the Hebrews will be discussed under the "Social Ethics of Deuteronomy." It appears to have existed among them from the earliest times and Jahveh's approval is naïvely extended to it as to other social institutions of their time. It scarcely is necessary to call attention to the fact that the decalogue prohibits neither polygamy nor slavery although they both were practised among the Hebrews at the time when the ten commandments are supposed to have been promulgated. On the theory of morality through revelation by commands from the blue, rather than through religious experience, it will be difficult to account for the omission of two commandments whose moral effect would have been greater than that of most of the prohibitions of the decalogue.

CHAPTER III

MORAL CHARACTER OF JAHVEH AND HIS CLIENTS IN THE EARLY LITERATURE

IN the previous chapter we utilized the JE traditions as indirect sources of information about the religion of Israel as it was before the conquest of Canaan and just after. We shall now use them as direct sources for the period which extends from the time of Deborah to that of Amos, from 1200 to 750 B.C. (cf. Chronology, p. xxii). We shall call this the pre-prophetic or Canaanite period of Israel's religion.¹ Even within this period of approximately five hundred years our literary data are not as full as we could wish. They are most satisfactory for the eighth and ninth centuries; less so for the tenth and eleventh. The traditions which pertain to the period from 1200 to 1000 B.C. have come down to us in the form of twice-used building-stones. Some, in fact, may have a more complicated history than that, and they often fill a place in the new literary structure for which they were not originally intended.

The length of the period with which we are dealing suggests the probability of considerable change. But before the political unification of the tribes under

¹ The term "pre-prophetic" is not strictly accurate, since it does not refer to a time when there were no Hebrew prophets, but to the time before Amos, the first prophet whose writings survive.

David and Solomon, changes in the popular conception of God, duty, and religion probably were local, slow, and inconsiderable. Besides, our sources for the earlier period are too indirect and scanty to warrant separate treatment. A better view of the religious situation is obtained by treating the period in question as a whole, remembering that our sources belong chiefly to the ninth and eighth centuries. They consist of the J and E traditions embedded in Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, and Joshua; the hero and prophet stories in the Books of Judges and of Samuel; and the oldest elements in the Books of Kings.

We noted in the preceding chapter that the religion of the ancient Semite was a part of his custom. The Israelites were Semites and religion was a part, also, of their custom; hence the interdependence of religious ideas and social custom which we shall have constant occasion to observe in our study of Israel's religion. One would naturally suppose that under these circumstances their conception of God would be built up out of the materials which their practical experience supplied.

Their conception of man at his best was that of a sheik, or of a king, whose two chief functions were to dispense justice and to fight their battles.¹ But even by the standards of their own time the best of their chieftains and kings were irascible, unjust, selfish, and barbarous. It is scarcely to be expected, therefore,

¹ I Sam. 8: 20.

that a conception of God which grew out of experience with such leaders in an unreflecting age could be in all respects admirable. We shall see that the limitations and faults of Jahveh's prototypes frequently reappear in his character as we find it delineated in the early traditions.

The religion of the pre-prophetic period is dominated by two correlate ideas: (1) that Jahveh is the God of Palestine only, being more or less localized at sanctuaries within its borders, and consequently an *intramundane* deity; (2) that he was the God of Israel alone, being concerned solely about the welfare of his Israelite worshippers, and the retention of their exclusive homage. He is, therefore, a national deity — an ardent partisan on behalf of his clients when they are loyal, and destructively resentful when they pay homage to rival deities. Within the boundaries established by these two controlling ideas practically the entire religious thought of the period moves.

The localization of deities at Semitic sanctuaries is a matter well known. Intercourse between the deity and his worshippers was assumed to be subject to physical conditions of a definite kind. The worshipper must go to the sanctuary in order to "appear before Jahveh." ¹ In other words, God was to the early Hebrew a part of the natural world in which he was living. One of the incidental results of this physical conception of the deity was a naïve popular belief that a dif-

¹ I Sam. I: 19, 22.

ferent Jahveh resided at each of the many sanctuaries. A full discussion of this psychological phenomenon will be found in a separate chapter.

We are more particularly concerned at this point with the fact that the Hebrews, during the cruder stages of the national-god period of their religion, believed Jahveh's presence and power to be limited to the territory inhabited by the Israelites. "Jahveh hath anointed thee to be prince *over his inheritance*," said Samuel to Saul when he anointed him king. It is not difficult to see that this conception of "Jahveh's inheritance" has been modelled on the idea of a king and his domain.

This circumstance furnishes an explanation of what at first sight would seem to be incidents and beliefs inconsistent with the idea of a Jahveh who is confined to Palestine. A king's power does not properly extend beyond the boundaries of his kingdom. But if his army invades foreign territory, or if persons or objects representative of his rule penetrate into adjacent regions, the ancient story-teller immediately enlarges the sphere of his influence and activity. Descriptions of Jahveh's activity exhibit analogous treatment. Abraham and Moses in Egypt, the sacred ark among the Philistines, are accompanied by manifestations of his power. But even under these circumstances it is usually mediated physically by a magic wand, a sacred chest, or by the person of the "prophet" who is endued with mysterious power by the deity.¹

¹ Gen. 20:7.

The appearance of Jahveh at the tower of Babel, and his extra-Palestinian activity in the narratives of the Garden of Eden and of the Flood, may be regarded as due primarily to the domestication in Hebrew tradition of stories in which other deities were originally the actors. This, to cite an example, is the way in which Jahveh became the subduer of the sea-dragon, a capacity in which he displaced the Babylonian god Marduk.¹ As additional instances might be mentioned two legends, in one of which Jahveh wrestles with Jacob at the ford of the Jabbok, and in the other attempts to slay Moses at a lodging-place on his way to Egypt. In both stories Jahveh has undoubtedly taken the place of local night-demons.

It will readily be seen that when Jahveh was made the hero of exploits in which originally other divinities figured, it was not always possible to change the scene of action to Jahveh's own domain, the land of Palestine. We may assume, too, that some transfers were made by compilers to whom Jahveh was already a universal God, and who, therefore, did not feel the need of accounting for his exercise of power in foreign territory. Earlier writers had different ideas upon this subject, for one records that when the Israelites were besieging a Moabite city, and the Moabite king sacrificed his eldest son, his god Chemosh brought calamity upon the Israelites, so that they returned to their own land. It was because Chemosh was more powerful in

¹ Cf. Is. 27: 1; 51: 9, etc.

Moab than Jahveh that "there came great wrath upon Israel."¹

In attempting to explain what are clearly incongruous elements in the early Hebrew conception of Jahveh it is important not to overlook the probability that we may be dealing with mingled products of at least two widely different religious developments. If the one went back to nomadic origins, and was in the main Hebraic, the other probably rested upon agricultural origins and was predominantly Canaanite. Among resulting differences in point of view may have to be reckoned, on the one hand, those passages which assume Jahveh's abode to be in heaven, and on the other, those which assume that he abides upon the earth.²

Israel's early connections with Arabia and its moon religion, the investment of Jahveh with the attributes of a storm-god and mountain-god, and the disposition of nomadic peoples to detach their deity from the soil, favored the view that Jahveh was celestial rather than terrestrial. Hence it is said that he came "down" upon Sinai,³ and the "angel" of Jahveh spoke "from heaven."⁴ It should be remarked, however, that these

¹ II Kings 3:27.

² In the present context Jahveh's declaration, "I will go down" (Gen. 18:21), must refer to the descent from the mountains of Judah to Sodom. In Gen. 19:24, "from heaven" is a superfluous gloss (Kautzsch). It is a question whether in Solomon's prayer (I Kings 8:22 ff.) the references to heaven may not also be late editorial glosses (Kamphausen, HSAT).

³ Ex. 19:11, 20 (JE); 34:5 (J); 24:10 (J).

⁴ Gen. 21:17 (E); 22:11, 15 (E). In these passages the "angel" probably has been substituted for Jahveh himself.

distinctions can easily be pressed too far, for it would, of course, be a serious mistake to invest the old Hebrew notions of heaven and earth with our modern philosophical and theological connotations. Jahveh descends upon Sinai from a cloud, which shows that the "heaven" of these early writers still is a part of their physical world. A heaven that is in danger of being invaded from a building, as in the tower of Babel story, or can be reached by a ladder, even in a dream, is scarcely above the imagination of a child. But the narrators of these traditions believed Jahveh to be at least a supra-terrestrial being, and their views maintained themselves with more or less tenacity until he was universalized by the prophets and a vaster heaven became his proper abode in popular thought.

The localization of Jahveh within the world receives further illustration from Hebrew beliefs about the abiding-place of the dead. These beliefs also furnish additional evidence of a mixture of contradictory conceptions. According to the ancient family religion of the Israelites the dead had their abode within the ancestral tomb and received offerings there. For the comfort of the deceased after death it was very important, therefore, that his body should be "gathered unto his fathers."

But they also believed in a common abiding-place of all the dead — the underworld called Sheol. Religions in their earlier stages attach little importance to the logical coherence of beliefs. This may account

for the fact that the obvious contradictoriness of the two views does not seem to have troubled the Hebrew writers. But they instinctively refrained from representing Jahveh as interfering directly with Sheol. To chastise enemies who have taken refuge in the realm of the dead he first snatches them thence.¹ Neither worship nor praise are offered to him there,² presumably because the dead were themselves regarded as divinities (*elohim*), and consequently as rivals.

In short, there is reason to think that the belief in Sheol was adopted into Hebrew religion from elsewhere, and always formed a somewhat indigestible lump in the mass of earlier beliefs. If the story of the fall of Adam and Eve is meant to represent death as a consequence of sin, as something unintended in the plan of God, how could the Old Testament writers suppose that God created Sheol from the beginning as a place for the reception of the dead? Curiously enough Sheol is never mentioned among the creations of God either in the first chapter of Genesis or in IV Esdras 6. Yet a creationist³ had no choice but to make God responsible also for Sheol. It certainly looks as if Sheol, which bears striking resemblances to the Babylonian Aralu, were something imported into Israel's religion. This, and the fact that Sheol was the domain of other *elohim*, would account for the disin-

¹ Am. 9: 2.

² Ps. 6: 5; Is. 38: 18, 19.

³ The rabbis of the Middle Ages referred the creation of Sheol to the second day because the approving formula, "and he saw that it was good," is omitted for that day!

clination of Hebrew writers to bring Jahveh into relation to it.

Leaving now these general considerations of Jahveh's within-the-world character, let us turn to more specific phases of the subject. The fact that Jahveh and his worship were popularly believed to be inseparable from Palestine may be illustrated by a number of interesting passages. One Old Testament writer speaks of the sacred ark, with which he associates the presence of Jahveh, as going up "by the way of its own border."¹ Cain complains, "Behold thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the ground [i.e., Palestine]: and from thy face shall I be hid [i.e., deprived of thy care and protection]."² The same presuppositions underlie the complaint of David: "They have driven me out this day that I should not cleave unto the inheritance of Jahveh, saying Go serve other gods. Now, therefore, let not my blood fall to the earth away from the presence of Jahveh."³ Expulsion from Palestine, "the inheritance of Jahveh," involves separation from him and his worship. To enjoy a measure of protection in a foreign land the fugitive had to adopt the religion of the land and people that sheltered him. What Ruth the Moabite says to her mother-in-law — "thy people shall be my people, and thy god my god" — is according to ancient views an inevitable consequence of her determination to exchange her native land for the land of Judah. These conceptions, of

¹ I Sam. 6: 9.

² Gen. 4:14 (J).

³ I Sam. 26: 19, 20.

course, were not peculiar to the Hebrews, but were shared by their Semitic neighbors. Thus one reads that Naaman, desirous of establishing a private cultus of Jahveh at his home in Syria, asks permission to take along "two mules' burden of earth."¹ He assumes that Jahveh cannot be worshipped in a foreign land unless the altar stands upon soil brought from Palestine. Syrian soil would be considered polluted, from the point of view of Jahveh's worshippers, by the presence and ownership of other deities. Equally suggestive is the case of the colonists deported by the Assyrians and settled around Samaria. Being harassed by wild beasts they ascribe their plight to the fact that "they know not the law [i.e., ritual requirements] of the god of the land." Consequently application was made for a Hebrew priest who "came and dwelt in Bethel, and taught them how they should fear [i.e., worship] Jahveh."²

It appears, therefore, that Jahveh was subject to physical conditions of a definite sort. These necessarily involve other limitations. A tribal or a national deity is by very definition a limited being. He can be neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Such attributes are applicable only to a deity whose rule is universal. So long as Jahveh was believed to reside only within Israel's territory, conceptions of his might and power were determined by this belief. Within the borders of Palestine, however, the Israelites ascribed to him a

¹ II Kings 5: 17.

² II Kings 17: 24-28.

practical omnipotence. If an eastern potentate's subjects scarcely dared to suggest that there were limits to the king's power, how much less likely were they to employ such language about their national god? Hence the proverb "Is anything too hard for Jahveh?"¹ If he chooses to assist Jonathan and his armor-bearer, there is nothing that can hinder him to help "by many or by few."²

But even these expressions do not disguise the fact that the ancient Hebrew thought of God as overcoming resistance with effort, and as feeling exasperation over the thwarting of his plans. The latter was due in part to the assumed limitations of his knowledge. In order to find a mate for Adam he first engaged in a futile experiment with animals. He had to search and call for Adam when the latter had hidden himself. Disappointment over the corruption of mankind "grieved him at his heart,"³ so that he resolved upon the destruction of his handiwork. Not a few of his actions, like Adam's expulsion from Eden and the confusion of tongues, were inspired by fear that man might encroach upon his privileges. In order to understand the character of men's doings "Jahveh came down to see the city and the tower which the children of men builded."⁴ Similarly he went himself to Sodom and Gomorrah in order to "see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I will know."⁵

¹ Gen. 18:14 (J).

² 1 Sam. 14:6.

³ Gen. 6:6 (J).

⁴ Gen. 11:5 (J).

⁵ Gen. 18:21 (J).

It will occur to the reader that a deity who betrays anxiety lest his creatures obtain the wisdom or the power to invade his prerogatives has not only physical but moral limitations. Observe the tacit assumption that if man succeeds in eating of the fruit of the tree of life he will have gained something of which even Jahveh cannot deprive him. In other words the tree possesses a magical virtue which is independent of Jahveh's will or power. If this were not the case, why are preventive measures adopted "lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever?"

Apparently it was the physical limitations of Jahveh which, in the thought of ancient Israel, sometimes made him act from unworthy motives. We find in the early traditions no assured conviction that God uses his power *only for moral ends*. The self-regarding motives with which the early writers endow him often betray him into unethical actions. Hence the possession of great power on his part was to them a source of fear rather than of comfort, for they thought he used it more often to avenge personal affronts than to enforce obedience to the moral customs of the time.

One of the causes which favored this mode of thinking about Jahveh was the settled habit of explaining every calamity or natural phenomenon as due to Jahveh's direct action. Famine, disease, sudden death, depredations of wild beasts, unsuccess in war, earthquakes, solar eclipses — whenever any of these events

occurred the ancient Hebrew looked about for some specific cause that might have moved Jahveh to action. Obviously no one at this time knew anything about the operation of natural laws. But tragic events were taking place constantly, and the supposed infringement of numerous ceremonial taboos offered the easiest recourse for an explanation. While neither the heeding nor the neglect of some of these ceremonial regulations presented a moral aspect, they all, unfortunately, made Jahveh play the part of a jealous guardian of his personal rights. In so far their effect was to depress the moral conception of Jahveh.

When David undertook to bring the sacred ark to Jerusalem, Uzzah, with the best intention, put forth his hand to keep it from falling off the cart at a point where the oxen became restive. Whether the realization that he had violated a taboo induced heart-failure or a stroke of apoplexy, is impossible to tell. In any case sudden death overtook him, and this fact required an explanation. The one which the Biblical writer offers is surprisingly unethical, but quite in accord with contemporary superstitions about Jahveh and the ark. "The anger of Jahveh was kindled against Uzzah; and God smote him there for his error; and there he died by the ark of God."¹ The mysterious occurrence leads the narrator to remark further that "David was afraid of Jahveh that day." He distrusted his mood. Under the circumstances it was con-

¹ II Sam. 6 : 7-9.

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sidered prudent not to bring the ark into Jerusalem, but to leave it in the house of a foreigner, Obed-Edom, where it could be observed for a change in Jahveh's temper.

On another occasion, when David was a fugitive, he is recorded as having said to Saul, "If it be Jahveh that hath stirred thee up against me, let him accept an offering: but if it be the children of men, cursed be they before Jahveh."¹ He thought it quite possible that God, for some reason, might be intriguing against him, in which case he could be bought off with a sacrifice. On still another occasion David regarded it as certain that Jahveh had commanded Shimei to curse him,² and a writer of the Book of Judges declared that "God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem."³

But most revealing of all is the last chapter in the second book of Samuel, which records the origin of the sanctuary at Jerusalem. The chapter tells how Jahveh⁴ incited David to take a census of the Israelites and then took offence because David complied. The idea that God may tempt men to commit a sin in order that he may have an excuse for punishing them was not uncommon in antiquity. It has been embodied in the proverbial saying that God first renders mad those whom he would destroy. When the time of reckoning arrived David was given his choice of three punish-

¹ I Sam. 26 : 19.

² II Sam. 16 : 10.

³ Judg. 9 : 23.

⁴ The chronicler (I Chron. 21 : 1) unloads responsibility for the instigation of the act upon Satan.

ments: seven years of famine, three months of flight before his enemies, or a three days' pestilence. David chose the pestilence and seventy thousand of his innocent warriors died for his personal act before the plague was stayed. To a modern mind such acts of caprice are unthinkable in connection with God. But to the ancient Hebrew, who sometimes was forced to harmonize the oracular directions of one day with the calamities of the next, events seemed to prove that Jahveh was liable at times to "break forth"¹ into unaccountable acts and sudden exhibitions of ill temper.

Having set these facts before the reader we ought, perhaps, to say a little more about the personality of Jahveh as it presents itself in the prophetic documents. That the narrators did not hesitate to ascribe human passions to him is an open fact to all readers of the Old Testament. In the later periods of Hebrew literature it is possible to detect a growing sensitiveness on this score, and a deliberate avoidance of crude anthropomorphisms. But the writers of the J and E documents did not hesitate to endow Jahveh with their own passionate natures.

Like other ancient religious communities they attributed their own enmities and hatreds to the national deity, and the horrible barbarities of war practised in those days not only had Jahveh's sanction, but were enforced as religious duties. We need instance only

¹ II Sam. 6:8.

the case of Saul and the Amalekites. Saul's failure to carry out utterly, from whatever motive, the vow to destroy both man and beast, should from our point of view have been reckoned to his credit, instead of having been made the occasion to deprive him of the kingship. But foreign nations and the gods were held to be so unquestionably foes of Jahveh that Old Testament writers often represent him as angrily resenting the sparing of conquered enemies. Every foreigner was at least a potential enemy. Actual foes of Jahveh were all with whom Israel engaged in feud or warfare, so that a record of Israel's martial exploits could be entitled "Book of the Wars of Jahveh."¹

A peculiarly primitive conception of Jahveh's personality comes to expression in the Jahvistic stratum of Ex. 32 and 33. The jealous wrath of Jahveh is aroused by the worship of the "golden calf," and he resolves to destroy the faithless Israelites. Then Moses intervenes by reminding him of his oath, and by recalling him, as it were, to his own better self, so that he is led to "repent of the evil which he said he would do unto his people." By comparison Moses appears more just and humane than God, who, like a quick-tempered monarch, is protected by his vizier from the consequences of his own ill-considered actions.

The Jahvist apparently did not feel Jahveh's liability to sudden fits of anger as a moral defect. He even puts into the mouth of God the words, "Ye are

¹ Num. 21:14.

a stiff-necked people; if I go up in the midst of thee for one moment, I shall consume thee."¹ The context, in which the "fierce wrath"² of Jahveh plays so large a part, makes it clear that in these words Jahveh expresses distrust of his own angry moods. The grave moral defects of such a conception of God need not be pointed out. They are the shadows of the Jahvist's social experience projected upon the clouds.

The counterpart to Jahveh's spatial and other limitations is found in the attitude toward non-Israelites which the early writers ascribe to him. A national deity is a partisan deity, and Jahveh is no exception in this respect. Even though such a deity should define religion in terms of moral obligation, it would be moral obligation between Israelites only. For just as Jahveh to the early writers is the God of Palestine and not of the universe, so he is the God of Israel and not of mankind. The influence of this nationalistic conception of Jahveh was felt strongly within the sphere of social duty. Its immediate effect was to limit the range of moral obligation to dealings with one's countrymen. Given the belief that Jahveh's interest is limited to Israelites, and that he is the patron of justice between Israelites merely within the borders of

¹ Ex. 33:5 (E); cf. vs. 3 (JE). Observe the naïve implication that Jahveh is a localized personality. If he does not go up with Israel he does not expose himself to those occasions which might provoke him to destructive manifestations of anger. Jahveh's knowledge of the conduct of the Israelites depends upon his physical presence among them. This presence was in early times associated with the ark.

² Ex. 32:9-14 (JE).

his own land, it follows that dealings with foreigners are governed by expediency, not by moral obligation.

This restriction of early Hebrew social morality to the tribal or national group corresponds to similar developments elsewhere. Cicero wrote that to "confine man to the duties of his own city, and to disengage him from duties to the members of other cities, is to break the universal society of the human race."¹ But on the whole it was not until the beginning of the Christian era, according to Lecky,² that the Romans experienced that "enlargement of moral sympathies which, having at first comprised only a class or a station, came at last, by the destruction of many artificial barriers, to include all classes and all nations." Though earlier Greek thinkers had expressed a broader view, Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. still held that "Greeks owe no greater duties to barbarians than to wild beasts." It need not surprise any one, therefore, to find that there was no religious or moral bond regulating the conduct of Israelites with men of other nations. We may, indeed, go further and say that to blink the presence of this limited view of moral obligation in the Old Testament is to place a serious obstacle in the path of religious progress.

One important source for the study of Israel's moral ideas is found in the characters of persons whom they idealized, such as Abraham, Jacob, Moses, Samuel,

¹ *De offic.*, III, 6.

² *Hist. of European Morals* (Appleton ed., 1870), vol I, p. 239.

David, and others. A classic illustration of group morality is afforded by the story of Abraham's descent into Egypt.¹ To guard against possible danger to himself he tells a lie that involves his wife in dishonor. After Pharaoh has enriched Abraham on her account with sheep, cattle, asses, camels, and slaves, Jahveh compels him to restore Sarah to her husband. Thus the clan-god secures to Abraham the practical advantages of his own deception. The story implies the common belief and practice of the time that there is no moral obligation which a Hebrew is bound to respect in his dealings with a foreigner. The action of Jahveh exhibits this moral defect, for he helps Abraham, not because he is right, but because he is his client.

The Elhoist² narrates the same tradition, but with significant evidence of deeper moral feeling. Abimelech here appears as the foreigner who sets off the shrewdness and superior divine affiliations of the tribal father. Abraham tells the same untruth, but the narrator seeks to mitigate the fact by pointing out that it was a half-truth, or white lie. The attempt to extricate Abraham from an unethical situation by sophistry is not morally defensible, but indicates that the narrator felt the injustice involved in a lie that proved injurious, even though it was only a foreigner who suffered. By our moral standard it is Abraham, not Abimelech, who owes reparation. Nevertheless, Jahveh punishes the man to whom Abraham has

¹ Gen. 12: 10 ff. (J).

² Gen. 20 (E).

"done deeds that ought not to be done," and then humiliates him still more by suggesting that he secure the favor of Abraham's intercession; as if the right and wrong of the case were of less moment to Jahveh than the triumph and enrichment of his client. Clearly the Jahveh of this story is far from being a guardian of universal moral law. He is a petty and partisan tribal god.

These Abraham stories are by no means exceptional in the attitude which they make Jahveh adopt toward foreigners. Even greater moral obliquity is exhibited in the story that tells how Jacob deceives his blind old father, and filches the blessing from Esau, who represents the Edomites. Despite falsehood and deception, so runs the tale, Jahveh espouses the cause of Jacob, for it is again the case of an Israelite against a foreigner. On the same principle the Israelites, on the eve of departure from Egypt, are directed by Jahveh to borrow from the Egyptians¹ — with the concealed intention of keeping what they get! If the Israelites had treated their fellow countrymen as they treated the Egyptians, they would have offended against the moral standard of their time, and been subject to Jahveh's displeasure. But the spoiling of foreigners was no sin in Jahveh's eyes; on the contrary, we are told that "Jahveh gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they let them have what they asked. And they despoiled the Egyptians."²

¹ Ex. 11:2 (E).

² Ex. 12:35, 36 (E).

The reaction of a higher morality against the defective ethics of such traditions reminds one of the famous line of Lucan: "The gods favored the conquering cause, but Cato the conquered."

All this illustrates how the national-god idea worked itself out in practical ethics. The conviction that Jahveh's acts must always be governed by moral ends, and not by racial preferences, had at this time scarcely dawned upon the Hebrew mind. They ascribed to him some moral characteristics, not a moral character, immutable and eternal. In the light of this fact, and of their particularism, it is easily seen how they could regard Jahveh as guardian of justice and morality in Israel, and yet ascribe to him acts and commands that were neither just nor moral.

Unless his mental vision is dimmed by a false doctrine of Scripture a discerning reader of the Old Testament will soon perceive that in these stories he really discovers the early Israelite painting his own ethical portrait as that of Jahveh. It is he, not Jahveh, whose moral character lacks coherence, whose acts are often immoral and unjust, whose humanity has racial and geographical limits, and whose religion still is honey-combed with unreason and superstition.

If this be true, what was the consequence? It follows that for every Israelite who took these stories to be objectively true, *they provided existing practices with divine approvals*. It involved the assumption that Jahveh's will coincided with Israel's national customs

and morals; that he was the guardian of Israel's social order as it was, and that only an infraction of that order was an infraction of his will. It meant that the average Israelite was enabled to contemplate his own very imperfect ethical ideals as God's ideals. Against this comfortable conception of Jahveh's character and demands Amos and Hosea were the first to hurl passionate denials. Under the moral revolution which they inaugurated the stories which we have considered not only became unbelievable, but scandalously and wickedly untrue. It was Jeremiah who wrote, "Take heed every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any brother; for *every brother will play Jacob's tricks*, and every neighbour will go about with slanders."¹

Jahveh's relation to his own worshippers is a subject which must next engage our attention. The early documents assume the existence of a covenant relationship between Jahveh and his people. This means an agreement in which both parties pledged themselves to do certain things. The ceremony of "cutting" a covenant could hardly be cruder than it appears in the JE account of the covenant made with Abraham. When darkness had fallen, Jahveh passed as a flame between the severed carcasses of the animals, and so ratified his part of the covenant. The ceremony suggests the self-imposition of a curse for failure to fulfil the agreement. An alliance made on these terms with

¹ Jer. 9:4; cf. vs. 3. The Hebrew words translated in the R.V. "shall utterly supplant" undoubtedly are a censuring allusion to Jacob's trickeries, for they are a word-play on his name.

a divinity must strike a modern mind as something strange and primitive. Yet the covenant idea is fundamental in Israel's religion, and when one takes the sources of the idea into account, it becomes clear that up to a certain point it rendered moral service. But some of the forms in which it still survives in Christian thought must be reckoned among the superannuated rudiments of religion.

Among nomads, relations between individuals or groups were regulated by covenant. Those made between Abraham and Abimelech, and Jacob and Laban, may serve as examples. In each case Jahveh was made third party to the covenant, for it devolved upon the clan-deity to see that the principals observed the covenant after they had separated and could not hold each other to account; as Laban puts it, "Jahveh watch [and intervene if necessary] between me and thee when we are separated one from another."¹ The blood of the sacrificial victims sealed the compact.

The covenant-guarding is also a covenant-making deity. The covenant ceremony between Jahveh and Israel is narrated by the Elohist. Moses sprinkles the blood of the sacrificial victims upon both parties to the contract,²—upon the people, who are regarded as a collective unit, and upon Jahveh, who is represented by the altar. Here, as always, the object of the covenant was the preservation and prosperity of the politi-

¹ Gen. 31:49 (J). Inexact rendering of one word by "absent" has caused the verse generally to be misunderstood.

² Ex. 24: 3-8 (E).

cal group which was believed to depend almost entirely upon the favor of the national deity. The way to secure his favor was to observe carefully the provisions of "the book of the covenant,"¹ with respect to which the people bound themselves to do "all that Jahveh hath spoken."

Examination of the Book of the Covenant, Exodus 20:22-23:33, shows that it was a brief digest of customary laws concerning compensations for injury, debtors, slaves, homicide, and numerous other issues that were liable to arise in the life of an ancient community. Mixed with them are directions regarding religious festivals, sacrifice, and some ritual taboos. The collection of "ordinances" exhibits that absence of differentiation between various kinds of laws which is characteristic of clan-custom. Considering the time to which they belong, most of them show a fine quality of simple justice. But a considerable number are unquestionably immoral, judged by the standard of morality common to most civilized people. Some in fact were judged to be wrong or unjust by the Deuteronomists a century later, for they abrogated or modified them in the new code which they drew up. Yet both the original laws and the contradictory, or divergent, new ones were set forth as "the ordinances of Jahveh."

Any act, then, which was contrary to the will of the national god expressed in the covenant-ordinances was simultaneously a political and a religious offence,

¹ Ex. 24: 7.

a breach of the covenant which guaranteed political security and prosperity to the nation. Before the Israelites entered Palestine, a writer of the Amarna letters used the Hebrew word for "sin" to describe an act of disloyalty to the king of which he had been accused. In repudiating the charge he protested that he was "righteous," using the word in the sense of loyal. It follows that loyalty to the gods and loyalty to the king were indistinguishable to the writers of the Amarna letters. The righteous man was the loyal man who conformed to the usage of the group; and since a covenant between a man and his deity involved mutual obligations, the covenant-loyalty of the deity came to be regarded as his righteousness. There are clear traces of both these conceptions in the Old Testament. We must assume, therefore, that among the Hebrews, as among the Canaanites, ideas of righteousness and sin have arisen out of their social order and so share its moral excellence and defects.

The usage of the group to which the ancient Israelite was expected to conform was by no means of one piece, as has been pointed out. Besides the fundamental social duties there was a large mass of observances which had for their object protection against supernatural dangers. They concerned, in the main, a man's relation to the "holy" and the "unclean." The reader should disabuse himself at once of the notion that these terms, from the earliest Hebrew antiquity, referred to moral purity and impurity. In the early

literature they mostly refer to customs and things that have nothing to do with morality. We are in the realm, here, of Semitic taboos.

A taboo may be roughly described as something that one must not do lest ill befall. After touching a corpse, or the blood of a sacrifice, or handling objects connected with the sanctuary, one has to observe certain precautions. "Holiness" and "uncleanness" were believed to be catching like a contagious disease. Thus one person might communicate the unpleasant consequences of his act to the whole community. Therefore, the breaking of a taboo, whether by accident or design, was a "sin," and as such prejudicial to the welfare of the community. It was every one's concern to wipe out such a sin, and it was usually done by wiping out the sinner. The mysterious contagion of Achan's violated taboo was supposed to have spread to everything about him; so the Israelites killed not only him, but his entire family and his domestic animals. This was believed to destroy the source of the contagion.

Even in connection with Jahveh the term "holy" often describes anything but an ethical quality. It seems at times to indicate simply the inapproachableness of Jahveh and the resentment which he manifests when men violate his etiquette of approach. He is represented as having slain seventy men of Bethshemesh "because they had looked into the ark." A glossator did not consider the casualty list in propor-

tion to the sin committed, so he added fifty thousand more. Then the men of Beth-shemesh asked, "Who is able to stand before Jahveh, this holy God?"¹

Most early societies had regulations against witchcraft. The Covenant Code, also, provided that a sorceress is not to be suffered to live. Sorcery was believed to consist in leaguings one's self with some supernatural power to effect selfish ends inimical to the general welfare. Therefore, the same penalty was provided as for the worship of another deity: "He that sacrificeth to any god save Jahveh only, shall be utterly destroyed."² The thought of our time classifies such matters as harmless superstitions and thereby takes them entirely out of the category of sin. Failure to recognize them as remnants of old superstitions has frequently made the Bible an instrument in the perpetuation of such atrocities as the witch-burnings of England and Scotland, and the hangings which followed a witchcraft delusion in Massachusetts.

The food taboos constitute another large group of regulations that illustrate one phase of the Hebrew idea of sin. Many of them are of complex and obscure origin. They prevailed during the entire Old Testament period. Some animals probably became forbidden food because they figured prominently in foreign cults. Others must have acquired their uncanny

¹ I Sam. 6: 19, 20. The LXX has a clause which gives a different and even less reasonable occasion for Jahveh's anger, viz., that "the sons of Jeconiah did not rejoice with the men of Beth-shemesh when they looked upon the ark of Jahveh."

² Ex. 22: 18, 20.

character through connection with totemism. In short, these taboos represent a mass of more or less evaporated beliefs that have lost the freshness of their early meanings. As a class they also belong in the realm of superstition. Jesus said, "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him." Yet to violate any of these taboos was, according to Hebrew ideas, a sin. It rendered a man "unclean," and consequently an object of displeasure to the deity.

Being external and mechanical, such sins were purged away by an external and mechanical ritual. In a system in which even sins committed unwittingly had to be accounted for, there could be no call to real repentance, no appeal to the individual conscience. The sacrificial ritual, and some external forms of abasement, were men's chief dependence to secure atonement. It is a significant fact that the denunciation of such mechanical means of atonement by the prophets was accompanied by new ideas of what constituted sin in the eyes of God.

Two things stand out clearly from the discussion of these taboos: —

1. The early Old Testament idea of sin has long ceased to be coextensive with ours. Many things described as "holy," or "unclean," have nothing to do with truth or falsehood, good or bad. On the other hand, certain social institutions, like polygamy and slavery, about which the Israelites had no moral scruples, now lie under strong moral condemnation in

all civilized countries. Within the Old Testament, also, the two concepts of righteousness and sin underwent considerable change, especially after the activity of the prophets began.

2. The guilt which a man was believed to incur by violating a taboo was of a mysterious *physical* kind, which could be communicated, like a disease, by contagion or infection. Unless it was checked by some act of purgation, the pollution generated by one man's act might spread through the entire social group and render every member sinful in the eyes of God. Apparently the very element which we have found to be a meaningless superstition, in the Hebrew conception of sin, is the thing upon which the doctrines of original sin and total depravity are founded. It can hardly be anything else, ultimately, than the infection-idea of sin, brought over from the Old Testament, which Paul sets forth in the fifth chapter of Romans when he says that "through the one man's [Adam's] disobedience the many were made sinners." Adam's sin was the violation of a food taboo, such as a purely moral conception of God would exclude from his acts and purposes. Let it be observed that the idea of collective responsibility, also a survival from primitive times, continued to play a part in this complex of ideas.

We have reached the point where the idea of collective responsibility and that of the physical communicability of sin merge in the idea of collective guilt and punishment. Many a pious soul has been

troubled by such questions as, Why did God destroy not only adults in the Flood, but all children and animals? They surely deserved a better fate! "All flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth,"¹ answers the priestly writer. Collective guilt, collective responsibility, sin diffused like a leaven through the whole lump — all expressed in one phrase! From the point of view of antiquity we have here a sufficient justification for God's indiscriminating destruction of "all flesh." The ancients were not often troubled by the feeling that wholesale catastrophes, which swept away entire populations, could not be regarded as divine punishments without impugning the justice of God.

But their answer no longer suffices us. Even if science and historical criticism had not demonstrated that the Flood described in Genesis can never have taken place, we should on moral grounds have to discard it as a punitive act of God. Long adherence to the principle that righteousness, sin, and punishment can concern only the individual, has made the idea of collective responsibility appear barbarous. In fact, the Hebrews themselves began to outgrow these ideas about the time of the Babylonian exile.

But there are indications even in J that the ancient Israelite doubted at times whether God was always just when he punished men collectively. Abraham, arguing with Jahveh before the destruction of Sodom

¹ Gen. 6: 12.

and Gomorrah, says: "That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, that so the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from thee: shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"¹ What lies behind the question but the fear that God may not always discriminate between the good and the bad in his wholesale inflictions of punishment. The very assumption of the Jahvistic writer, that God may be argued into justice by reminding him of his obligations as a judge, shows absence of Amos' assurance about a God whose justice is an inner necessity of his being, and as unvarying as the law of gravity.

Readers of the dialogue between Jahveh and Abraham will observe that Abraham's anxiety concerns only adults. A modern must feel that the presence of children in those cities should have raised much the more serious question of justice in connection with their destruction. Yet claims of the children's righteousness are not advanced. Why? First, because the "righteousness" under consideration still is largely if not entirely forensic. It could be predicated only of those who discharged the political and religious obligations on behalf of the family — the heads of families. Secondly, because children were not independent persons. They were property in a narrower sense even than women. The writer naïvely assumes for Jahveh the feeling and practice of his time, which regarded children up to the age of puberty as property. Con-

¹ Gen. 18: 25.

sequently what happened to them was considered only in the light of its effect upon the owner, the head of the family. Here, indeed, we are at the source of such notions as that Jahveh could command Abraham to sacrifice his son, the first-born being the best of a man's alienable possessions.

This discussion of morals and God in the early literature of Israel has been confined somewhat closely to those features which serve best as a background for the new conceptions advanced by the prophets. It would be easy to brighten the picture which we have drawn by citing those instances in which the higher conceptions of God and duty came to expression. Had there not been a substratum of ethical and spiritual qualities in the life of the people, the prophets could not have appealed to their hearers as they did. But there also was so much unreason and superstition in the early religion, so much that is unworthy of the defence which it still enjoys among persons who are more zealous than informed, that we have thought best in this chapter to prepare its most harmful features for slaughter by the prophets. We are now with Amos and Hosea at the turn of the road that leads to morally higher and rationally more tenable views.

We have not said anything in this chapter about the decalogue. If one adopts the Mosaic origin of the decalogue in the form in which it has come down to us, it should have received consideration in the chapter on Moral Beginnings. But the evidence indicates that

the form in which we have it is the form which it assumed at the end of a long development. In view of the fact that some of its precepts are undoubtedly very ancient, bridging the period between the pre-Mosaic era and that of the exile, we feel justified in taking up the decalogue separately in the next chapter. By doing this we are afforded an opportunity to discuss in greater detail certain fundamental features of Hebrew morality, together with the changes that took place.

CHAPTER IV

ORIGIN AND MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECALOGUE

AMONG the earliest aids to memory used by the ancients were ten-finger memorials, or decalogues. They were formularies employed to summarize those duties and practices upon which the conscience of the social group laid most emphasis. The makers and codifiers of Israel's laws likewise made use of this device. But no social conscience ever was, or can be, static in its content, and that of Israel was no exception.

The almost unanimous testimony of human experience shows that the lawmaker does not precede, but follows, the developing social conscience. What the lawgiver enacts into formal precept or law must previously have proved its worth in the collective experience, otherwise it would have no binding force.

In the light of considerations like these the search for a definite chronological origin of the decalogue looks like a mistake of method induced by the view that a Hebrew lawgiver, in Old Testament ethics, *could* make eight o'clock into noon by pushing the hands of the clock around. Indeed, the attempt to find a precise place for the origin of the decalogue in the moral development of the Hebrews seems futile. Belief in its Mosaic origin in any of the forms in which

it has come down to us may be regarded as abandoned by most Old Testament scholars.¹ Further investigation, we believe, will establish as certain that the decalogue embodies within itself the products of different developments of divers origins. In other words, the decalogue did not spring into existence full-grown, like Minerva from the head of Jove, but is itself *the outcome of a long and complex development*. That commands against the use of images in worship and against stealing should have arisen simultaneously is incredible to a student of ethical origins.

A little reflection will show that it is only some form or arrangement of the decalogue, not the origination of the ethical obligations it expresses, that could at best be attributed to Moses. The wrong of murder, theft, false witness, and adultery required no special revelation even in his day. Such acts had been penalized in the Hammurabi Code a thousand years earlier, and are among the commonplaces of prayers and confessions in other early literature of Egypt and Babylonia. Hebrew tradition itself assumed that the religion of Jahveh had stigmatized such acts as sins from the remotest antiquity.² Their condemnation as

¹ Addis, Baentsch, Barton, Bennett, Benzinger, Bertholet, Budde, S. A. Cook, Cornill, Guthe, Holzinger, Kuenen, McNeile, Marti, Matthes, Montefiore, G. F. Moore, Oort, Paton, Smend, W. R. Smith, H. P. Smith, Stade, Steuernagel, Thomas, Wellhausen, and doubtless many others.

² Rabbinical tradition met the difficulty by assuming the existence of the seven so-called Noachian laws, six of which were supposed to have been enjoined upon Adam. Among them are five prohibitions of the decalogue, nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.

wrongs committed against the social group must have attended the earliest manifestations of the moral instinct even in the man of the stone age.

The disposition of Hebrew bibliographers to ascribe the origins of their social and religious institutions to Moses has a reverse as well as an obverse side. If they dated later origins back to him, they probably also dated some earlier origins up to him. The separate history of individual precepts of the decalogue certainly reaches beyond Moses and beyond Jahvism. But with respect to the entire decalogue it would be much more daring than true to assume that there was a sufficiently long pre-Mosaic Hebrew moral development to have made possible the compilation of such a set of precepts by Moses in the fourteenth or thirteenth century B.C.

Besides, there is evidence which indicates that the process of instituting and compiling decalogues has been gradual and changeful. The religion of Israel knew more than one decalogue, and at least two variant editions of the same decalogue. As early as the fifth century A.D. an anonymous Greek theologian¹ credited Moses with the writing of two decalogues, one in the twentieth, the other in the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus. Since then others have noted the existence of these two completely dissimilar sets of ten commandments. The German poet Goethe was one who discovered the fact during his student days, and made it

¹ Cf. Nestle, *Miscellen*, ZAW (1904), p. 134.

the subject of his inaugural disputation, maintaining that the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus contained the original ten commandments. The faculty at Strassburg refused to publish his dissertation, so he embodied the substance of his discovery in an anonymous article two years later.¹

The most striking characteristic of the above-mentioned decalogue is its ritual character. We shall therefore refer to it as the ritual decalogue, to distinguish it from the standard decalogue, which is chiefly moral. Some have found evidence of superior age in the simple fact that the former does concern itself with ritual. But this fact is not a safe criterion of age, for the elements of social morality must have arisen at least as early as most of the surviving ceremonial regulations. Nor is the fact of its inclusion in the J document more than presumptive evidence of antiquity. More fruitful is the enquiry how early ethical, rather than ritual, requirements were held to be of the essence of religion. The answer to this question cannot be doubtful. The change of emphasis from the ritual to the ethical in Israel's religion was effected by the prophets of the eighth century. Therefore the ethical decalogue is certainly the more recent.

Examined in detail the precepts of the ritual decalogue are found to have a background of agricultural life. The most important observances of the peasant religion of Palestine were included among these pre-

¹ *Zwei wichtige bisher unerörterte Fragen*, 1773.

cepts. The chapter in question expressly mentions "ten words."¹ Since this decalogue now contains twelve or thirteen commandments we must suppose that it has undergone editing by later hands. Omitting, as the most probable additions, the Sabbath commandment, and the one requiring all Hebrew males to appear before Jahveh thrice a year, the following list² results: —

1. Thou shalt not prostrate thyself before any other god.
2. Thou shalt make thee no molten gods.
3. Thou shalt keep the feast of unleavened bread.
4. Every first-born is mine.
5. The feast of weeks thou shalt observe.
6. And the feast of ingathering at the turn of the year.
7. Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven.
8. The offering of the Passover shall not be left until the morning.
9. The best of the firstlings of thy ground thou shalt bring to the house of Jahveh thy God.
10. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk.

No one familiar with the religion of the great prophets from Amos to Jeremiah would consider this decalogue

¹ Ex. 34:28.

² Some omit the Sabbath commandment and no. 2 on the ground that these do not occur in what looks like a repetition of this decalogue in Ex. 23:10-19; still others seek to preserve the number ten by omitting nos. 5 and 6, and retaining the Sabbath commandment and the one requiring males to appear before Jahveh thrice a year.

a summary of the cardinal points of their preaching. On the contrary, observances of the ritual denounced by these prophets are here singled out for special enforcement. It can, therefore, hardly have originated in religious circles to which Amos and Isaiah belonged. On the other hand, the importance attached to agricultural festivals (nos. 3, 5, and 6) makes it certain that this decalogue cannot have originated with Moses. Such commands would have been worse than meaningless to nomads, who not only had no experience of agriculture, but despised it as a mode of life. For details upon this aspect of the problem the reader is referred to the chapter on Israel's Moral Beginnings.

There falls into the scale as an additional consideration the fact that the command, "All that open the womb are mine," was understood to involve child sacrifice. This is shown by the later practice of substituting an animal, by the continuance of child sacrifice until Jeremiah's time, by the latter's express repudiation of it as a command of Jahveh, as well as by Ezekiel's acceptance of it as such, and by the archaeological evidence of recent excavations in Palestine. Even defenders of the traditional Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch might be willing, one would suppose, to clear Moses of any share in the giving of such a decalogue. Its character is best explained by supposing it to be a modified survival of that peasant religion of Palestine which was a blending of Israelite and

Canaanite cults—a mixture against which the eighth-century prophets and the Deuteronomists waged such a relentless war. Indeed, the conclusion of the Deuteronomic edition of the decalogue, with the statement that Jahveh “added no more,”¹ may have been intended to discredit other and differing forms of the decalogue which were known to exist. It must not be supposed, however, that the Jahvist originated the ritual decalogue which now bears his name. On the contrary, literary criticism shows that he found it a part of the tradition which came to him out of the past.

Turning now to the two variant forms of the standard decalogue, preserved in Ex. 20 : 1–17 and Dt. 5 : 1–22, we are bound to raise the question of its origin. The tendency of recent critical investigations is to regard this decalogue as an original part neither of Deuteronomy nor of E in Exodus. The evidence, best summarized by Steuernagel, indicates that it was first inserted by an editor in the fifth chapter of Deuteronomy, and that after the exile a P redactor inserted it in the JE narrative between Ex. 19 : 25 and 20 : 18. The time of its inclusion in the Book of Deuteronomy, however, is not necessarily the date of its origin. We shall find reason to think that this ethical decalogue, also, has had a long history, in which it passed through various stages. Its *present form* may not be earlier than the Deuteronomic period, but it probably contains a

¹ Dt. 5 : 22.

substantial nucleus which is very much older. Besides the two variant forms of the decalogue, mentioned above, there is a third which stands about midway between the two. It was found on a papyrus fragment in Egypt a few years ago. Cook ¹ assigns it to the early part of the second century A.D.

Before taking up the discussion of the individual precepts of the decalogue two general questions should receive consideration: (1) Were all or particular persons in the Hebrew community addressed in the decalogue? (2) Were the precepts supposed to have a universal, or only a tribal and national range of application?

A number of considerations indicate that the decalogue is addressed only to adult men, and more particularly to those who were heads of households. The second person masculine singular is employed in "thou shalt," but this grammatical fact cannot be urged here, because the masculine gender in Hebrew may be employed to cover both sexes. More heavily weighs the fact that some commands, like the fourth, seventh, and tenth, contemplate men only. Since women were not held competent to qualify as witnesses, or to exercise the religious rites and functions of the Hebrew cultus, the first, second, third, and ninth, also, are addressed to men. The Hebrew legal régime was one in which men alone figured, because

¹ PSBA xxv, p. 34 ff. The writing is in an early form of Hebrew character. Though only a fragment, it is the earliest Biblical manuscript of any kind in existence.

women were owned and had no independent social responsibility. Analogous, among the ancient Arabs, is the case of the ten commandments of the Fitra, which, as Wellhausen observes, "appear to have concerned only the man, not the woman." ¹

There can be no doubt that the observance of the decalogue was at first obligatory only among Hebrews and in so far as it related to Hebrews. They alone could be expected to receive and observe commands relating to Israel's cultus. Nor did foreign peoples come within the purview of its social benefits until Hebrew religion ceased to be national. In other words, the morality of the decalogue was at first a group morality, since the "neighbour" was always understood to be a fellow Hebrew. The facts upon which these statements rest are abundantly set forth in other connections, and need not detain us here. We are ready now to consider the different commandments individually.

1. *Thou shalt have no other gods besides me.*

The first four commandments relate to the cultus. This fact must be taken into account if one seeks to assign an earlier origin to the ritual decalogue because it is so exclusively concerned with the cultus. It is, as a matter of fact, only a preponderant emphasis upon morals that distinguishes the moral from the ritual decalogue. If the moral decalogue were concerned exclusively with morals, as the ritual decalogue is con-

¹ *Reste arab. Heid.* (1897), p. 168.

cerned exclusively with the cultus, it might be possible to maintain that the two decalogues were contemporaneous; that one was intended to inculcate the duties of worship, the other, of social morality. As the facts stand this claim could be maintained only by supposing that the ritual decalogue was a possession of the Canaanite population absorbed by the Hebrews after the conquest, and that the standard decalogue goes back to distinctively Hebrew origins. But since Canaanite civilization was much more ancient than Israel's religion, the ritual decalogue would still be the older in point of origin.

The prohibition of the worship of other gods obviously does not constitute monotheism, but monolatry. The framers of this decalogue did not question the actual existence of other gods. Otherwise they would have declared their unreality to clinch the interdiction of their worship. If worshipped by Israelites, they become real rivals of Jahveh and thus excite his *jealousy*. Jealousy aroused by a nonentity is a thing too absurd to consider. The motive of jealousy is introduced as an amplification of the second commandment, but really concerns the first. The naïve endowing of God with such an ignoble passion has moral difficulties of its own with which we have dealt elsewhere.

Monotheism, even in Hebrew thought, came by stages, and not as a flash from the blue. To some of these stages we have called attention in the chapter on

the Monojahvism of Deuteronomy. It is a question whether even Jeremiah had fully grasped the truth of God's universality, although it lies implicit in his thought. Men who for the first time consciously attain to a new conception of God and the world are accustomed to enlarge upon the fact. Had the thought of Jahveh's sole existence not been a novel idea to Deutero-Isaiah he would hardly have exploited it with so much enthusiasm during the exile.

However, the form of the first commandment was found sufficiently elastic to admit of a monotheistic interpretation after monotheism had become an accomplished fact. Judaism had recourse to the *Shema*¹ "Hear, O Israel, Jahveh our God is one Jahveh," as a better formula for its belief. But it should be observed that the Jews do not follow the text of the passage, since in liturgical use they substitute "Adonay" (Lord) for the ineffable name "Jahveh." This change really makes of the *Shema* a statement of monotheism, and the King James version adopted this interpretation in its rendering: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." But, historically considered, the first commandment, as well as the *Shema*, are products of a time when other gods still were realities to the average Israelite. The first commandment asserts that Israel's God demands exclusive devotion, while the *Shema* asserts that Jahveh is not many, but one.

¹ Dt. 6:4. So called from the opening word in Hebrew for "Hear."

2. *Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image.*

The ritual decalogue prohibited only "molten images," i.e., images of metal cast in a mould by a founder. The term in Hebrew is *massēkāh*; both the name and the thing were probably borrowed from the Canaanites. The standard decalogue prohibits the graven image, or *pēsēl*, which was commonly made of wood.

Both kinds of images were used in ancient Israel without offence, and without betraying any consciousness that Moses had forbidden them. Micah the Danite is represented as employing a descendant of Moses, even, to perform the duties of a priest of Jahveh and as such he operates with a molten as well as with a carved image.¹ Another tradition mentions a teraphim in the house of David as if it had been something unobjectionable that could be found in any Israelite household.² Rachel stole her father's teraphim and Laban, in seeking to recover the image, referred to it as "my god."³ A passage in Hosea alludes with evident regret to a time when the sacred stone pillars, ephods, and teraphim would be unknown in Israel.⁴ He regarded them as essential to the religious observances of his people.

¹ Judg. 17; cf. 18:30.

² I Sam. 19:9 f.

³ Gen. 31:19, 30. Some regard the teraphim as a relic of ancestor worship corresponding to the penates, or household gods of the Romans. Gressmann advocates the view that the teraphim was a mask worn by the priest when he impersonated the deity (*Mose u. seine Zeit*, p. 249). Whatever it was, its character and use should have put it under the ban of image worship on the supposition of a Mosaic origin of the second commandment.

⁴ Hos. 3:4. Deuteronomy condemned them all as idolatrous.

But the most conclusive evidence against a Mosaic prohibition of images is afforded by the incident of the bronze serpent. The Deuteronomic editor of the Books of Kings,¹ in recording the destruction of the serpent as an idolatrous object, declares it was the one "that Moses had made." An E redactor in Numbers² narrates that Moses made it in obedience to the command of Jahveh. Tradition is concerned here, doubtless, with a symbol employed after the manner of sympathetic magic. But it must be clear that an age which could see nothing wrong in ascribing the origin of such an object to Moses had no such scruples about the use of images as would have been created by the second commandment.

Finally, the state religion of Ephraim countenanced the representation of Jahveh by portable images of a bull overlaid with gold, contemptuously called "golden calves" by the prophets. Such images constituted the principal equipment of the great Israelitish sanctuaries at Dan, Bethel, Samaria, and probably Gilgal. Juda-ites participated more or less in the cultus at Bethel. If Amos and Hosea had been aware of a Mosaic prohibition of images, it is difficult to account for their failure to invoke its aid in their campaign against these bull images, especially since Amos appeals to the Mosaic period in support of his antisacrificial views.

In our opinion this array of facts points clearly in the

¹ II Kings, 18:4.

² Num. 21: 8.

direction of a post-Mosaic origin of the commandment against images. It also accounts for the consciousness of novelty which informs the Deuteronomist's elaborate argument on behalf of an imageless worship.¹ It should be observed, on general grounds, that a prohibition against images would not be issued in advance of a people's practical acquaintance with their use. Such a prohibition must have come as the product of a religious reaction. We probably are close to the facts if we seek the beginning of this reaction in the work of the eighth-century prophets, and its culmination in Deuteronomy.

But there may be truth in the Deuteronomist's assumption that the earliest form of Jahvism was imageless. It is generally conceded that the employment of images of gods belongs to a comparatively advanced stage in the history and development of religion. In so far Eusebius was right when he said that "the oldest peoples had no idols." But it would be difficult to prove that the Israelites, or any part of them, were in the aniconic stage of development in the days of Moses, especially since they were surrounded by peoples who had long been familiar with the use of images. In any case a religion that is imageless because it is primitive, and one that is imageless because of advanced theoretical considerations, are two totally different things.

¹ Dt. 4: 12 ff.

3. *Thou shalt not take the name of Jahveh, thy God, in vain.*

This is the common English rendering of the third commandment, but the Hebrew text leaves the door open for other interpretations. Literally translated it reads, "Thou shalt not lift up the name of Jahveh, thy God, unto naught." What does this mean? The answers vary greatly. Here are some: that it prohibits the use of the name of Jahveh in connection with trivial matters; that it is directed against profane swearing; that it forbids the use of the divine name in magic, or divination.

The above are the most plausible of the current interpretations, but they are all open to serious objections. Paton¹ has made out a strong case for the view that the Hebrew text of the commandment should be translated, "Thou shalt not cry aloud the name of Jahveh, thy God, when thou bringest naught." It was customary to invoke the name of the deity in connection with an offering, and this, in Old Testament phraseology, was "to call upon the name of Jahveh."² The original intention of the third commandment, then, would have been to set up the rule, No sacrifice, no worship, which accords substantially with the old injunction "None shall appear before me empty."³

If this was the original meaning and purpose of the third commandment, it hardly reflects the mind of the

¹ JBL (1903), p. 201 ff.

² I Kings 18: 23 ff.; cf. Ps. 16: 4.

³ Ex. 34: 20.

great pre-exilic prophets who scorned the thought that sacrifices were the essential element in acceptable worship. On the other hand, it must belong to a time when heads of families, as in the case of Elkanah, still exercised the function of sacrifice. After the ritual of sacrifice had become the exclusive prerogative of the priesthood, such a commandment addressed to male Israelites would have lost much of its original significance.

Since the Deuteronomic reformation under Josiah inaugurated the changes that took the sacrificial cultus out of the hands of the common man and made it a priestly function, it is conceivable that the third commandment underwent a corresponding change of meaning at that time. The form of the precept and the fact that Semitic antiquity was always living at close quarters with superstitious dread of deities' names, determined the subsequent interpretation of the third commandment. At any rate, the belief arose that it was directed against all misuse of the divine name Jahveh, and this tradition may reach back to the Priests' Code, whose influence greatly fostered the fear of sacrilege in connection with the use of the divine name.

The early Israelite naïvely thought that his national deity must have a personal name by which he was distinguished from other deities. The earlier writings of the Old Testament show that there existed no fear of its use in worship, or in connection with the affairs

of daily life. It was natural, however, to invest the divulging of this name with the same perils and solemnities which in early human societies attended the giving and use of personal names. One's real name is made known only to intimates who will not use it in magic to the disadvantage of the bearer. Jahveh also makes known his name to intimates and votaries only; according to the earliest traditions to the patriarchs,¹ according to E and P for the first time to Moses.²

The witch of Endor, according to the ancient Hebrew chronicler, had the power to summon the shade (*elohim* = divinity) of Samuel to appear against his will. This, supposedly, was done by invoking his name. But citing so powerful a being as Jahveh in non-ritual connections was regarded as a perilous adventure. Amos, in his graphic picture of the lone survivor of the family hiding from God's wrath in the innermost part of the house, lets him say, "Hush, do not speak the name of Jahveh,"³ lest his attention be attracted and worse befall.

When the earlier and cruder superstitions connected with the use of the divine name had passed away with the institutional innovations of the time between Josiah and Ezra, a new kind of awe of the Name began to flourish in the soil of Jewish legalism. The prohibition of the third commandment probably was now applied to all extra-ritual utterance of the name Jahveh. So rigid did this taboo of the name

¹ Gen. 4:26; cf. Gen. 6:2-8.

² Ex. 3:14; 6:3.

³ Am. 6:10.

become that about 300 B.C. it was no longer uttered in Jewish synagogues, the substitute "Adonay" (Lord) being used instead. Leviticus prescribed that "one who blasphemeth the name of Jahveh shall surely be put to death."¹ It is a significant fact that in the Septuagint Greek translation of the Pentateuch this is rendered "one who *nameth* the name of the Lord shall surely be put to death." The inference is that to the Jews of the third century B.C. mere utterance of the name Jahveh was blasphemy.

In consequence of this curious development the correct vocalization of the four consonants JHVH remained for a long time a matter of uncertainty;² mystic potencies imputed to the real name of him who was no longer a national deity, but the God of the world, revived its use in magic practices, and gave rise to a kind of philosophy of the Name which may be traced into the New Testament.³

4. *Observe (var. remember) the Sabbath day to keep it holy.*

Passages in the JE traditions which relate to the earlier Sabbath are not entirely free from the suspicion of having been edited so as to accommodate them, where necessary, to a later form of Sabbath observance. The writings of the eighth-century prophets,

¹ Lev. 24:16.

² Cf. Arnold, JBL (1905), vol. xxiv, p. 107 ff.; Moore, OTSS, vol. I, p. 143 ff.

³ Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu*.

therefore, contain the earliest undoubted references to the Hebrew Sabbath.¹ In them it has the earmark of a lunar feast-day and is always paired with the new-moon festival, an association which it retained also in the language of writers who lived after the Sabbath had been detached from the moon phases.

If the Sabbath was originally a real partner of the new moon, it means that there was only one Sabbath in a month. Otherwise, how could the phrase "new moon and sabbath" originate? The supposition that the Sabbath here means the seventh day of the week, without reference to moon phases, comes to grief against the fact that then the new moon and the Sabbath would occasionally have coincided. Neither does it commend itself to suppose that the new moon was the first and most important of the monthly group of four sabbaths determined by the moon phases, for then the phrase should have been "new moon and sabbaths." What is more, the new moon is nowhere called a sabbath, but is always distinguished from it. We, therefore, are compelled to look for a monthly lunar feast-day, coördinate with the new moon, which was called Sabbath. The only other distinctive lunar phenomenon of the month was the full moon, and our next step must be to enquire whether the day of the full moon had special religious significance in Semitic antiquity.

Ten years ago Pinches² discovered and published a

¹ Am. 8:4 *ff.*; Hos. 2:11; Is. 1:13.

² PSBA (1904), p. 55 *ff.*

lexicographical Babylonian tablet, containing a list of the days of the month, in which the term *shabattu* is applied to the fifteenth day of the month. Since the Babylonians reckoned a lunar month of about thirty days, the middle of the month, or the fifteenth, would be the full moon. This is confirmed by a line in the Babylonian Story of Creation¹ in which the moon is addressed thus: "On the fourteenth [day] thou shalt be equal [in both] halves."² The testimony of the somewhat mutilated line is still stronger if we read with Pinches and Zimmern, "On the Sabbath thou shalt be equal in both halves."

What was the character of this day among the Babylonians? Another cuneiform tablet contains the equation *ûm nûkh libbi* = *shabattu*, which means, literally translated, "day of rest of the heart = sabbath." There is general agreement that the phrase which describes this sabbath does not refer to cessation from labor, but designates it as a day of penance on which an angry or capricious deity must be pacified. The full-moon period, therefore, was a critical and portentous day in the astral theology of the Babylonians and was known as the "sabbath." The fact that numerous existing contract tablets are dated on Babylonian sabbaths tends to show that they were not observed as rest days.

On the strength of these facts Meinhold³ and Beer,⁴

¹ Tablet, v, 18.

³ *Sabbat u. Woche* (1905).

² So Ungnad in Gressmann's AOTB.

⁴ *Der Mischna-tractat Sabbat*.

following a suggestion of Zimmern, have worked upon the theory that the early Hebrew Sabbath was originally the day of the full moon, and that it had at first nothing to do with the seventh day of rest. There is much presumptive evidence in favor of this view, and it is not without support in the Old Testament. The P tradition in Exodus makes the Hebrews enter the wilderness of Sin on the day of the full moon. This was the region of Sinai where the full-moon cultus still survived among Arabs in the sixth century. The fact that Amos mentions the Sabbath of his time as a day of cessation from labor and trade is no objection to identification with the full moon, for he says the same of the new moon. Apparently the celebration of both differed in no essential respect from the observance of other Hebrew festivals, marked chiefly by slaughter-sacrifices and the joyous abandon of the accompanying feasts. Such celebrations of necessity involved cessation from labor. As Strabo¹ observed, "The Greeks and barbarians have this in common, that they accompany their sacred rites by a festal remission of labor." This accounts for the fact that domestic animals and servants were considered available for journeys on the Sabbath as well as on the new moon. Yet neither a journey² nor changing of guards in the temple³ would have been admissible if rest had been the emphatic element in the observance of the day.

¹ x, 3:9.

² II Kings, 4:22 ff.

³ II Kings, 11:4 ff.

A matter of much significance is the apparently hostile attitude of the pre-exilic prophets toward the Sabbath of their time. They include it among the sacrificial feasts which Jahveh hates.¹ If it was a day of rest, its denunciation by these humanitarians is hardly intelligible. But if it was a lunar feast-day, having a recognized connection with the Babylonian-Canaanite astral religion, their hostility is easily explained. Since the Book of Deuteronomy represents a strong reaction against astral religion, and presents the teaching of the prophets in practical form, its complete omission of the Sabbath, as well as of the new moon, from the original edition of the book is a most significant fact. It seems to indicate that the rest-day Sabbath was still unknown when the book was promulgated in 621 B.C., and that the lunar-feast Sabbath celebrated on the full moon was the day denounced by the prophets.

The probable relation between the Babylonian full-moon Sabbath and the Hebrew rest-day Sabbath has been discussed at length by Morris Jastrow.² He finds a close analogy between the Babylonian *shabat-tum* as a critical time in the lunar month, and the *shabbathon* of Lev. 23 : 32, which like the Babylonian Sabbath was invested with the austerities of an atonement day. But he also finds that though there are "traces among the Hebrews of lucky and unlucky

¹ Is. 1 : 13; Hos. 2 : 11; probably included in Am. 5 : 21.

² *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions* (1914), pp. 134-95.

days, of a significance attached to periods of transition, of the importance of the new moon and of the full moon, of the special import connected with the number seven, and of precautions exercised on certain days which have left their traces in some of the Sabbath regulations of the Pentateuchal Codes," there was no parallel development of the Hebrew rest-Sabbath and the Babylonian propitiation-Sabbath on the basis of their common elements. The probable reason for this we have already indicated.

Just how the lunar-feast Sabbath was made over into the seventh day of rest, dissociated from the moon phases, still is obscure. But there were many radical changes just before and during the exile, and this was one of them. Hardly anything seems to have been taken over from the full-moon Sabbath except the name. In the observance of the old Sabbath, abstention from labor was incomplete and incidental to the celebration; in the new Sabbath it was the essential thing in the celebration. The Sabbath, for instance, was a day suitable for journeys in old Israel; but in New Testament times travelling was reckoned among the things that were strictly forbidden on the Sabbath.¹ In fact this new Sabbath rapidly underwent deterioration from a day of release from labor to one on which it was labor to rest as prescribed. The Deuteronomic variant of the Sabbath commandment urges only humanitarian motives for the day's ob-

¹ Mt. 24:20; Josephus, *Ant.* XIII, 8:4.

servance; but at the time of Nehemiah it had become a kind of ritual requirement, enforced by civil authority. A later law of P even imposed the death-penalty for Sabbath-breaking. The creation-origin of the Sabbath was added to the Exodus edition of the decalogue as a priestly afterthought. Similarly P, in the first chapter of Genesis, arranged the creative acts to fit the scheme of a weekly cycle which in his day was already an established custom.

In consequence of post-exilic developments, in which the ritual sanctity of the day was increasingly emphasized, it inevitably lost something of its cheerful character. The modification of the pre-exilic local sacrificial feasts, from joyous social functions into a solemn ritual act of the priests at the central sanctuary, may have helped to inaugurate this tendency toward an austere Sabbath. Its sanctity was thought of as something inhering in the day itself, which was hedged about by a formidable array of enactments that in some circles tended to make the day a burden instead of a refreshment. It was this tendency which Jesus challenged when he said that "the sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath."¹

We may briefly summarize the history of the Sabbath as follows: its origin as far as the name is concerned goes back to the Sumerians. The Babylonians applied the name to the full-moon day in the middle of each month and observed it as a propitiation day.

¹ Mk. 2: 27.

The early Israelite Sabbath seems, also, to have been a full-moon festival and a day of joyous feasting. As such it figured once a month, like the new-moon festival, in the sacrificial cultus which the pre-exilic prophets denounced because of its Canaanite associations. About the time of the exile a seventh day of rest, freed from association with moon phases, was inaugurated and called the Sabbath, although it had little in common with the earlier institution under that name.

5. *Honour thy father and thy mother.*

The fifth commandment inculcates the duty of honoring one's parents. In a society founded so completely upon family organization as the Hebraic, the filial obligation set forth in this precept undoubtedly belongs to a time more ancient than that of Moses. Indeed, the question must be raised whether in its most ancient form it may not have been an injunction to pay ritual homage to the manes of dead parents.

An interesting question arises from the coördinate mention of the mother with the father. Since the Israelite family was polygamous, the children all claimed the same father, but not the same mother. Add to this the fact that the father had absolute power both over the mother and the children, and it becomes apparent that the precept could not have been understood to teach equal obligations toward both parents.

Duty toward stepmothers is not mentioned. Yet it was not in the case of Leah and Rachel only that the

question of this relationship arose, for the Book of Deuteronomy¹ attempts to check the abuses of harem-favoritism in a duogamous family. Under the conditions presupposed there, each of the rival wives intriguing to advance the interests of her own offspring, the inculcation of filial duty toward a stepmother must have seemed a hopeless thing. The omission may receive further explanation from the fact that the first-born son's stepmothers were anciently inherited by him as his wives when his father died, and his duties toward them consequently came under a different head.

Some scholars have maintained that there is sufficient vestigial evidence to assume the existence of a matrilinear society before the beginning of the patrilinear. In such a society the duties of filial obligation could have had for their object only the mother, since the father could not be known. But the Israelite family, so far as one can trace its history, is patrilinear and, therefore, it can be a matter of antiquarian interest only to inquire whether the mention of the mother beside the father is an echo from a matrilinear period of society.

The commandment has traditionally been understood to apply to children still under parental authority. This is clearly an impossible supposition. Under the type of family organization known to us in Israel the father alone was the absolute ruler of the family; so absolute, in fact, that it took on all the quali-

¹ Dt. 21: 15; see p. 247.

ties of proprietary ownership, for he had the right to sell his children into slavery in payment for his debts. Actual ownership of the child by the father is the tacit assumption behind Jahveh's alleged request that Abraham sacrifice his son. In a society where children were independent persons with inalienable rights, no one could ever have raised the question, "Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" Obviously the Israelite could sell, or offer as a sacrificial gift, only that which he believed to be his property.

If such was the status of the free-born children and their mothers, how are we to apply this commandment to children born of female slaves whom the head of the family treated as concubines? The children of such unions, born into slavery, cannot possibly have been placed by this precept under equal obligation to both parents, since the relation between father and mother, and father and children, was that of a master to his slaves. The fact is that the power of the Israelite father over his family was so unrestrained that a commandment in his interest addressed to children still under his authority would have been a bonus on tyranny — a killing of the slain. On the whole they needed protection against arbitrary exercise of paternal power much more than counsels of respect! Custom, approved by divine sanction, gave him the right to put to death a son who was a drunkard or a spendthrift.¹

¹ Dt. 21: 18-21. The transfer of authority to a court is in appearance

The right to sell his daughters into concubinage and slavery was expressly recognized by the Mosaic Law.¹ A daughter's failure to acquiesce in her father's desire to profit by what even in those days involved for her a measure of degradation, would clearly have been a breach of the fifth commandment. In short the supposition that the fifth commandment was addressed to children still under parental control presents insuperable difficulties.

Let us suppose, however, that the fifth commandment, like the rest, is addressed *to adult male Israelites only*. Then it acquires quite a different significance, for the father and mother in question in that case were *the aged parents* of sons who had founded their own households and were beyond parental control. A woman passed from the control of father, brother, or uncle, to that of her husband-master. She had no initiative or independent social responsibility, and was held incompetent to exercise religious rites and functions. Therefore the ancient legislator addressed no commands to her. Even the wisdom writers invariably addressed their precepts to sons, never to daughters.²

Since both the family and the family-cultus were perpetuated through sons it was a sacred duty to do everything possible to insure the male succession. As in Greece, Rome, and India, so also in Israel pa-
only, since parental complaint is all that is necessary to invoke the death penalty.

¹ Ex. 21:7-11.

² Prov. 4:1; 5:7; 23:13 ff.; 29:17.

rental blessings and curses were regarded as the most important factors that determined the good or ill fortunes of descendants. A father's curse, once pronounced, might exercise its blighting effect almost automatically without the aid of Jahveh, and the paternal blessing was thought to operate in much the same way. Isaac, having through deception been led to pronounce a blessing on Jacob, can utter only a curse on Esau, and both work out their effects independently of Jahveh. Noah and Jacob in similar manner controlled the destinies of their sons by the mystic power of curses and blessings which they bequeathed to them. Here lay the primary source of the sanctity that attached to the persons of aged parents, and which invested with sinister as well as auspicious significance the words, "that thy days may be long in the land which Jahveh thy God giveth thee."

Plato furnishes in his *Laws* striking evidence of the existence of analogous beliefs among the Greeks. Neither God nor man, he averred, could countenance neglect of parents. "The curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. . . . May we not think . . . that we can possess no image [of a deity] which is more honored by the gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? Whom when a man honors, the heart of the god rejoices and he is ready to answer their prayers." ¹

¹ XI, 930-32.

6. *Thou shalt not kill.*

The sixth commandment is a simple prohibition expressed in Hebrew by one word with a negative. It is not the usual word for "to kill," but one that signifies murdering. Since blood-revenge ranks among the earliest and foremost of a clansman's social obligations, murder of a clansman, or of a fellow countryman, was probably one of the first acts that was counted a wrong against the social group. In its original intention this commandment, of course, applied only to those who were members of the same political group, whether small or large.

The regulations which govern homicide in ancient communities always have reference to the fighting capacity of the group. The killing of a clansman meant the weakening of the clan to that extent, and this was the concern of all its members. Therefore clans made reprisals on the principle of collective responsibility in requiring the killing of some member of the murderer's clan, not necessarily the actual murderer.

Within a large group, as a tribe or a nation, the collective method of settling one's grievances early gave way to that in which the nearest kinsman of the slain constituted himself the avenger of blood and settled the family's account with that of the murderer by retaliation. This was the practice in Israel during the greater part of the Old Testament period.

The ancient institution of blood-revenge, there-

fore, marked out a large domain in which this commandment remained inoperative. Even a man who caused the death of another accidentally was legally at the mercy of the avenger unless he could reach some specified asylum without being overtaken. The very appointment of cities of refuge in Israel, to which one guilty of involuntary manslaughter might flee, conceded to the slain man's kin the right to murder the innocent refugee if they could. This grave evil could be remedied only by the abrogation of the right of private revenge. But the practice was so fortified by religious sanction and tribal custom that the asylum system was first put forward, also in the name of religion, as a palliative.

As a matter of course the ancient Israelite made no application of this commandment to the barbarities of warfare. Wars continued to be declared "holy" in the name of Jahveh. The ban ¹ of destruction, involving at times the massacre of all the males of a conquered city, at other times of the entire population of men, women, children, and animals, continued to be carried out in the name of the very religion that owned the ten commandments.

Finally, there remain as virtual exceptions of the sixth commandment those numerous cases in which the death penalty was inflicted for comparatively trivial or superstitious reasons. The barbarous system of collective responsibility countenanced the killing of all

¹ Josh. 6: 17-24; Dt. 13: 15 ff.; I Sam. 15: 33.

the members of a family with the guilty one, or in his stead. David handed over to the Gibeonites seven descendants of Saul to be put to death for misdeeds committed by their grandfather. And the Gibeonites "hanged them in the mountain before Jahveh."¹

Since the law of blood-revenge applied only in the case of freemen the killing of a slave was not a serious matter. A master who beat his slave so that he died after a day or two was not to be punished, according to the Mosiac Law, for the reason that "he loses his own property." In primitive as in more modern times the various forms of judicial murder have yielded but slowly to the demands of a higher moral law and a growing appreciation of the value of human life.

The absolute value, therefore, which this commandment appears to place upon human life is found to be illusory when examined historically. All formulas of this kind mean much or little, according to the culture and ethical temper of the age that uses them. The ancient Hebrews understood it relatively only, and in conformity with the exceptions made by their customs. Jesus put into it the meaning of a new age.

7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

This commandment was intended to protect the exclusive right of a man to his wife. Both the second person masculine of the verb, and the fact that usage generally applied it to the acts of men, shows that the

¹ II Sam. 21:9.

adult male Israelite is the person addressed. A wife was acquired by purchase, which may account for the fact that one feels uncertain in some instances whether adultery is treated as a violation of property rights, or as a breach of sexual purity. A man's property interest became effective the moment he had paid the *mohar*, or purchase price. Hence a man who sinned with "a virgin betrothed," one for whom the purchase money had already been paid, was held guilty of having "humbled his neighbour's wife," and the case like any other was punishable with death.¹

The treatment of misconduct with a concubine is clearer in its bearing. In such a case the guilty man was required only to pay a fine to her master. A concubine was almost invariably a female slave, and the fine was exacted to atone for the infringement of her husband-master's property rights. The ultimate reason for this lenient treatment of both offenders must lie in the fact that a natural son by a concubine stood little chance, ordinarily, of becoming a link in the regular male succession of the family. As we shall see, it probably was the vital religious importance attached to the legitimacy of the male heirs in a family that led to the rigorous treatment of adultery. Usually the severity of penalties imposed by society furnishes a measure of the injury it is supposed to have suffered.

The readiness with which Abraham and Isaac in early traditions² expose their wives to adultery in

¹ Dt. 22: 23, 24.

² Gen. chaps. 12; 20; 26.

order to protect their own persons deserves consideration in this connection if these traditions reflect the moral feeling of those who wrote them down during the ninth or eighth century B.C. Saul took away David's wife, Michal, and gave her to Paltiel, and a pathetic story tells how, after a time, she was wrested again from the latter by David's command.¹ In neither case is there an allusion to a breach of the seventh commandment. The matter is treated as a violation of property rights. Similarly Nathan,² in the case of Uriah the Hittite, charges David with high-handed stealing and murder. The rich man appropriates the lamb which the poor man has "bought" and nurtured. Adultery is not mentioned by name, although it doubtless was present to the mind of the narrator. The property-aspect of the deed is uppermost even in the mind of the redactor who makes Jahveh say to David, "I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them to thy neighbour," making Jahveh the agent in punishing one case of adultery with another. But did not the wives deserve moral consideration? What happens to them is considered only in the light of its effect upon David, their husband-owner. This indicates that the property aspect of adultery still outweighs that of moral purity. Otherwise Jahveh is deliberately proposing the moral degradation of David's wives merely to lacerate their husband's feelings.

How relative and one-sided the seventh command-

¹ II Sam. 3:13-15.

² II Sam. 12.

ment is appears in the fact that Israelite wives were never accorded ground for complaint on account of a husband's unfaithfulness. The very conception of a husband's obligation of fidelity to his wives was lacking. The laws were made by men for men. Therefore only husbands were liable to injury, on the one hand by their wives, who could break only their own bonds of wedlock, and on the other by men who could break only those of others. So far as wives were concerned, a husband's affairs with other women were not regarded as an infringement of their rights. The Israelite freeman was answerable for his actions as a husband only to other freemen whose marital rights he might invade.

The existence of these entirely different standards of sexual morality, one for the husband and the other for the wife, is an indisputable fact of Old Testament social ethics. It is an extremely tempting inference that this divergence in the community's comparative estimate of male and female sexual responsibility was occasioned by beliefs connected with ancestor worship. The general prevalence of polygamy and the condition of serfdom to which women were reduced would have tended to fix and perpetuate the double standard after it had arisen. It would be interesting to learn to what extent the Old Testament has been responsible for the nurture of a dual standard of social purity in Christian countries.

Undoubted survivals of ancestor worship among the

ancient Hebrews suggest that the commandment against adultery was prompted by a motive deeper than the desire to protect property rights, and yet one that was distinct from the modern requirement of social purity. In India, Greece, and Rome an offering could be made to a dead person only by one who was actually or constructively descended from him. A natural son meant the extinction of the family and its religion, and the perpetration of a grave act of impiety against the ancestral dead.

Beliefs so widespread among ancient societies undoubtedly had their counterpart in Israel. The Deuteronomist still exacts a liturgical oath from every male Israelite when he brings his tithe that he has not "given thereof [as an offering] to a dead person."¹ Given the belief that the happiness of the dead depends not upon the life led in this state of existence, but upon offerings brought by legitimate descendants, a powerful motive is supplied for the observance of conjugal fidelity. It will be seen at once that under this construction of family religion the obligations rested entirely upon the wife, for her conduct only could affect the status of the family of which she formed a part. She was the real authenticator of birth and parentage. Her husband's acts could endanger only the status of other families. Here may lie the source of the belief that a wife's unfaithfulness is a vastly more serious matter

¹ Dt. 26:14; cf. Gen. 35:8, 14; these two verses doubtless were separated by the P redactor.

than that of her husband. Therefore when the religion of Jahveh invested with a divine sanction this ancient obligation never to break that series of legitimate heirs which was every family's sole and sacred bond between the living and the dead, it did a notable thing. It carried the obligation beyond the woman to the man, for it said to *him*, "Thou shalt not commit adultery."

8. *Thou shalt not steal.*

This precept is so elementary that it undoubtedly formed part of the unwritten moral code of Israel long before the time of Moses. In early nomadic societies, however, there was not much that could be stolen except animals, weapons, food, and garments. As the arts of life advanced, the number and variety of property rights increased, and theft became a more and more serious offence.

Among the Israelites the obligation to respect private property, we must suppose, experienced the same gradual enlargement as other promptings of the moral instinct. This means that originally it had binding force only between members of the same tribal group. This was particularly true of nomads who almost depended for their living upon theft and robbery. Even David played the part of a Bedawin sheik when he levied blackmail because his men had not made booty of Nabal's flocks.

The constantly reiterated warnings of the prophets and the Deuteronomists against unjust treatment of

the resident foreigner or client had their reason in the inherited practice of making moral obligations coextensive with blood-kinship only. Plain foreigners were legitimate prey. It is the Elohist ¹ who tells how Jahveh himself, through Moses, requests the Israelites to borrow from the Egyptians with the concealed intention of keeping what they get. In spite of all the expedients of traditional interpreters this is and remains to a modern mind plain stealing. But in the mind of the ancient Hebrew the act aroused no scruples, because all foreigners were real or potential enemies, and his conduct toward them was not governed by moral considerations. His religious ethics still were tribal in their scope.

9. *Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.*

The enormous importance attached to public opinion in all forms of early society is a thing well known to anthropologists. In more advanced societies customary law began to take care of a man's reputation. As the law concerned itself more and more exclusively with penal offences, slander became a matter of slighter importance. But a member of a ruder and more primitive society, as Mr. Marett remarks, "cannot stand up for a moment against an adverse public opinion; to rob him of his good name is to rob him of all that makes life worth living." We must suppose, therefore, that this commandment had as a forerunner one directed against

¹ Ex. 11: 1-3.

slander. Such a one still survives as a part of the Covenant Code, and it is found conjoined with another which is substantially the ninth commandment of the decalogue: "Thou shalt not utter a false report; thou shalt not assist him who is in the wrong by becoming an unrighteous witness." ¹

The present form of the commandment not to bear false witness assumes the existence of some kind of judicial machinery. Under the tribal organization it must have been extremely primitive, for a sheik cannot enforce his decision even if he makes one. His authority had moral force only. Gressmann ² has stated convincingly some critical objections to the view that Moses instituted at Mount Sinai the somewhat elaborate judicial system attributed to him in Exodus.³ But when he assumes that events at Kadesh instead of at Sinai form the historical basis of the tradition, one is tempted to desert him for a later date and a more complex society.

Josephus is authority for the statement that women and slaves could not qualify as witnesses.⁴ Whether this held true during the entire Old Testament period cannot be decided upon existing evidence. But wherever witnesses are mentioned they are men, and the present commandment, also, is addressed to men on behalf of men. Since in the family all were under the power of the master, Hebrew judicial procedure prob-

¹ Ex. 23: 1.

³ Ex. 18 (E).

² *Mose und seine Zeit*, p. 175 ff.

⁴ *Ant.* IV, 219.

ably was closely analogous to that of Rome both in origin and in practice. Plutarch declares that at Rome women could not appear in court as witnesses.¹ The jurisconsult Gaius furnished the following reason and explanation: "It should be known that nothing can be granted in the way of justice to persons under power — that is to say, to wives, sons, and slaves. For it is reasonably concluded that, since these persons can own no property, neither can they reclaim anything in point of justice."² In short, the public tribunal existed only for the master of the family, and he was responsible for the members of his household. So far as the evidence goes, this states the facts also for Israelite practice. "If an unrighteous witness rise up against any man to testify against him of wrong-doing," writes the Deuteronomist, "*then both men between whom the controversy is shall stand before Jahveh, and before the priests and the judges that shall be in those days.*"³

How liable this crude system of administering justice was to abuse through employment of false witnesses is shown by the case of Naboth who was put to death upon the testimony of two "base fellows."⁴ The moral censure of the prophets and wise men, and the severe punishment meted out to a false witness, indicates the existence of a strong public sentiment against this evil. The actual evidence of this feeling,

¹ Plutarch, *Publicola*, 8.

² Dt. 19: 16, 17.

³ Gaius, II, 96 ; IV, 77, 78.

⁴ I Kings 21.

however, is confined almost entirely to literature that originated after the middle of the eighth century B.C.

10. *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house.*

If this was the original form of the commandment, the word "house," as often in Hebrew, meant the family and everything that belonged to the family. The Deuteronomic variant puts the wife first as the foremost of a husband's possessions. It scarcely is necessary to remind the reader that the "neighbour" meant a fellow Israelite.

There has been much discussion about the tenth commandment because it apparently passes from evil acts to evil desires. Many look upon this fact as in itself evidence of a comparatively late stage of religious development. Others, like Eerdmans, maintain that "Old Testament righteousness is always external and never becomes a matter of inward disposition."¹ He holds that the word translated to "covet" should be rendered to "appropriate that which has no individual owner." In support of his view he appeals to the passage "neither shall any man covet thy land, when thou goest up to appear before Jahveh thy God three times the year."²

Old Testament morality is undoubtedly forensic and external. While the religion of the prophets ultimately developed a certain degree of inwardness, few

¹ *Theol. Tijdschrift* (1903), Heft 1, p. 25.

² Ex. 34:24; cf. AS, III, p. 142.

evidences of this deepening process can be found during the pre-exilic period. It is not likely, therefore, that such a commandment as this would have been included in the decalogue unless the law-giver had thought of the deed in connection with the desire. So much may be regarded as certain even though one finds the evidence for Eerdmans' meaning of the word inconclusive.

A little reflection will show that the late arrival in Hebrew religion of the subjective element of thought and intention is found in keeping with what one might expect. The period of group morality and of a communal conception of religion is not favorable to the development of a subjective conception of religious duty. The subjectivizing process of religion and morality is found associated historically with individualism, not with communalism. Individualism in Hebrew religion, however, does not begin to appear until about the time of Jeremiah. The general trend of these considerations, therefore, favors either a comparatively late origin for the tenth commandment, or a concrete and external interpretation of its meaning.

The general results of this discussion may be summarized as follows: —

1. More than one decalogue arose in the course of Hebrew history.
2. Of two which survive, the component precepts were addressed only to men as heads of families;

women and children being bound to obedience through the men, who alone were capable of discharging religious functions.

3. The standard decalogue contains some commandments that must have originated long before the time of Moses; others, again, can scarcely have originated until long after his time.

4. We are, therefore, compelled to assume that the decalogue is itself the product of a long development, and that it was compiled after the great prophets had finished their work.

To the student of ethical development, the point of chief interest lies not in the origination of the individual precepts, but in the selection of these commandments as a summary statement of an Israelite's religious duties. Being of a very general character, their interpretation and observance necessarily changed so as to keep pace with the morality, enlightenment, and culture of an advancing society.

It must already have occurred to readers of these pages that the prevailing interpretation and appraisal of the decalogue as a rule of conduct is strangely at variance with the ascertainable facts of its origin and its immature social ethics. These facts are fatal to any theory of miraculous oracular deliverances on Mount Sinai, and happily so. Moral precepts must be judged by their character, not by their sources. Conscience may be educated, but it cannot be instructed. Even God cannot legislate for man morally except through

his own sense of right. Even if an action were not otherwise wrong, it would be less than right unless the doer, in his own heart, judges it to be right. God is not morally served if he is obeyed in any other way.

For these reasons the traditional view of the decalogue, and of its origin, is not only false on the facts, but immoral in its theory. Men have only recently learned that moral education cannot consist in telling the pupil on authority what he ought to do, but in making him see for himself the thing that is right. A growing moral personality must be self-directing. Though no judgment of conscience is infallible, a moral faith in God as the moral law-giver is identical with the belief that, in so far as we see right, we find his will.

Incontestable facts show that the decalogue, also, has been promulgated, divinely indeed, from the Sinais of countless human hearts. Here, as in the storm and stress of other struggles for a higher life, the lightning flashed and the thunder broke from clouds of human experience. Nor will one who has watched, through long hours of historical study, the toilsome progress of mankind toward higher ideals be disturbed by the constant identification of God's will with the partial attainments of the toilers. They were but expressing their intense faith in the value of their gains. It was Jesus of Nazareth who denoted the inhibitions of this early human experience as incomplete when he applied the demands of a higher conscience to what

“was said to them of old time,”¹ and made the essence of “the law and the prophets” consist in the practice of the golden rule.

NOTE. — Meek’s careful treatment of “The Sabbath in the Old Testament” (JBL, vol. xxxiii, pt. iii) reached me after the completion of my manuscript. It is a great pleasure to find that our conclusions are in substantial agreement.

¹ Mt. 5:21 *ff.*; cf. 7:12, and 22:37-40.

CHAPTER V

PIONEERS OF A NEW ERA

Amos of Tekoa and Hosea ben-Beer

I

AN almost countless series of essays and books testifies to the fascination which the extant writings¹ of the herdsman prophet of Tekoa have exercised over the minds of Bible students. This is not due merely to the circumstance, whether original or adventitious, that Amos' sermons inaugurate the era of written prophecy. To one who approaches his utterances through the early traditions of Israel, he exhibits a moral elevation that challenges attention as does the Matterhorn above the valley of Zermatt. His person and work constitute a striking phenomenon in the history of religious experience.

Budde doubtless is right in his explanation of the opening verse of the book, with its reference to the "two years before the earthquake,"² as a learned addition of later date. It would be useless in any case for the determination of the commencement of Amos'

¹ The following passages, generally recognized as editorial additions of a later date, do not enter into this study: Am. 1:2; 1:9-12; 4:13; 5:8-9; 6:2; reference to hunger for "words of Jahveh" probably interpolated in 8:11-13, if the whole passage is not a later addition; 9:5-6, and 9:8-15. It seems very likely that 1:6-8, and 3:7 also are later additions.

² Cf. Budde, ZAW, 1910, pp. 37-41.

prophetic career. For practical purposes one may assume that his activity began about 750 B.C. Probably the impression produced by the great solar eclipse of 763 B.C. lies behind the threat that "the sun shall go down at noon."¹ Earthquakes were of frequent occurrence in Palestine, and the fact that Amos refers in the same breath to earthquake and solar eclipse as impending calamities is indirect testimony to the great terror which both inspired. They always were portentous signs to the peoples of antiquity, who obviously had no conception of general laws.² Amos and his Israelite contemporaries regarded Jahveh as the direct cause of all such portents and calamities, and, therefore, assumed that he must have some definite reason for sending them.³ This fact affords him the opportunity to reach their conscience by playing upon their fear. In doing so he is speaking out of the popularly accepted beliefs of his day.

It would be obscurantism to hide from ourselves the fact that such beliefs have become untenable. They are the product of a primitive science of the world, and a theory of the moral order which is to us immoral. Jesus on one occasion called attention to the fact that God lets the sun shine and the rain fall on the good

¹ Am. 8:7-10.

² In one of the old chronicles of Hildesheim, as late as the year 990 A.D. occurs the following entry: "In the same year on the 21st of October occurred a great solar eclipse, and it was followed by great mortality among men and beasts." Transl. from *Monumenta Germaniae*.

³ The idea that Jahveh causes earthquakes and eclipses must at some period have displaced the belief that earth and air demons were responsible for these phenomena.

and the bad alike. A larger science has enabled the modern man to see that God governs the world by orderly processes of law, not by sporadic interferences, and a deeper theodicy has shown a serious moral defect in the view that God employs great natural catastrophies to punish men, thus engulfing both the good and the bad in one common ruin. Besides, the conception of a world that is governed in the interest of a favored minority, a "chosen people," is in any case incompatible with the Christian idea of God.

But Amos shared these beliefs with his contemporaries and proclaimed them with a "Thus saith the Lord." They were almost inevitable under the conception of the moral order which then prevailed. This fact will become more apparent later on. Amos as yet knew nothing of a future life to which the problem of divine rewards and punishments could be referred. Yet belief in Jahveh's guardianship of right demanded requital of men for their deeds. It will be sufficient at this point to suggest that one who is restricted, as Amos was, to our natural world for evidences of God's moral government has no recourse but to interpret national calamities as divine punishments, or to declare the world a moral chaos.

Until the middle of the eighth century B.C. Hebrew prophecy had concerned itself chiefly with the *defence* of the national life. Amos applies his prophetic gifts to a relentless *criticism* of the popular and sacerdotal religion of his time, and thus leads the first great moral

advance. The greatness of the service he rendered cannot be fully appreciated without a brief review of contemporary ideas about the deity's relation to the nation. It has already been pointed out, in passing, that the existing social order was reflected in Hebrew popular theology. The people conceived the relation between Jahveh and Israel to be a natural and indissoluble one, like that between the Moabites and their god Chemosh. He is the king behind the king and regards his worshippers as the latter regards his subjects. A king without subjects and a deity without worshippers are equally unfortunate, for the one needs the homage and gifts of his subjects, and the other the sanctuary and sacrifices provided by his worshippers. It is assumed, therefore, that the deity, no less than the king, will seek to secure the perpetuation of the nation as a measure of self-interest.

From this narrow tribal conception of Jahveh it follows that his obligations toward the nation are chiefly of a protective nature. He must help the Israelites against their foreign enemies. Moral considerations hardly play a part where foreigners are concerned. The narrator of Gen. 12 is scarcely conscious that Jahveh, by "plaguing Pharaoh with great plagues," justifies the lie whereby Abraham has enriched himself and dishonored his wife. The same moral twilight envelops the tradition that represents Jahveh as bound to carry out against Esau the fraudulently obtained blessing of Isaac. This was a perfectly natural assump-

tion as long as the average Israelite attributed to Jahveh his own hostility to foreigners. The assumptions which underlie these and similar traditions may be offered as typical illustrations of the two main obstacles which stood in the way of moral progress: the *national-god-idea*, and the *identification of Jahveh's will with the particularistic ethics of Israel's tribal customs*.

What does Amos have to say to this moral obliquity by which Jahveh, on the basis of a supposed necessary alliance between Israel and himself, is claimed as the sanctioner and defender of Israel's wickedness? His answer must have been startling in the extreme; to many it must have seemed even blasphemous and unpatriotic. "You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore will I visit upon you all your iniquities."¹ Amos grants that Jahveh is the God of Israel only, but he makes a use of the national-god-idea which was bound to destroy its old meaning. Two objections are entered: (1) Jahveh's relation to Israel is not a necessary, but a voluntary one. He chose them and can dissolve the relation again, for they are not necessary to his existence or well-being. (2) Far from becoming their champion in political troubles and so conniving at their wickedness, he, being a moral personality, is bound to chastise them even unto destruction.

It is difficult for a modern to realize how paradoxical this declaration must have sounded to the hearers of

¹ Am. 3:2.

Amos, for popularly it meant the destruction both of the nation and of its religion. Since the exercise of religion in Israel, as in other ancient Semitic states, had for its object the prosperity and perpetuation of organized society, no one could suppose that any god would destroy his own clients. On the contrary, the chief function of the national god is that of leading his worshippers to victory against foreigners,—his enemies and theirs. Hence the Israelites are looking forward to the great battle-day on which Jahveh will vindicate them against their foreign enemies.

Amos has only bitter scorn for *this expectation of unmoral partisanship*. "Woe unto you, that desire the day of Jahveh: Wherefore would ye have the day of Jahveh? . . . As if a man did flee from a lion, and a bear met him: or went into the house and leaned his hand on the wall, and a serpent bit him. Shall not the day of Jahveh be darkness, and not light? Even very dark and no brightness in it!"¹ Jahveh's favor, declares Amos, is contingent upon the moral character of the recipient. Claiming to be his people, they must conform to his will, which is ethical. Failing in that, the religious bond which should be their strength, must be their undoing, for Jahveh does not grant his aid, as a certificate of good moral character, to a people that does not deserve it.

One must bear in mind that Hebrew worshippers at this time were not conscious of a distinction between

¹ Am. 5: 18-20.

cultus and religion, for they regarded the support and proper administration of the cultus as a complete discharge of their religious obligations. This was a time-honored belief in Semitic as in many other ancient religions. There might be times when the deity would be offended and refuse to accept the offered sacrifices. But that he might refuse them altogether, as inefficacious to secure his favor, was an idea foreign to ancient notions of divine requirements. The sacrificial feasts were a highly prized feature of community life and tended to be orgiastic in their joyousness. According to the simple theology of those days the deity shared the pleasures of the occasion with his worshippers, and so renewed the bond that constituted him their champion and patron.

But Amos, in no uncertain tone, exposes as a delusion this popular confidence in the cultus as the be all and the end all of religion. He understands Jahveh to say: "I hate, I despise your [sacrificial] feasts,¹ and will not smell [the savor of] your festal assemblies. Yea, though ye offer me your burnt-offerings and meal-offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts."² Observing the zeal with which the people make pilgrimages to Bethel and Gilgal in order to sacrifice and feast merrily together, the prophet declares it not only valueless, but sinful.³

¹ *Haggim*, "pilgrim feasts," which were of a highly joyous character; I Sam. 30: 16, describes the Amalekites behaving as at a pilgrim-feast.

² Am. 5: 21 f.

³ Am. 4: 4-5.

The sacrifices, it should be noted, are offered to Jahveh. The statements of Amos and Hosea leave no doubt upon this point. The Deuteronomic writers of a later period are unhistorical in their representation that not Jahveh, but idols, were worshipped at the northern sanctuaries. In his very tone Amos assumes that the people already know what Jahveh demands in place of this ceremonial service. Nevertheless he formulates his conception of Jahveh's requirements in several striking sentences.

In place of the rejected and worthless sacrifices they are to "let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as an everflowing stream."¹ The direct parallelism between the following passages indicates that "seeking Jahveh" and "seeking good" are substantially equivalent expressions:—

"Seek Jahveh, and ye shall live";²

"Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live."³

To "seek Jahveh" had always meant to visit a Jahveh sanctuary in order to offer sacrifices. The very different meaning which Amos now gives to the phrase is in detail dependent upon the question of what he understood by "good." It must suffice in this connection to note its undoubted moral significance. In extant written prophecy these passages constitute the first great declaration, in the Old Testament, of *the inseparability of morality and religion*. So fundamental is this recognition of the ethical character of

¹ Am. 5: 24. ² Am. 5: 6. ³ Am. 5: 14. Cf. also 5: 6 and 5: 15.

true religion that out of it have grown the positive gains of the entire subsequent development of Israel's religion.

Amos' declaration that sacrifice cannot indemnify for the neglect of Jahveh's moral precepts implies a clear perception of God's will as an ethical will, and that he recognized in moral conduct the supreme requirement of religion. To his credit, therefore, will it ever be said, that he was the first great prophet in Israel who defined religion in terms of moral obligation. There was no possibility of moral progress in the old idea that Jahveh was simply the guardian of existing social customs among Israelites, and that he demanded sacrifices as fines for sins committed, or as a retaining fee to champion their cause against foreign enemies. Such a religion was a comfortable pillow, especially as long as the king assumed the duty of maintaining the cultus in a state of becoming magnificence out of the royal funds. Upon this religion of mad and sensual indulgence, typified by the sacrificial revelers at Bethel, the herdsman prophet of Tekoa served the summons of a higher conscience, supported by an essentially new conception of Jahveh and his demands.

It would be interesting and illuminating to learn what Amos included under the term "good." To read a New Testament meaning into the word would be a serious mistake. He doubtless would have admitted some social customs and forms of conduct under this heading which the Christian judgment of our time

would unhesitatingly classify differently. We need but instance polygamy, slavery, and blood-revenge — institutions which entirely escaped censure by the prophets, because the moral feeling of the time discerned nothing wrong in them. In such matters Amos, also, stood upon the moral plane of his environment. He may have endeavored to regulate the abuses of such institutions, but did not advocate their abolition.

If we do not know all that Amos meant by "good," neither do we know all that he meant by the "iniquities" which Jahveh is to visit upon his people. Some of Amos' denunciations suggest that his understanding of "evil" included things that cannot be condemned on moral grounds. Notice, for instance, his vehement arraignment of what might be called ordinary luxuries of life. Like many another ardent reformer, he probably did not always stop to distinguish between abuse and legitimate use of certain things. Unfortunately neither the depths nor the shallows of his moral judgment are accessible now to the plummet of psychological analysis. This much, however, is clear, that the fundamental social virtues — justice, honesty, truthfulness, and fair dealing — occupy the foreground of his thought. There is, indeed, a series of passages which seem to restrict Jahveh's moral requirements to the proper administration of justice on the one hand, and a condition of legal rectitude on the other.¹ This identification of righteousness with legal

¹ Am. 2:7 f.; 5:7, 10-12; 8:4-6.

righteousness, however, is to be regarded as more apparent than real. The limit lies in the emphasis, not in the application of his thought. Amos had before his eyes the everlasting curse of the East, bribery of elders and priests who served as judges. This corruption of the courts deprived the poor man of his right and filled the houses of the rich with violence and spoil.¹

Since overtness is a necessary condition of legal guilt it is well to remind one's self of the fact that the judgments of Amos and his successors still move in a realm where motives as yet play a scarcely perceptible part. For morality differentiates itself from legality at the point where the inward test of merit begins to supplant the outward. Amos is seeking to apply concrete remedies to concrete sins. Therefore he postulates as the foundation of acceptable religion that elemental requirement of the moral law which his hearers so signally violate in their human relations. For the same reason Jahveh seems to him an impersonation of justice, and the sacrifices "a covering of the eyes," an attempt to bribe the supreme judge.

No picture of Amos' fancy is so full of meaning as that of the mystic figure on the wall with a plumb-line in his hand. It is his symbol for an inexorable, un-deviating Justice whose decision must prove fatal to Israel. The fundamental character of social justice in the sermons of Amos is a matter of scientific interest to the student of moral origins. Here as elsewhere the

¹ Am. 3: 10.

facts of moral development among the Hebrews are in harmony with the wider experience of mankind.¹

We have already had occasion to observe that legal righteousness does not exhaust the ethical content of what Amos calls "good." Legal righteousness would, of course, mean *Hebrew* legal righteousness, which could not be otherwise than local and temporal in its scope. But Amos has in mind an ethical standard by which he judges the conduct of neighboring nations also.² In other words, he begins to free the idea of justice, of good, from national and legal limitations, giving to the morality he preaches an international significance.³ Crude and vague as it undoubtedly was in particulars, it now was capable of developing into rules of action that have universal validity.

Since the issue is charged with ethical consequences, it devolves upon us, at this point, to enquire whether Amos was a monotheist. In my opinion this question must be unhesitatingly answered in the negative. There are those who have seen in him an "uncompromising monotheist." But this view rests either upon a loose interpretation of the term monotheism, or upon an imperfect understanding of the course of religious development in Israel. Strictly understood, monotheism means belief in the existence of one God

¹ On justice in the system of Thomas Aquinas, cf. W. H. V. Reade, *The Moral System of Dante's Inferno*; for a general treatment of the subject, cf. Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, and Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, I, Justice.

² Am. 1:3, 13; 2:1.

³ Cf. Marti, *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion* (5th ed.) p. 189.

only, whose rule is universal. In the literature illustrating religious ideas before and during the time of Amos there is no evidence of such monotheism. Jahveh was the God of Israel and to him alone the nation owed fealty and worship. But every Israelite knew and believed that other nations also had their gods, whose real existence no one doubted. From one point of view this was henotheism, from another monolatry. But under no circumstances may one claim monotheism for Amos. Consideration of certain expressions employed by him makes it very improbable that he ever speculated upon the subject at all.

Belief in the existence of other deities carried with it the correlate idea of a separate domain within which each god exercised power. "Jahveh's inheritance," for instance, is Palestine, and one who passed beyond the boundaries of the country left Jahveh behind, and had to place himself under the protection of "other gods" whose domain he has entered.¹ Jahveh, therefore, as we have pointed out elsewhere, was not supreme over the world; he was a part of it. He still was intramundane in the popular phraseology.

Amos, seemingly, did not share this view of Jahveh's place and power in its earlier crude form. But it is apparent that he was not working with a *fundamentally different* conception. He still thought that foreign lands were "polluted" because of the presence of other deities.² To emphasize the impossibility of escape

¹ I Sam. 26: 19; Gen. 4: 14.

² Am. 7: 17.

from punishment, he declared that Jahveh will *bring up* those who dig through into the underworld, and *bring down* those who climb up into heaven.¹ Even on the supposition that he employed here figures of speech one cannot ignore the tacit assumption that Jahveh's proper dwelling-place and judgment-seat is in Palestine, the prophet's material world of daily experience. Amos has not yet attained, in his thought of Jahveh's rule, to a world that is an ordered whole, a cosmos, over every part of which the will of Jahveh is supreme. This inference is supported by the fact that the idea of God's creatorship is found nowhere in the extant writings of Amos.² The occurrence of this idea of creatorship would be presumptive evidence of a cosmic conception of the world, and consequently of monotheism. During the post-exilic period of conscious speculative monotheism the idea of God's creatorship is nearly always associated with the thought of his unity and universality.

The important point to note is that in Amos Jahveh still is *intramundane*, and monotheism, when it emerges, rests not upon an intramundane, but a supramundane, or quasi-transcendental conception of God. But may not Amos have been an "ethical" monotheist, as some have claimed? He mentions the Philistines and the Aramæans as people over whose movements Jahveh

¹ Am. 9: 2; cf. Lods, *La croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts*, vol. 1, p. 225; also Beer, *Der biblische Hades*, p. 7.

² The three passages, Am. 4: 13; 5: 8, 9; and 9: 5, 6, have on independent grounds been recognized by scholars as doxological editorial additions.

has exercised a directive control. If the text is reliable, an impious act of the Moabites against Edom calls forth the denunciation of the prophet.¹ It would show that Amos believed his Israelitic moral standard to be valid for non-Israelitic nations also. The case is the more remarkable, because the particular failure he has in mind is not incident to an issue between an Israelite and a foreigner, but concerns the inhuman conduct of one foreign nation toward another.

Undoubtedly Amos greatly expanded the national-god idea. From more than one point of view that was the psychological consequence of his proclamation of doom for Israel. If Jahveh can contemplate the destruction of those whom alone he has "known of all the families of the earth," it raises the presumption that his purposes must embrace more than the fortunes of Palestine and its people. He must be able to indemnify himself for the loss of his worshippers. These considerations indicate that Amos is moving in the direction of a cosmic conception of God. The close connection between the idea of God and the idea of moral obligation appears in the correlate extension of the sway of moral law beyond the boundaries of Palestine. The propulsive power is his sense of Jahveh's ethical will, expressing itself in the positive requirements of a moral law.

However, the conclusion that Amos logically inferred the universal rule of God from his belief in the

¹ Am. 2:1.

universal validity of moral law is not warranted by the facts. Amos was not working with an abstract conception of moral law. He as well as later Hebrew prophets were almost painfully concrete in their mental processes. When we come to those points in his writings where the broader humanitarian view of God and the world, which one is accustomed to associate with ethical monotheism, might be expected to manifest itself, we find he is still speaking the language of Hebrew particularism. The tone in which he refers to the Philistines and Aramæans, and especially his clapperclaw reference to the Cushites,¹ reinforce his assertion that Jahveh has "known"² the Israelites *only*. In other words, he expands the national-god-idea, but does not burst it. God's impartial fatherly interest in all men is not yet an article of his faith. This view of the limitations of Amos' contribution to Israel's growing knowledge of God agrees also with the otherwise remarkable fact that not even the Deuteronomic writers, more than a century later, had arrived at a clear monotheistic conception of God.

When Thomas Aquinas noted as a distinguishing characteristic of the Old Testament that *it did not undertake to punish the soul*³ he saw more clearly than most modern readers of the prophets. It requires considerable familiarity with ancient modes of thought to remain conscious of the fact that no ancient Hebrew

¹ Am. 9:7 ("Ethiopians").

² Am. 3:2.

³ "Lex vetus animum non cohibebat." *Summa Theol.*

practised religion in order to save his soul, in the New Testament sense of that expression. He would have understood and used the phrase in the sense of prolonging life on earth, that being the chief benefit which he anticipated from the faithful performance of religious duties. True, he believed in a shadowy existence beyond the grave. But he had no expectation of a *future life* in which Jahveh might reward his virtues or punish his sins. Sheol was a cheerless and shadowy place where neither rewards nor punishments were distributed. Hence the religious economy of the Old Testament concerns itself solely with man's earthly life. Only in the land of the living can the worshipper maintain relations with the deity, or become the object of his regard.¹

However, a moral order, to be authoritative, must have power to reward obedience and to enforce it with penalties. In the theology of Amos and his contemporaries, this difficulty was met by the time-honored belief that Jahveh's rewards were bestowed in the form of material prosperity and the perpetuity of national existence. On the other hand, sword, drought, pestilence, and all the various misfortunes of life were his instruments of punishment. The highest reward of Hebrew virtue, therefore, could be only a tangible and earthly good,² and no punishment could extend beyond the body and the possessions that minister to its com-

¹ Ps. 6:5; 30:9.

² "Bonum sensibile et terrenum" in the apt phrase of Thomas Aquinas.

fort and joy. Though the story of Job belongs to a later period of developed individualism it illustrates the point under discussion here. Possessions, family, self — this is the order of values. "All that a man has, will he give for his life." Death is the last blow which the punishing hand of the deity may deal. Disease and extinction of issue only increase the terrors of its approach.

A very important fact to observe in this ante-mortem theodicy is its communal application. The benefits and penalties of religion, especially during the pre-exilic period, were believed to be administered primarily to the nation. This was a perfectly natural expectation, since religion existed for the purpose of preserving organized society, the state. Hence the duties of religion and of citizenship were identical. Long experience had taught ancient societies that the individual is safe only behind the bulwark of a strong and stable social organization. Preservation of the clan is self-preservation. This fact explains the intense feeling of group solidarity which pervades Hebrew literature in song and in story. It also suggests why religion was a part of every Israelite's solicitude for the continuance of his nation, and why in time of danger or of conquest it stalked arm in arm with savage passions across the bloody battlefields of the "wars of Jahveh."

The following arrangement will summarize and bring out graphically the chief differences between the

religious conceptions of the pre-exilic prophets and those of the New Testament: —

<i>Pre-exilic O. T. Prophets</i>	<i>New Testament</i>
Subject of religion: the historical <i>people</i> of Israel with its political and social institutions.	Subject of religion: the <i>individual soul</i> , conceived to be eternal and immortal.
Point of view: communal-national.	Point of view: individualistic-humanitarian.
Jahveh, God of Israel only.	"Our Father," God of all mankind.
Jahveh, though invisible is of this world and dwells particularly in Palestine. Intramundane.	"Our Father, who art in heaven," Transcendent.
No heaven and no hell.	Heaven and hell.
No mention of the devil or of Satan.	The devil part of a developed demonology; identified with Satan.
The body alone subject to punishment or reward, and only during its earthly existence.	Punishment of the body in this life a secondary consideration. Emphasis upon punishments and rewards of the soul after death.
Benefits of religion, material. Peace and prosperity of the estates of the realm.	Benefits of religion, spiritual. Peace of conscience as a sign of healthy spiritual life.

To these controlling conceptions must be added the further fact that the morality of the prophets is not the inner, universal morality of the human soul, but the civic and social morality of the Hebrew as a member of the Israelite commonwealth. It is this latter morality of which Amos conceives Jahveh to be guardian and which, together with the purely mundane benefits of its practice, he has in mind when he says, "Seek good and not evil, that ye may live."¹ Jahveh's favor is the guarantee of the nation's life, of its perpetuity. According to current popular views it is secured by abundant

¹ Am. 5:14.

sacrifices and the faithful observances of feast-days and ceremonial. According to Amos it can be secured only by the honest administration of justice;¹ by the retention of simple life and manners;² by the protection of the weak and the poor;³ by the practice of honesty and brotherliness;⁴ and by the eschewing of sexual and other excesses.⁵

Measured by Christian standards this morality is so simple, and so close to the earth, that it scarcely comes within sight of the Sermon on the Mount. But so fundamental was it in its simplicity, that it turned the whole course of Israel's religious development into a new channel. Henceforward the homage of moral conduct, be it ever so crude, is deemed an essential divine requirement.

It remains in conclusion to discuss specifically Amos' idea of retribution. In the light of the foregoing discussion his pronouncement of doom upon Israel appears in its proper conceptual background. Eternal punishment, or eternal death, is its corresponding equivalent in Christian theology. Nothing was so potent to arouse the fear of an Israelite as the prospect of national, and consequently individual, destruction. In the proclamation of its coming, contingent upon conduct, lay the prophet's power to force the hand.

The Deuteronomic reformation is a historical ex-

¹ Am. 2:6; 5:10, 15.

² Am. 6:4 *f*.

³ Am. 5:11; 8:6.

⁴ Am. 5:12; 8:5.

⁵ Am. 2:7.

ample of the effect produced by such fears. The common assumption that the moral law could hardly command obedience, without the belief in retribution beyond the grave, is contradicted by the moral experience of Israel, where the expectation of *post-mortem* rewards and punishments was still far below the horizon. But there was an expectation of retribution in *this* world of which the prophets make effective use. It was the traditional force of ancient beliefs, as well as the exigencies of his own moral philosophy, that constrained Amos to give to every public calamity a sinister meaning. Earthquake, solar eclipse, drought, famine, locusts, disease, were interpreted as divine punishments, and as premonitions of the final catastrophe. So long as the people, rather than the individual, was conceived to be the subject of retribution, the inadequacy of this theory was not strongly felt. Later the rise of individualistic tendencies made it increasingly untenable.

But we cannot concern ourselves here with the ethical defects of this somewhat superstitious view of God's moral government of the world. The needed corrections were destined to be made by the remoter successors of Amos. It is sufficient to remember that this was but a part of a mass of other ideas equally crude, equally untrue, and equally far behind the moral and scientific discernment of our time. Nor can we prudently forget, regarding the philosophical inwardness of some of these problems, that our age

is not much wiser — only more cautious. Our object has been to see Amos in his environment of men, ideas, and institutions, to discover the new stimulus he gave to the religious development of his time. If it appears that he also "could but speak his music by the framework and the chord," that truth and prejudice, ignorance and wisdom, are strangely mixed in the fervid poetry of his thought, what have we but a new reminder of the simple fact that Amos, the prophet, was also a Hebrew herdsman of the eighth century B.C.

II

Between the period of Hosea's activity and that of his elder contemporary Amos there intervene at most only twenty years. Both belong to the middle of the eighth century B.C. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hosea presents substantially the same conception of God and defends the same ethical ideals. Since the fundamental generalizations of the foregoing discussion of Amos hold true also of the theology and the world-view of Hosea, it is not necessary to take up these common elements anew.

A determining peculiarity of Hosea's thought is the background of marital experience which gives a characteristic color and quality to his writings.¹ His

¹ Besides numerous glosses, the following longer passages are later additions, or doubtful, and have not been utilized in this study: Hos. 1:7; 1:10-2:1; 2:14-23; 3:1-5 (?); 4:15; 5:15-6:3; 6:11; 8:4-6; 8:14; 10:3-4; 11:8-12; 12:4-6; 12:9-10; 12:12-14; 13:4; 14:1-9; 10: 12 probably is only misplaced.

domestic tragedy yields him the conceptual apparatus of his argument. Jahveh's relation to Israel, he holds, is like that of a husband to his wife.¹ Out of the conflicting passions of one of the deepest emotional experiences of which the human heart is capable he depicts Jahveh yearning over his wayward people as he himself is yearning over his unfaithful wife. This is obviously the reason why he places *loyal love*² (*hesed*), rather than justice in the foreground of his thought as Jahveh's supreme requirement. Consequently, also, he appeals to the love rather than the fear of God in the motives he urges for the realization of his ethical ideals in the life of the nation. He is thus a more winning preacher of morals than Amos, in so far as the sweet constraint of love is greater and more lasting than the compulsion of fear. Perhaps some of these differences are to be sought in temperament as much as in the personal experiences that form the background of their respective messages. The following tabular comparison will make the correspondences and differences more apparent: —

¹ Both the land and its people appear in this rôle. Cf. 1:2 where the land is the "mother"; in 5:7 and 6:4 *the people* are in the mind of the prophet. For "baal" as owner and husband see p. 192.

² *Hesed* is difficult to translate because it comprehends several meanings which must be rendered by different words in English. Thus it signifies not only "goodness" and "kindness," but also "love" or "affection" as shown by the parallel phrase "love of thine espousals" [to Jahveh] in Jer. 2:2. The context and symbolism show that Hosea uses the word primarily in this sense. But because he intentionally lets it overflow into other meanings in the same connection I have indicated its occurrence parenthetically in the translations.

AMOS

Jahveh, a righteous Judge.

"I hate, I despise your sacrificial feasts. . . . Let *justice* roll down like waters and *righteousness* as an everflowing stream." ¹

"Seek good and not evil, that ye may live . . . and establish *justice* in the gate." ²

HOSEA

Jahveh, a loving but outraged and angry husband.

"I desire *love* (*hesed*) and not sacrifice; the *knowledge of God* and not burnt-offerings." ²

"Sow for yourselves righteousness, reap the fruit of *love* (*hesed*); break up your fallow ground of *knowledge* that he may come and rain *righteousness* upon you." ⁴

Hosea complains "There is no faithfulness (*'emeth*), nor love (*hesed*), nor knowledge (*da'ath*) of God in the land. There is nought but swearing and breaking faith, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery." ⁵ These are the same social sins that Amos had denounced. But one member of the trinity of moral qualities, whose absence Hosea deplures, was never mentioned by Amos — the "knowledge of God." To understand thereby an intellectual apprehension of divine requirements would be a mistake. Not to "know," as here used, means not to "care for," or not to "have intercourse with." ⁶

Hosea means by "knowledge of God" the serious endeavor to maintain respectful and loving reli-

¹ Am. 5:21 f.

² Hos. 6:6; "more than burnt-offerings," R.V., is not according to the text and destroys the force of the original. The translators tried to save a place for sacrifice in spite of Hosea.

³ Am. 5:14, 15.

⁴ Hos. 10:12, according to the LXX. Cf. Hos. 4:1.

⁵ Hos. 4:1 ff.

⁶ Cf. Baumann, "Yada^e und seine Derivate," ZAW, 110 ff. (1908). The Hebrew meaning of the word has been carried over into English in the Biblical phrase, "he *knew* his wife," etc. Cf. also I Sam. 2:12, where Kittel (HSAT, p. 382) rightly translates . . . "nichtswürdige Menschen, die sich um Jahwe nicht kümmerten."

gious intercourse with Jahveh. Hence, when he complains that there is "no knowledge of God in the land," he does not have ignorance in mind, but deliberate and culpable neglect of Jahveh's will as it was then understood. It cannot be denied that Hosea, at this point in his theology, is phraseologically dependent on the prevailing physical mode of thought according to which Jahveh is the husband and owner, the *baal*, of the land. The fruitfulness of the soil, the increase of the flocks, and the growth of the population are evidence of a harmonious relationship. An estrangement is followed by drought, famine, and death.¹ Thus wedlock becomes his symbol for religion, whoredom for idolatry, and "knowing Jahveh" is terminology borrowed from the Semitic vocabulary of sex relations, for the purpose of designating acceptable religious intercourse with Jahveh. "The spirit of whoredom is within them and they know not (i.e., care not about) Jahveh."² He declares there is a false and a right way of maintaining relations with Jahveh; the former is by sacrifice and burnt-offerings, the latter by love and the knowledge of God. The foregoing explanation shows why Hebrew parallelism can employ knowledge of God and love as practical equivalents. The scheme of marital symbolism which forms the framework of his sermons accounts for his choice of these expressions.

Once the word "knowledge" occurs in an absolute

¹ Hos. 4:3; cf. also 9:14.

² Hos. 5:4.

sense, and in a connection in which it seems to be equivalent to "the law (*tôrah*) of your God."¹ This raises the question how much importance Hosea attached to the administration of justice as a religious requirement. Ordinarily *tôrah*, during the pre-exilic period, referred to the traditional precedents or decisions of customary law. The so-called Book of the Covenant, Ex. 20-23, is one of the earliest written collections of such decisions. They were of divine origin, according to popular belief, and included both civil and ceremonial law. From ancient times it was the peculiar duty and prerogative of the priests to dispense justice. Where possible, this was done by precedent according to the traditional digest of "statutes," which it was the duty of the priests to know. In new and difficult cases, it seems, the priests also had recourse to the sacred lot,² or rendered judgment according to the assumed principles underlying existing decisions.³ The general prevalence of bribery, and the depravity of the priesthood, made this system peculiarly liable to abuse. Since the priests were custodians also of ceremonial law the sacrificial system afforded them another opportunity to profit by the imposition of sacrificial fines. This fact must be taken into account in connection with the prophetic crusade against the sacrificial system.

¹ Hos. 4:6; cf. Guthe, Hosea, p. 7, in Kautzsch's HSAT.

² Cf. I Sam. 14:41 *f.*, and art. "Urim and Thummim," by G. F. Moore in Ency. Bib.

³ Cf. Ex. 18; Hos. 8:12.

The maladministration of justice is one of the serious and wide-spread sins in Israel which the prophets never tire of denouncing. It is difficult to suppose that Hosea did not have in mind these corrupt practices of the priests when he inveighs against them,¹ however far his moral demands may outreach the formal administration of justice. They are the more culpable in his eyes because they are the recognized custodians of "decisions" whose patron and author is Jahveh. Marti infers, doubtless rightly, that the failure of the prophets to appeal to such *tôrah* collections as Hosea apparently knew ² is to be taken as evidence that they did not consider their observance an adequate discharge of religious duty.³ Here also one must reckon with Hosea's transfer of emphasis from mere justice to that many-sided attitude of love toward God and man which is the source both of justice and of the gentler human virtues. Jahveh, declares Hosea, desires not the sacrificial cult, but the maintenance of those social virtues among Israelites which insure the stability of their society. Just as in human relations the fulfilment of a loved one's wishes passes from duty to privilege, so a sense of personal attachment to Jahveh must transform a perfunctory into a spontaneous observance of his will.

What the prophet conceived to be the particular content of that will it is not so easy to say. Nearly the

¹ Hos. 4: 4-11.

² Hos. 8: 12.

³ Marti, *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion* (5th ed.), p. 184.

same considerations apply here as were discussed under the heading of what Amos meant by "good." The student who wishes to proceed historically must be prepared to admit that Hosea would have included, and did include, under the will of Jahveh demands which no enlightened conscience of to-day could possibly accept as divine, except in so far as the operation of the divine spirit is believed to manifest itself even in the imperfect aspirations of the human soul after good. It must be remembered that the prophets unconsciously thought of God in terms of the highest in themselves, even as do the men of our time. But our conception of what is good and admirable in conduct and personality has been refined by nineteen Christian centuries of philosophical and ethical development. If what we now conceive to be the unity of men's highest ideals proves but an inadequate representation of the divine, how much less could Hosea and his contemporaries, amid the crude moral environment of the eighth century B.C., be expected to portray the eternal acceptably with colors borrowed from their own feelings, experiences, and convictions! It is not surprising, as we shall see, that he fell into some errors which it is our duty to recognize as such.

Obviously, the hoped-for reward of piety is for Hosea, as for Amos, the prosperity of the nation and its preservation. One cannot help marvelling at the manner in which the prophets transformed into a potent factor of civic moral progress, this eagerness for social, ante-

mortem benefits from religion. Hosea's own deepening ethical conception of Jahveh as the guardian of civic righteousness has given him a keen eye for the moral failings of his people. Justice, social corruption, reliance on a Canaanitish Jahveh-cult, and foreign political alliances, he thinks, have left Jahveh no alternative but the destruction of the nation. But the language in which he expresses this conviction, as a threat from Jahveh, is so full of savage passion that it grates on the ear: "Therefore am I to them a lion; as a leopard will I watch by the way; I will meet them as a bear that is bereaved of her whelps, and will rend the caul of their heart; then will I devour them as a lion, like a wild beast tear them in pieces."¹ In two other passages the barbarous slaughter of women and children, a common incident of Semitic warfare, is placed in prospect as a manifestation of Jahveh's indiscriminating vengeance.²

These judgments, attributed to God in the Old Testament, are rarely anything else than actual or anticipated occurrences translated into acts of Jahveh, and considered in the light of primitive human justice — half punishment and half outrage. The punishment of children for the sins of the fathers presented no ethical difficulty under the group morality system of the time. Hosea was not far enough along on the road to individualism to question the justice of such punishment. The Hebrew prophet believed that earthquakes and

¹ Hos. 13: 7, 8.

² Hos. 10: 14; 13: 16.

eclipses of the sun could be warded off as easily as a pestilence — by the recovery of Jahveh's favor; for all were manifestations of divine wrath. The modern knows that the pestilence is in his own power if he can but find and destroy the microbe; that earthquakes are not sporadic irruptions of divine punishment; and that a solar eclipse is a harmless phenomenon obeying laws so regular that the astronomer can foretell its advent to a second.

The foregoing considerations have directed attention to figures of speech, used about God or put into his mouth, that may become a source of immoral conceptions about him. This danger is especially great under the old static view of revelation, which still lies as a tacit assumption behind the preaching of many pulpits, and by force of traditional momentum carries along nearly the entire Biblical instruction of the young. Thus it happens, through ignorance of the facts of Israel's moral development on the one hand, and a false view of revelation on the other, that deplorably crude and immoral ideas about God are still imparted as the "word of God." The corrective lies in realizing the fact that the prophets naïvely attributed to God their own feelings and sentiments, which naturally did not rise at all points superior to the moral and æsthetic limitations of their age. "Jahveh said unto Hosea, go take unto thee an impure wife," ¹ illustrates, for instance, a not uncommon

¹ Hos. 1:2.

practice of Hebrew prophets to sanction the beginning of a course of events by the outcome.¹ Hosea, brooding over his domestic sorrow, viewed it in the light of his later ministry as his divine call, — God's rear-most thought. But it does not follow that he was actually divinely directed to marry a woman preordained to prove unfaithful to him, in order that this bitter experience might prove helpful to him in his ministry. Both the teaching of Jesus and a deeper religious philosophy require us to dissent from a theory of determinism that makes God operate with evil in order to effect his purpose. We face an element here, in Hosea's conception of God's providence, that was borrowed from his time. That is its historical justification. But for its literal use and interpretation in these days there is no justification except that of ignorance. A declaration based on similar naïve presuppositions, and put into the mouth of God, is the following: "I have given thee a king in mine anger, and have taken him away in my wrath."² The service of the Bible to the higher Christian culture of our time must suffer grievous harm if such passages are used by the unthinking to propagate immoral ideas about God.

Hosea's depiction of Jahveh as an injured husband gave a new impulse to the possibly already existing disposition to represent him as actuated by feelings of jealousy.³ Since jealousy implies an attitude toward

¹ Cf. Is. 6:8 ff. and Jer. 32:8. ² Hos. 13:11; cf. Ezek. 20:25.

³ Cf. Küchler, *Der Gedanke des Eifers Jahwes im A.T.*, ZAW (1908), p. 42 ff. (Ex. 20:5; 34:14; and Josh. 24:19 may be later than Hosea.)

rivals, and must be reckoned among the ignoble passions, its attribution to God, the Absolute, should now be accounted an intolerable anthropopathism. Hosea's use of the idea, however, may be taken, among other things, as evidence that he still believed in the reality of other gods. Other primitive ideas, brought over from an earlier period, survive in his thought. He regards Palestine as the "land of Jahveh," and assumes that in Assyria the food of the Israelites will be in a state of "pollution," because it is impossible to consecrate it there by dedicating the prescribed portions to Jahveh.¹ Apparently Jahveh was still believed to be inseparable from Palestine; in at least one speech of Jahveh Hosea makes him refer to Canaan as "my house,"² from which the Israelites are to be driven forth into exile. Hosea, therefore, holds the same intramundane view of Jahveh's relation to the world that we found in Amos. It follows that, like the latter, he is not a monotheist, but a henotheist. Since they were practically contemporaries, the evidence on this point in their writings is mutually confirmatory.

In his polemic against the Canaanitish Baal cult, with which Jahveh was being worshipped at the high places, Hosea condemns particularly the employment of images³ representative of Jahveh. One can hardly be far wrong in recognizing this fact as evidence of a growing sense of Jahveh's spirituality, or rather of the

¹ Hos. 9:3, 4.

² Hos. 9:15.

³ Mostly bull images, contemptuously referred to as "calves," perhaps on account of their diminutive size. Hos. 8:4-6; 10:5; 13:2.

supersensuousness of his being. Other questions involved in the prophetic crusade against the high places are taken up in connection with the Book of Deuteronomy. It must suffice here simply to state that the sacrificial cult and the high-places he is attacking under the name of Baal worship are not a form of foreign idolatry but the official Jahveh worship of his time.

Hosea furnishes an interesting illustration of the abrogation of one "Thus saith the Lord" by another. The ninth and tenth chapters of II Kings record Jehu's treacherous massacre of the family of King Ahab. Elisha is represented as having instigated the deed. All the revolting details of the long series of murders are recorded. Then comes to Jehu the word of Jahveh, presumably through Elisha: "Because thou hast executed well that which was right in mine eyes, and hast done unto the house of Ahab according to all that was in my heart, thy sons of the fourth generation shall sit upon the throne of Israel."¹ This surprising sanction of so horrible a deed illustrates anew the fatal facility with which even a prophet like Elisha identified the will of Jahveh with the rude morals and blood-thirsty passions of the day. Hosea, standing upon the higher moral ground of a later century, declares his conviction that the deed of Jehu was wicked and ruinous, and thus repudiates the sanction of Elisha. Very different is the word of Jahveh that comes to

¹ II Kings 10:30; cf. 9:1 f.

him: "Call his name Jezreel; for yet a little while, and I will avenge the blood of Jezreel upon the house of Jehu, and will cause the kingdom of the house of Israel to cease."¹ It is a cancellation of development, the expression of a more enlightened ethical judgment. Comparison of these two passages furnishes an example of the moral value of historical criticism. Both theology and ethics have suffered at the hands of earnest but misguided literalists who accept Jahveh's alleged sanction of Jehu's murders, or Elijah's slaughter of the priests of Baal, as the will of God. The result of Biblical instruction which rests upon such immoral presuppositions about God cannot be otherwise than intellectually and morally pernicious.

We have already called attention to an ignoble by-product of the literary device by which Hosea presents Jahveh in the character of a jealous husband. It remains in conclusion to note a lasting advantage. The thought of Jahveh's love, though often obscured, never again leaves the theology of Israel. A theory of human conduct, expressed or implied, that postulates temporal national well-being as the goal of ethics and the reward of piety, must be largely motivated by prudential considerations. In the days of Amos and Hosea, goodness as an ideal, to be achieved primarily for its own sake, still hides behind nearer and more tangible, but also more transient ideals. The finer

¹ Hos. 1:4; notes the assumption that God punishes the whole nation for the sin of one of its kings.

moral distinctions of an individualistic theory of human conduct are wanting, and the feeling of individual responsibility must have been vague. But love, even in the Hebrew sense of the word, looks toward individualism. Therefore Hosea took a long stride forward when he declared that the love of God should be the mainspring of human conduct. He drew the larger circle which included that of Amos.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROPHET OF HOLINESS

Isaiah ben-Amoz

AMONG the men whose genius and devotion brightened the far-off centuries of Israelitish history there is no figure more conspicuous nor a mind more brilliant than that of Isaiah ben-Amoz. There are at least four different aspects which his life and writings present to the student. Whether one considers his career as a statesman, as a reformer, as a poet, or as a theologian, one finds in each case abundant material for thought.

As a statesman he first came into prominence during the Syro-Ephraimitic invasion, bravely trying to save his country from disastrous political entanglements. To him as to other Hebrew prophets, the affairs of politics were not something apart from his mission, for he lost no opportunity to place his hands upon the unsteady political scales in which the destinies of his nation were swaying. Had the Athenian patriot Demosthenes sketched his ideal of a statesman with Isaiah in mind it could hardly have resembled the Hebrew prophet more closely. There is good reason to think that on two supreme occasions his firmness and advice were all that prevented the collapse of the Judean state a century before it finally came.

Or is it in the capacity of reformer that one desires to study him? — to hear him thunder out his tremendous invectives against greed and injustice, drunkenness and idolatrous superstitions. It would scarcely be possible to find anywhere a more scathing arraignment of unjust wealth concentrated in the hands of a few than the sixfold denunciation beginning: "Woe unto those who join house to house, who add field to field till there is no more room, and ye are settled alone in the land." ¹ Here also his profound insight into the causes of national decay has had many sad vindications in the downfall of states whose institutions had been undermined by these insidious vices.

Less often is Isaiah mentioned as a poet. Yet in this particular capacity he far outstrips every rival in the field of prophecy. Unfortunately, the revisers of our English Bible have given no hint that nearly the whole of Isaiah's writings is in poetry, for while they have adopted the metrical form of arrangement for Job and the Psalms, they have retained the prose form of arrangement even for those of his prophecies which as poetry stand unsurpassed in the literature of the Hebrews.

Not less eminent was Isaiah ben-Amoz as a theologian. But the very symmetry of his powers embarrasses one in the attempt to point out his special contribution to Israel's growing knowledge of God. The highly poetical character of his language, too, makes

¹ Is. 5:8.

the student doubt at times the propriety of drawing theological inferences from what is evidently not the product of theological reflection. But this consideration applies in other cases, also, though to a less degree, and must be allowed to operate as a caution rather than as a deterrent. The fact remains that Isaiah has exerted a profound influence upon the religious thought of Israel, and has enriched all the liturgies of Christendom with the products of his consecrated genius. For even the modern worshipper, when he desires to speak of the holiness and majesty of God, can find no language more exalted than that which Isaiah puts into the mouth of the adoring seraphim: —

“Holy, holy, holy, is Jahveh of hosts;
The whole earth is full of his glory!”¹

Isaiah's remarkable description of the vision of his call, and his frequent references to the manner in which he believed Jahveh's will to have been communicated to him, affords an appropriate opportunity for a word about the Hebrew conception of revelation. The reader will do well to disabuse his mind at once of the notion that it always meant a definite thing. The word itself is an abstraction of occidental origin, with a variety of theological connotations that probably never entered the mind of an Old Testament writer. The effort to comprehend the extremely varied contents of the Hebrew Scriptures under an exclusive theological definition of revelation has proved, and will continue to

¹ Is. 6 : 3.

prove, futile for the simple reason that life cannot be fixed in a formula.

The Old Testament recognizes three sources of divine guidance: the "word" of the prophet, the "counsel" of the sage, and the "law," or "instruction" of the priest.¹ The first dealt primarily with matters of social ethics; the second with prudential precepts for the practical guidance of everyday life; and the third with ceremonial and ritual regulations. The prophecies of Amos, the Book of Proverbs, and the Book of Leviticus are typical illustrations respectively of the literary products of these three classes of persons. Of these the first only is pertinent to our present inquiry into the Hebrew idea of revelation.

It is interesting to observe that in the course of centuries not only the content of prophetic preaching changed, but that the prophets gradually modified their view of the manner in which God was thought to reveal his will to them. Our earliest information about the order of the prophets shows that they lived in religious communities or societies, the members of which were known collectively as "*B'nē hannebi'im*," i.e., "sons of the prophets," in the sense of members of a prophetic guild. This peculiarity they are believed to have had in common with similar religious societies among neighboring nations, for instance among the Phœnicians. Besides, in primitive times both Hebrews and Phœnicians believed a dervishlike frenzy to be

¹ Cf. Jer. 18: 18.

the mark of divine inspiration, or rather, possession, inasmuch as they spoke of it as a "seizure." Occasionally an artificial stimulus was employed in order to induce this psychic condition. Elisha, for instance, employed a musician on a certain occasion. "And it came to pass when the minstrel played, that the hand of Jahveh came upon him." ¹

This naïve possession-theory of prophecy for a long time constituted the answer of popular philosophy to the question "How does Jahveh communicate his will through the prophet?" At a time when these psychic states of religious frenzy were generally regarded as evidence of spirit-seizure, and when no other answer to this question was either known or conceivable, primitive prophetism naturally yielded in act and thought to this theory. Probably because almost any one could by auto-suggestion, or by external stimulus, produce within himself the desired psychic state, and because the frenzied dervish prophetism of Saul's time could no longer satisfy an age of higher culture, the authenticity of these ecstatic states as evidence of divine inspiration came to be doubted. Dreams and visions, recognized as means of divine communication from time immemorial, gradually began to supersede ecstasy in the economy of prophetism.

But experience shows that primitive religious beliefs are practically indestructible so long as the race survives. It is not surprising, therefore, that occasional

¹ II Kings 3:15.

instances of ecstasy-prophetism are met with among literary prophets even after the collapse of Hebrew nationality. But from the time of Isaiah onward there is increasing evidence of a more rational interpretation of the means by which the Divine Will was believed to be communicated. Among them are to be reckoned the teaching of personal experience, flashes of insight prepared for by communion with God and long meditation upon the ethical relation of Jahveh to Israel; and last, but not least, the lessons of history — the first half-unconscious identification of Jahveh's word with the deductions of the prophet's reflective thinking.

Finally reason and reflection began to assume a large place in prophetism, although it continued to appear in the rhetorical and figurative dress peculiar to an earlier period of prophecy. This entire course of development illustrates the gradual elimination of superstition and unreason from religion. One remarkable fact about this rationalizing process in Old Testament prophecy is the gradual abandonment of a sharp distinction between the human agent and the divine spirit thought of as localized.

A moment's reflection will show that the possession theory of prophetism is so primitive that it lies altogether outside of modern categories of thinking. It tacitly implies that God is within the world and a part of it, being limited by time, by space, and by matter. Neither our philosophical idea of transcendence, nor that of immanence, has any real point of contact with

this conception of God, which is essentially animistic and intramundane. Of God so conceived it is impossible to say that he is absolute, omnipotent, or omniscient. This difficulty began to be felt by the later prophets, and it led to the gradual abandonment of the possession theory and ecstatic prophetism. Nevertheless they continued to believe that abnormal states of consciousness, happening irregularly and according to no perceptible law, were evidences of the divine afflatus. The New Testament idea that the human and the divine may be indistinguishably and inseparably united is a product of later thought and deeper experience; a conviction which it is safe to say never dawned on the mind of any Hebrew prophet, even the latest.

Isaiah, like his predecessors, must still be reckoned among those who prophesied in a state of ecstasy. He refers to the hand that overpowered him at the moment when Jahveh's message came to him.¹ But a state of ecstasy in which a man could produce prophetic poems of such high literary merit as are most of Isaiah's, could have had little in common with the dervish-frenzy of earlier days. This remains true even though we suppose that the literary finish of his poems was due to elaboration at the time they were written down.

The remarkable sixth chapter of his book, in which he describes the vision of his call, exhibits some suggestive phenomena. He allowed several years to pass

¹ Is. 8: 11. Cf. Ezek. 3: 22 ; 8: 1.

before he wrote down an account of the experience that constituted his call, for the opening words imply that another king is upon the throne, and that the record is a reminiscence. The result of reflection upon these years of unsuccessful preaching is woven into this reminiscence. It appears in the conviction that his warnings and appeals are destined to fall upon unheeding ears. The case is analogous to that of Hosea who, after his wife had proved unfaithful, saw in the experience that led to his choice of her the will of God. Brooding over his domestic sorrow and interpreting it in the light of later events as God's *arrière pensée* he wrote: "Jahveh said, Take unto thee an impure wife." So Isaiah hears through his experience the same voice, saying: "Go, and say to this people: Hear on, but understand not! See on, but perceive not! Make fat this people's heart, make dull their ears, and besmear their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and their heart understand, and their health be restored." ¹

From this naïve theory of determinism, so frequently found in the Old Testament, a deeper religious philosophy requires us to dissent. We shall feel less reluctance in doing so when we see that this was an element in Isaiah's conception of God's rule that was borrowed from the thought of his time. It was a widespread belief of antiquity that God first renders him

¹ Is. 6: 9, 10. The text quotations of Isaiah are mostly from the excellent translation of T.K. Cheyne, SBOT.

mad whom he would destroy.¹ Ethical individualism had not yet arisen, and our modern concern about the dependence of individual responsibility upon free will was equally unknown. The prophet speaks in communal terms throughout. The explanation that Isaiah intended to express the New Testament idea that men, after listening to his message, were rendered worse by sinning against the light, is a piece of modern individualistic theologizing of which he was almost certainly innocent.

But the point of chief interest in this connection is the fact that reflective reasoning begins to have a larger place among the means by which God's will was believed to be communicated to the prophets. In short, there is found, even during this period of objectivity in religion, a half-unconscious recognition of the fact that revelation comes not as a voice out of the flame or the cloud, but wells up out of the consciousness of the prophet, comes through the normal processes of men's minds. As Isaiah once expresses it, "Jahveh of hosts hath revealed himself in mine ears."²

The task to which Isaiah, in the main, devoted his life was to lift the nation's conduct out of a religion of *ceremonial* into a religion of *character*. Intuitively he selected the most strategic approach to his problem. He endeavored to make his conception of Jahveh's holiness the regulative ideal of conduct. Holiness is

¹ Cf. I Kings 22:20 ff.; Ex. 7:3 (P). These passages move within the same circle of ideas.

² Is. 22:14.

to him the most outstanding characteristic of God. Mystical divine beings — seraphim — nowhere else mentioned in the Old Testament, guard his presence and proclaim him trebly holy. Equally significant is the fact that Isaiah coins for Jahveh a new title, the Holy One of Israel.

But if the idea of holiness is to be regulative in the sphere of ethical conduct it must possess ethical significance and the worshipper must have some notion of what it is. Certain it is that originally holiness did not signify the possession of any moral quality. Even the Phœnicians described their gods as holy, and in Isaiah's time there were found at Hebrew sanctuaries the utterly degraded wretches known as the "holy ones." Smend has furnished a definition which best comprehends the extremely varied uses of the word. "*Kodesh*," he says, "originally meant about as much as divine potency." Persons or things connected in any way with the deity, or the sanctuary where the numen was supposed to dwell, became "holy." In popular belief they became charged with a mysterious power peculiar to the deity, transmissible like electricity or contagion, and dangerous to any one who was not in a state of ritual fitness.

In this use of it the term "holy" has evidently its original ritual significance only and is the exact equivalent of the Latin *sacer*, the Greek *hagios*, and the Polynesian *taboo*. As such it describes not a particular phenomenon of Hebrew religion, but one that belongs

to religion in general. The fundamental idea, as in all systems of taboos, is that of separation for special religious use or behavior. Perhaps the most instructive single chapter in the Old Testament to illustrate this point is the one on the Nazirite and his head of holy hair.¹ It is the more instructive because it exhibits the very element in the idea of holiness from which the prophets were breaking away. In comparatively late times, under priestly influences as the book of Leviticus shows, it suffered deterioration again in the direction of this earlier meaning. The priestly injunction, ascribed to Jahveh, "be ye holy for I am holy" means no more than "keep yourselves in that state of ritual taboo which is acceptable to me."²

The primary rule of action, therefore, which the primitive thought of holiness suggested was the negative one, "Do not touch."³ In consequence the word has never lost the idea of inapproachableness and inviolability as an element of its meaning. This notion is by no means absent in Isaiah's characterization of Jahveh's holiness, and explains why he naturally used it as a companion attribute for Jahveh's majesty. But Amos, as we have seen, had shifted the centre of gravity in Israel's religion from the ceremonial to the moral. In declaring Jahveh an ethical personality this cere-

¹ Num. 6:1-21; cf. Judg. 16:17.

² Lev. 11:44.

³ Cf. Num. 4:15, 20; Ex. 19:12, 13; Ex. 29:37; Num. 16:36-40; Ezek. 44:19; II Sam. 6:6-7; I Sam. 6:20. Whether objects or their supernatural owners were first declared "holy" is still a matter of debate; the attribute probably was first applied to things and then transferred to the deity.

monial attribute of the Godhead necessarily had to acquire ethical significance also. It must be accounted Isaiah's most distinguished service to the religion of Israel that he gave to Jahveh's holiness a fulness of ethical meaning which made it possible to say: "The holy God shows himself *holy through righteousness*." ¹

In order that we may not overlook important landmarks of prophetic doctrine let it be observed, in passing, that the pre-exilic and post-exilic prophets drew practically opposite inferences from the premise implied in the above quotation. While the former looked for the manifestation of Jahveh's holiness in a judgment of destruction upon Israel at the hands of the heathen, the latter looked for it in the destruction of the heathen and the restoration of Israel.² Isaiah's doctrine of the remnant,³ and his promise of a time when the Assyrian rod of Jahveh's punitive anger will itself be broken,⁴ were no doubt influential factors in the development of the later expectations. But if Isaiah could have witnessed the search of some of these epigones for holiness through ritual etiquette, he would doubtless have poured out the vials of his indignation upon their self-righteous pretence.⁵

¹ Is. 5: 16. This verse doubtless is part of an insertion by a later hand, but it expresses Isaiah's implicit thought precisely. Unfortunately both the A. V. and the R. V. miss the force of the passage altogether by making God "sanctify" himself, whatever that may mean.

² Ezek. 20: 41 f; 28: 25; 38: 16, 23. "I will be sanctified in you in the sight of the nations" will be more intelligible if we render "I will show myself holy [by proving my power] on your behalf before the eyes of all nations."

³ Is. 7: 3; cf. 8: 18.

⁴ Is. 10: 5; cf. 14: 24, 25.

Holiness through righteousness, — that was the countersign of Isaiah's religion. It was not the holiness of the auditors to whom he was preaching. They, like the revellers castigated by Amos in the north, thought they were worshipping a God to whom moral conduct was a matter of relative unimportance; whose first interest was to observe the quality and number of sacrifices offered to him, and who was ever ready to resent an infringement of the etiquette of approach which he had instituted. When people with this conception of God were visited by misfortune, or by a national calamity, it was a sign to them that he was offended, either by inadequate sacrifices, or by an intentional or unintentional infringement of ceremonial law. The only remedy which suggested itself to them was more sacrifices and a more rigid administration of the cultus. Thoughts of reform did not go beyond the externalities of religion because the idea of Jahveh's holiness, which they were anxious enough to respect, had little or no ethical content.

That the holiness which Isaiah ascribes to Jahveh does not refer merely to his inapproachableness, exaltation, and supremacy may be shown by reference to many passages. It is this attribute of God which he considers outraged by the social and judicial corruption of his time. In the presence of the Holy One of Israel he feels that he, as Jahveh's spokesman, is himself "a man of unclean lips," and he "dwells in the midst of a people of unclean lips." Despite the sym-

bolical cleansing performed by one of the seraphim the figure of speech describes not ceremonial but moral unfitness, for on a subsequent occasion it is "this people" of whom he hears Jahveh say, they "draw near me with their mouth and with their lips honour me, but their heart they keep far from me, and their fear [i.e., worship] is but a precept of men learned by rote."¹ They are unwilling to respect or appreciate the prophetic issue between cultus and character, between the appearance and the reality of religion. They deride "the purpose of Israel's Holy One" as expounded by Isaiah on the basis of these eternal distinctions. Its inevitable fulfilment, he declares, means

"Woe unto those who call evil good, and good evil,
Who put darkness for light, and light for darkness,
Who put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter." ²

We have already alluded to the fact that Isaiah's companion attribute for the divine holiness, and one which he makes almost equally prominent, is the glory (*kabhōd*) of Jahveh. The term is practically equivalent to our word majesty and was used in this sense to describe the pomp and power of kings. In the earlier records of Israel's religion it had no perceptible ethical significance even when predicated of God. Moved by fear of deadly consequences the Jahvist lets Moses see only the rear of Jahveh's "glory," which is physical in its manifestations; so physical, indeed, that a post-exilic priestly elaborator of Mosaic tradi-

¹ Is. 29:13.

² Is. 5:18 ff.

tions even makes the light of Jahveh's *kabhōd* communicate itself to Moses' face.¹ Similarly the volcanic theophanies of the exodus and all the more violent disturbances of nature were interpreted as exhibitions of Jahveh's glory.

Isaiah's conception of Jahveh's *kabhōd*, also, discloses unmistakable evidence of origin amid the cataclysms of nature. Earthquake and tornado are blended in his picture of "the day of Jahveh," which is to be signalized not only by the abasement of human pride, but by the destruction of everything that might minister to the same. The cedars of Lebanon and the oaks of Bashan; mountains, towers, battlements, and ships, are destined to go down before "the terror of Jahveh and the splendour of his majesty when he arises to strike awe throughout the earth."²

When Isaiah declares that the whole earth is full of Jahveh's glory, he evidently meant both more and less than most commentators have ascribed to him. Though a resident of the Hebrew metropolis, he shared with Amos, the herdsman, some ancient prophetic anti-cultural prejudices. A judgment of destruction upon that which is lofty and impressive in nature and

¹ Ex. 34: 29-35. By "my goodness," which Jahveh declares (33: 19, JE) he will cause to pass before Moses, is not meant moral goodness as a study of the use of *tubh* shows. It has the concrete meaning of "good things," and is here used in the sense of physical splendor or beauty. *Hesed* would have been the word to use for moral goodness. Cf. Hosea.

² Is. 2: 10-19. This probably is Isaiah's earliest extant prophecy. The phrase "splendour of his majesty" must be taken here as synonymous with "glory." The "terror of Jahveh" corresponds to the German *Gottesschrecken*, the Panic-fear of the Greeks.

art, in order that "Jahveh alone may be exalted," is neither ethical nor a tribute to divine power and greatness.

It is a significant and remarkable fact, however, that Isaiah ethicizes and spiritualizes the conception of Jahveh's glory in relation to man. "Jerusalem comes to ruin, and Judah falls," he writes, "because their tongue and their deeds are against Jahveh to defy the eyes of his glory. . . . The spoil of the destitute is in your houses. What mean ye by crushing my people, and by grinding the face of the destitute?" ¹

Had Isaiah done no more than to invest the two divine attributes of holiness and glory with these new and deeper ethical meanings, he would have made an invaluable contribution to Hebrew moral development. But he more than trebled the force of their appeal to the emotions by the striking literary felicity of his statements, and by the air of sublime dignity and mystery with which he surrounds the transcendent personality of the Holy One. The average Jerusalemite thought of Jahveh as inhabiting the innermost recess of Solomon's temple; but of the gigantic royal figure of Isaiah's vision it is said, "The train of his [robe] filled the temple." In the popular apprehension Jahveh's glory was so linked with the temple that even a later Psalmist ² still confesses, "I looked upon thee in the sanctuary, to see thy power and thy glory"; but the cor-

¹ Is. 3:8-15.

² Ps. 63:2.

responding sanctuary of Isaiah's vision is the whole earth, and it is full of Jahveh's glory.

Thus Isaiah recreated the very forms of Hebrew thought about God, replacing petty survivals from more primitive times with symbols of almost cosmic grandeur. If in his earliest prophecies there is occasionally in Jahveh's actions a suggestion of irritability, it is offset in the prophet's later years by the investment of the Holy One with that beautiful serenity which is the reflection into the heavens of Isaiah's own quiet faith in God. During the stormy days of Egyptian intrigue and Assyrian aggression, when every hour seemed to bring forth new agitation and alarm, Isaiah wrote "Jahveh hath said unto me, I will be still, and will look on in my place, like the flickering ether in sunlight, like dew-clouds in the heat of harvest."¹ What apter symbols of divine tranquillity could there be than sunlit summer spaces and the seemingly stationary, high cirrus clouds from which the dew was believed to fall.

It seems natural that the creator of this reposeful conception of God should have been the first to set forth quiet trust in God as a religious requirement. It is the nearest approach in the Old Testament to the Christian idea of faith. "Be wary, and keep thyself calm," said Isaiah to panic-stricken King Ahaz during the Syro-Ephraimitic invasion. "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established."² And the same

¹ Is. 18:4. ² Is. 7:4, 9. The latter statement contains a word-play which might be rendered, "No confiding, no abiding."

Jahveh whom he pictured serene as a summer day above the intrigues and commotions of the little kingdom bids him say, near the end of his career, "By turning and remaining quiet ye would have been delivered; in quietness and [pious] trust ye would have found your [true] strength. But ye refused." ¹

Finally, Isaiah is an unsparing opponent of that mechanical, sacerdotal conception of religion which makes it consist in sacrifices. With a directness and sureness unattained by any of his predecessors Isaiah asserts the ethical character of Jahveh by pointing out that he requires of his worshippers conformity with a moral standard, and not observance of feast days and ritual. Unaccustomed to such demands as Isaiah is making upon their conduct in the name of religion, the people treat him with indifference, and even scorn. He calls them

. . . "rebellious people, lying sons,
Sons who will not hear the direction of Jahveh;
Who say to the seers: See not! and to the prophets:
 prophesy not to us true things!
Speak to us smooth things, prophesy delusions!
Turn from the way, go aside from the path;
Trouble us no more with Israel's Holy One." ²

But Isaiah does not compromise with duty, nor abate one jot of his conviction about the truth. Others may lull their fears with patriotic phrases about Jahveh's help, or dazzle their eyes with false visions of security. But he abides by his conviction that true

¹ Is. 30:15.

² Is. 30:9 ff.

religion must concern itself with the right and wrong in human conduct, and that Jahveh's judgments hinge upon the criterion afforded by their lives.

In the first chapter, known sometimes as "The Great Arraignment," he asserts in passionate language the inherent falseness of the popular conception of God, and of the character of his demands. Sacrifices, the blood of beasts, temple-treading, new moons, sabbaths (full moons?), assemblies — such religion is worse than worthless. Then, in language that glows with moral fervor, he reaches the climax of his oration in a simple statement of his own conception of religion in terms of moral conduct: —

"Your hands are stained with blood [of sacrifices].

Wash you, make you clean, let me see the evil of
your doings no more.

Seek out justice, chastise the violent,

Right the orphan, plead for the widow."¹

So far as we can tell, the last spoken words of Isaiah that have come down to us were addressed to the joyous inhabitants of Jerusalem, as they crowded the walls of the city to watch the doughty warriors of Sennacherib's army disappearing among the hills. It was a mournful spectacle to him, because they had not been turned back with the sword, but with silver and gold. "Thy slain are not slain with the sword, nor fallen in battle,"² said the prophet. Such dead might

¹ Is. I: 15f. The blood which stains their hands must mean the blood of sacrifices. Murderers, as also Duhm remarks, would not have been invited to begin the work of social reform. The very blood which they think will make "atonement" for them is the symbol of their irreligion.

² Is. 22:2.

still be undefeated. But his living contemporaries never even tried to stand their ground in battle for prizes which are above comfort and above life.

Once more there arises before his vision the day in which the Lord "did call to weeping, and to mourning, . . . but, behold, joy and gladness, slaying oxen and killing sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine: [for they said] Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall die. And Jahveh of Hosts hath revealed himself in mine ears, Surely this iniquity shall not be forgiven you till ye die, saith the Lord, Jahveh of Hosts." ¹ They chose the sacrificial feasts, a mechanical religion of ceremonial, and in this choice of ceremonial above character, the prophet read their doom.

It cannot be said that Isaiah added anything essentially new to the message of his predecessors. But his political sagacity, his oratorical power, the splendor of his diction, and above all the exquisite literary quality of many of his prophetic poems, give not only greater force and amplitude to his message: they place him in a class by himself. He trebled his power by the law that

"A thought's his who kindles new youth in it,
Or so puts it as makes it more true."

¹ Is. 22: 12-14.

CHAPTER VII

THE MONOJAHVISM OF DEUTERONOMY

FOR reasons set forth in previous chapters we are unable to agree with those who find a clear recognition of monotheism in the pre-Deuteronomic prophets. It becomes necessary at this point to face the question whether even the Book of Deuteronomy itself teaches monotheism. The well-known passage of chapter six, "Hear O Israel, Jahveh our God is one Jahveh" has long been regarded as the leading proof-text of Mosaic monotheism. General abandonment of the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy, and its recognition as a priestly-prophetical compromise of the seventh century B.C. have shifted the question to a later period. But one who desires to trace the development of the idea of God in Israel must nevertheless address himself to the task of determining whether the above-mentioned passage teaches monotheism. Since Deuteronomy is not a unity, such an enquiry involves the consideration of possible differences between earlier and later parts of the book. Elsewhere we have sought to show that the crucial passage of the sixth chapter teaches not monotheism, but a transitional form of the Hebraic idea of God for which we have coined the irregular, but necessary, word "monojahvism."¹

¹ Cf. Badè, *Der Monojahwismus des Deuteronomiums*, ZAW, II (1910).

This Deuteronomic stage of development is so clearly the product of specific historical conditions that it seems expedient to pass them briefly in review.

Recent years have shed much archaeological light upon the extraordinary mixture of Baal cult and Jahveh worship found in the earlier literature of the Old Testament. Our chief sources of information are the excavations of Macalister, Sellin, and Schumacher. The Amarna tablets, also, furnish the historical background for a considerable period in the fourteenth century B.C.

While the evidence is not decisive there is good reason to believe that Jahveh was worshipped among the Canaanites as a local divinity in pre-Israelitic times.¹ In that case he must have figured as a local Baal long before the Hebrew prophets began their crusade of reform. It is not easy to determine when the Baal cult of ancient Palestine originated. But it seems certain that it was well established there before the end of the second millennium B.C.

The Deuteronomic editors of the Book of Judges, rewriting the history of ancient Israel according to the pragmatic standard of the twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy, explain its varying political fortunes by assuming a see-saw of national apostasies and repentances. The service of Baal brings oppression, and

¹ Cf. Marti, *Jahwe und seine Auffassung in der ältesten Zeit*, ThSK, (1908), pt. 3.

Ward, *The Origin of the Worship of Jahveh*, AJSL, vol. xxv, no. 3 (1909).

return to Jahveh, deliverance. As history this representation is not only inherently improbable, but demonstrably erroneous. In the results obtained by archæological and historical research there is nothing that suggests the occurrence of sweeping changes of religion on Palestinian soil. On the contrary, the evidence is in keeping with those parts of the Old Testament which imply that the native population, together with the characteristics of its culture, was gradually absorbed by the Israelites. This blending with cognate racial types, continuing through centuries, had an effect upon religion and culture very different from that which would have resulted from a brief campaign of military subjugation and extermination.

That climatic, social, and economic conditions always are determining factors in shaping the development of a religion is an accepted fact among students of the history of religion. It explains, incidentally, why the agricultural population of Canaan saw in its numerous local deities, the so-called Baals, patrons of agriculture, and why the Hebrews, when they became agriculturists, invested their own Jahveh with this patronate. Hosea, in the second chapter, furnishes an instructive account of the transfer. Wayward Israel is represented as saying: "I will go after my lovers [Baals] that give me my bread and my water, my wool and my flax, mine oil and my drink." . . . "She did not know that I [Jahveh] gave her the grain, and the new wine, and the oil." Naturally those ritual practices

in which the products of the land played a part developed into more and more prominence, for worshippers invariably attribute to their deities their own preferences in the matter of sacrificial gifts. The practice of offering the first fruits of the field was introduced by the agricultural Canaanite, not by the nomadic Hebrew.

The centre of Canaanite culture is obviously to be sought in the fruitful plains of Palestine. This explains and confirms the tradition that the invading Israelites, being nomads and half-nomads, first secured a foothold in the Palestinian hill-country. In the more densely settled agricultural districts the Canaanites were strong enough to withstand the invaders for a long period. What has nearly always happened under similar circumstances took place there, also, in the course of time. The superior culture of the native population, of whom it is reported as early as the reign of Thutmose III, 1500 B.C., that they had more grain than sand on the seashore, entered into the life of the newcomers.

Every reader of the Old Testament knows how appreciatively Hebrew tradition speaks of Canaan's fortified cities and the agricultural wealth of the land. It is Israel's tribute of admiration to a culture more complex and more developed than its own. Seven centuries after the exodus the Deuteronomist mounts the pulpit behind the dim figure of Moses and utters to his contemporaries warnings against what has al-

ready taken place. "And when Jahveh thy God shall bring thee into the land which he sware unto thy fathers . . . to give thee, great and goodly cities, which thou buildedst not, and houses full of all good things, which thou filledst not, and cistern hewn out, which thou hewedst not, vineyards and olive-trees, which thou plantedst not, and thou shalt eat and be full; then beware lest thou forget Jahveh. . . . Thou shalt fear Jahveh thy God; and him thou shalt serve, and shalt swear by his name. Ye shall not go after other gods, of the gods of the peoples that are round about you." ¹

This, as we shall see, was an indirect indictment of the prevailing worship of Jahveh-Baal, long denounced by the eighth-century prophets as essentially Canaanitish. The dangers against which Moses might fitly have cautioned were realized in the conditions of the Deuteronomist's time. Jahveh had been identified with the local Baals; their names, bull-images, rites, and sanctuaries had been appropriated so completely in the popular cult of Jahveh that the Deuteronomist can see in it only a worship "of the gods of the peoples that are round about."

It was a correct instinct that led the Deuteronomist to connect the corruption of Israel's religion with the appropriation of Canaan's material civilization. Canaanite culture and the local cults of the Baalim were so deeply interfused that it was practically impossible

¹ Dt. 6:10-15.

to adopt the one without the other. Hence the passage of the Israelites from nomadism to peasant life involved a corresponding change in their religion. The possession of a common tongue, the incorporation of entire Canaanitish clans ¹ into the Israelite commonwealth, and a fundamental resemblance between the two cults must have greatly furthered the process of fusion.

Observing how the physical changes of their life seemed to entail religious changes which they greatly dreaded, the prophets of the eighth century began to denounce certain luxuries and refinements of their Israelite contemporaries as sinful. They knew them to be products of that Canaanite civilization which was corrupting Jahvism. The religious order of the Rechabites carried this reaction even to the point of abstention from agriculture, viticulture, wine, and settled abodes. To them pure Jahvism and pure nomadism were inseparable.

But these protests were powerless to stop the triple fusion of people, religion and civilization which continued uninterruptedly from the time of the Judges to that of the Kings. Israel conquered, but was Canaanized; Jahveh conquered, but was Baalized.

The word *baal* is not a proper name, but a descriptive term ² meaning lord, owner, or master. As such

¹ Cf. Josh. 9. The story of the Gibeonites seems to be the attempt of a later age to account for the long independence of this clan and its connection with the Solomonic temple.

² The feminine form *baalah* means "mistress"; hence *baal* was also

it was, among the Western Semites, the common designation of any male deity. One immediately suspects, what indeed was true, that a great variety of local divinities masqueraded under the title. They were distinguished from each other by some attribute, by adding the name of the locality, or by using the deity's proper name. The Baal of Tyre was the same as the god Melkart; the Baal of Haran was the moon-god Sin. By analogy Jahveh was the Baal of Israel, or of Palestine. While in strictness the term *baal* needs to be completed with the mention of the place or people whose "Lord" the particular deity is, this was not always done. The inhabitants of a particular city or district knew as a matter of course the identity of the Baal venerated at their sanctuary. Hence he was simply referred to as "the Baal," i.e., the Lord. When the fusion of Jahvism and Baalism began, this neutral designation could be treated like a blank Mr. ———, enabling the Hebrew to supply tacitly or explicitly the name of Jahveh, and yet retain in his worship the entire ceremonial apparatus of the average Canaanite sanctuary.

In a number of personal names the Old Testament has preserved decisive evidence of such identification of Jahveh with "the Baal." Ishbaal ("man of Baal"), Meribaal ("hero of Baal"), and Beeljada ("Baal

commonly used in the sense of "husband," "master." "Baal of an ox" means "owner of an ox"; to be the "baal of a woman" is "to be married." Ex. 21:3.

knows") ¹ were sons of Saul, Jonathan, and David who certainly meant Jahveh by Baal. After the Deuteronomic reform, editors, determined to eradicate all evidence of the hated cult, mutilated these names in the second book of Samuel by changing "Baal" into "bosheth" (i.e., shame), and into "El" (i.e., God). But the early Greek versions and the first book of Chronicles have preserved them correctly. In the same category belongs Baal-jah ² ("Jah is Baal"), the name of one of David's heroes, in which the identification of Jahveh with Baal is made directly. Finally, a passage of Hosea ³ testifies that Jahveh was called "Baali," i.e., "My Baal."

Marti undoubtedly is right in regarding the appearance of bands of wandering prophets toward the end of the period of the Judges, as further evidence of religious fusion. For, while at this time they are in the service of Jahveh, they are to be regarded as descendants of similar bands that formerly were attached to the cult of Baal. This conclusion is forced upon us by the disparaging tone in which they are mentioned,⁴ by the dervishlike frenzy which they took for divine inspiration, and by the evident resemblance between these bands and the prophets of the Tyrian Baal in the

¹ II Sam. 2:8 *ff.*; I Chron. 8:33; 9:39 (= Ishbosheth). II Sam. 4:4 *ff.*; cf. I Chron. 8:34; 9:40 (= Mephibosheth). II Sam. 5:16 (= Eljada); I Chron. 14:7 (= Beeljada).

² R.V., Bealiah; I Chron. 12:5.

³ Hos. 2:16. The evidence of the passage on this point is not affected by questions of authorship.

⁴ I Sam. 10:9 *f.*

days of Elijah. Samuel's connection with these bands may be taken as evidence of influences by which their wild fanaticism was gradually purified.

Turning, now, to the writings of Amos and Hosea, one finds in them precisely the kind of syncretism which the conditions described above would have led one to expect. The local divinities, or Baals, have been absorbed by Jahveh. The Canaanite high places have become his sanctuaries. Even their origins have been domesticated in Hebrew tradition by the stories of the Jahvists and Elohistes who report appearances of Jahveh that are supposed to have given the patriarchs occasion to found them. The rites formerly employed to propitiate the Baals as patrons of agriculture are now used to secure the favor of Jahveh, who has taken their place. Hosea makes no secret of his conviction that the cultus of the high places, notably at Bethel and at Gilgal, consisted of Canaanite religious customs which the Israelites had adopted with the civilization of Palestine and transferred to Jahveh.

Because the Deuteronomist writes from the point of view of Moses, he has to use the *future* tense in his attack on *actual* conditions. If one bears this fact in mind the following passage affords striking confirmation of Hosea's charge: "When Jahveh thy God shall cut off the nations from before thee . . . take heed to thyself that thou be not tempted to imitate them . . . and that thou inquire not after their gods, saying, How did these nations worship their gods, in order that I

also may do likewise? Thou shalt not do so unto Jahveh thy God: for every abomination to Jahveh, which he hateth have they done with respect to their gods; for even their sons and their daughters do they burn in the fire to their gods." ¹ It is a picture of his own times which the Deuteronomist delineates in these words.

The legislation of Deuteronomy particularly proscribes three things which the prophets had execrated as heathenish infiltrations into popular Jahvism: —

1. *Human sacrifice.* Early Jahvism, as is well known, regarded child sacrifice as a divine requirement. Among the ordinances set before the Israelites on the authority of God is this: "The first-born of thy sons thou shalt give unto me." The original intent of the passage is made unmistakable by the following: "*Likewise* shalt thou do with thine oxen and with thy sheep." ² The results of Palestinian excavations have proved the prevalence of child sacrifice among the Canaanites. If the claim of the prophets, that this practice was unknown in Israel before their settlement in Canaan, is correct, the fourth commandment of the Jahvistic decalogue, "Every first-born is mine," attributed to Jahveh in the Mosaic legislation, is of purely Canaanite origin. In any case Deuteronomy counts child sacrifice an "abomination to Jahveh," ³

¹ Dt. 12: 29, 30; cf. 18: 10.

² Ex. 22: 29, 30. Redemption by means of an animal is a later practice enjoined in an addition to the Jahvistic decalogue, Ex. 34: 19-20.

³ Dt. 12: 31. Cf. Ex. 34: 19; II Kings 16: 3; Jer. 7: 31; 19: 5; Ezek.

and Jeremiah makes him say, "I commanded it not, neither came it into my mind." Jeremiah's denial, let it be observed, is aimed at a wrong done *on Jahveh's alleged authority*. Apparently there survived even in his day some who claimed divine authority for child sacrifice. The prophet Ezekiel was one of these, and he clings to the tradition in spite of the fact that he is forced to admit that Jahveh did what was "not good" when he gave the ordinance.¹ The well-known story of Abraham and Isaac makes dramatic capital out of the feelings of a father who has received from Jahveh the command to sacrifice his only son. It is a grievous charge against much popular religious education of our time that it still uses this immoral portraiture of God as if it were true, thus sinking below the moral level of Jeremiah and Deuteronomy.

2. *Religious prostitution*. Both male and female temple prostitutes, known as the "holy ones," were anciently attached to sanctuaries of Jahveh. Amos and Hosea denounce this form of impurity as they observed it at Israel's sanctuaries,² and the Deuteronomist expressly provides that "there shall be among

16:20, 21; also Gen. 22. "Molech" is probably an intentional corruption of "Melek," king, giving it the vowels of the word *bosheth*, shame; like Baal, it was a term equally applicable to any deity, and was certainly applied to Jahveh. The representation of the Deuteronomists that sacrifices of children among the Hebrews were made only to alien deities is clearly unhistorical. The *bosheth* of Jer. 3:24 and 11:13 is shown to be the same as Baal or Melek, both of them designations applied to Jahveh. Lev. 18:21 and 20:2-5 convey the impression that children were sacrificed to Jahveh as Melek even in the temple at Jerusalem.

¹ Ezek. 20:25, 26.

² Am. 2:7; Hos. 4:14. Cf. I Sam. 2:22.

Israelitish girls or boys none who becomes a temple prostitute." The proceeds of their infamous traffic went customarily into the treasury of the sanctuary. This explains the curious figure of speech by which a late prophetic writer promises that "the gains and hire" of Tyre as a harlot "shall be dedicated to Jahveh."¹ Undoubtedly the religious prostitutes who were quartered in the temple of Jerusalem at the time of Josiah's reformation were the source of no small part of "the money that had been brought into the house of Jahveh," and which Hilkiah is directed to use for the repairs of the temple.² It is this form of consecrated licentiousness which the Deuteronomist, scornful of such profits, expels from Jahvism. "Thou shalt not," he writes, "bring the hire of a harlot or the wages of a dog [male temple prostitute] into the house of Jahveh thy God for any vow: for even both these are an abomination unto Jahveh thy God."³

This class of persons corresponds to the hierodules of Greek and Roman temples. They figured largely in the cult of the Babylonian Ishtar and the Canaanite Astarte.⁴ Since it seems improbable that nomadic Jahvism was acquainted with this vile institution, we may assume that it came into Israel's religion through fusion with that of Canaan.

¹ Is. 23: 17, 18.

² Cf. II Kings 22: 4 and chap. 23.

³ Dt. 23: 18; one passage, 22: 5, forbids the wearing of garments to disguise sex, probably another regulation designed to check religious prostitution.

⁴ These two are essentially the same. The Old Testament *Ashtoreth* is an intentional perversion to suggest *bosheth*, "shame."

3. *Images of Jahveh.* Certain forms of expression in the Old Testament can have arisen only in connection with the worship of an image. To "appear before Jahveh," to "behold" or to "seek" his "face," or even to "mollify the face of Jahveh" are expressions that betray a concrete origin,¹ however much they may have been spiritualized in later times. The numerous Hebrew terms employed to designate images must also be taken into account. But the long-continued warfare of the prophets against the use of images furnishes the most decisive evidence of their commonness both in public and in private cults.

The favorite symbol of the Canaanite Baals was the bull-image. Doubtless many Canaanite sanctuaries were provided with such images as a matter of ancient custom. The subsequent identification of Baal with Jahveh caused them to be appropriated as representations of Jahveh. In the polemic of the prophets these bull-images were styled "golden calves," perhaps in contemptuous allusion to their diminutive size.²

Taken literally this slurring phrase has become responsible for the popular misconception that the Israelites, with beef-witted perverseness, lapsed into actual calf-worship, and that on the most trivial pretexts. On the contrary, the "two calves of gold" which Jeroboam is reported to have set up in the northern sanctuaries of Bethel and Dan were examples of the

¹ Cf. Ex. 34:23; 32:11; I Sam. 13:12, "I have not made the face of Jahveh pleasant." See Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*, p. 105.

² Hos. 13:2.

already well-known bull-images used to represent Jahveh-Baal, and the worship accorded to them was the official Jahveh-worship of the time. Even in the account of Aaron's connection with bull-worship, the proclamation of a feast to Jahveh clearly shows that the writer censured the worship of the image as a perversion of Jahveh-worship, not as an act of heathen idolatry. The bull-image was not worshipped as such, but was to them a representation of Jahveh. Wherefore they acclaimed it with the words: "This is thy God, O Israel, who brought thee up out of the land of Egypt."¹ The extant figure of a bronze bull, recovered in East Jordanic territory, may be taken as a fair illustration of these portable images, which in some cases, probably, were carved out of wood and overlaid with gold.

For various good reasons it seems unlikely that the Israelites employed the bull-image as a symbol for Jahveh before their religion syncretized with that of Canaan. But it would be very unsafe to assert that Israel's religion was originally imageless. The superstitious veneration bestowed upon the ark indicates a type of religiousness that had by no means risen above the use of concrete symbols.

¹ Ex. 32:4. JE makes this form of idolatry begin with Aaron at the time of the exodus. Although this narrative is almost certainly unhistorical it is prudent to entertain the possibility that the Minæans may have employed the bull-image for the moon-god. In that case the Israelites might have made their first acquaintance with this form of image worship at the time of the exodus. Cf. Nielsen, *Die altarabische Mondreligion und die mosaische Ueberlieferung* (1904), p. 112. Also Barton, *Semitic Origins*, p. 201.

The Deuteronomic crusade against images and sacred pillars necessarily had the effect of enhancing the religious importance of the ark in the temple at Jerusalem. A reform involving the destruction of particular, instead of all, idolatrous objects only falls under the suspicion of being not entirely disinterested. Jeremiah appears to have felt that a radical reform, such as the great prophets might have countenanced, should have included the repudiation of the ark, for he covets the time when it will be held worthless.¹ It must, however, be regarded as a very significant concession to prophetic feeling that the ark of Jahveh is pointedly ignored in Deuteronomy. Only once is it indirectly referred to as "an ark of wood" made to serve as a receptacle for the "tables of stone."² This is the more remarkable since the earlier traditions of JE and the post-Deuteronomic ritual of P invest the ark with rigid taboos and treat it as if it contained the *numen praesens* itself. One cannot help feeling that revival of idolatrous regard for the ark in post-Deuteronomic times would have been avoided if it had been explicitly included among the objects of cult that were to be abolished.

But the reform party gained at least one strategic advantage by securing the abolition of all symbols of

¹ Jer. 3: 16.

² Dt. 10: 1-3. Marti and others regard Dt. 10: 8, 9, as a redactor's addition. P differs from D in alleging that Bezaleel, not Moses, was the maker of the ark. For fuller treatment of the subject cf. Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahve's* (1906), and Marti, *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion* (1907), pp. 79-81.

Jahveh's presence save only the ark. It was an act that added to the effect of the appointment of one sanctuary for ritual worship, for it helped to demolish the popular belief that there was more than one Jahveh. The baalized Jahvism described above was bound to become polytheistic through the identification of Jahveh with a number of local divinities. The process might be described as an absorption of the local Baals by Jahveh. So in parts of Italy the absorption of ancient local divinities by the Virgin Mary has fostered among the ignorant classes the belief that there are different *madonnas*. In the experience of the writer it is no uncommon thing to find in Naples and its environs pious common folk by whom the various famous local *madonnas* are held to be distinct individuals. This might be described as *polymadonnism* in the same sense in which we shall speak of *polyjahvism*.

Despite centuries of editing, the older strata of Hebrew tradition still exhibit clear evidence of a popular religion which assumed the existence of more than one Jahveh. One naturally looks for such phenomena in literature that has sprung more immediately from the folk-mind. But even in more thoughtful circles the disposition to assume a plurality of Jahvehs appears to have been strongly felt. In the story of Absalom's rebellion the success of the intrigue turns upon the assumption that the Jahveh of Hebron is not the same as the Jahveh at Jerusalem. Although the sacred ark was at Jerusalem, David found nothing strange in

the request of Absalom that he be permitted to fulfil in the presence of the Jahveh at Hebron the vow he had made on foreign soil.¹ Under the Deuteronomic construction of religion the proper reply would have been that there was but one Jahveh, and that he must be worshipped only at Jerusalem. But neither David nor the recorders of this tradition knew anything about a "Mosaic" law of Deuteronomy and its doctrine of the single sanctuary.

Similar testimony is afforded by a passage of the prophet Amos. It may be regarded as certain that Amos 8 : 14 refers to the Jahveh of Samaria, the Jahveh of Dan, and the Jahveh of Beersheba.² The present form of the Hebrew text is the result of a process, familiar to students of Semitic religion, by which the names of deities were mutilated or obscured. Such intentional obscurations are the words translated "sin"³ and "way," by which neither a Hebrew nor any other Semite would have thought of swearing. Behind these pious mutilations of the text lurk the different local Jahvehs [Baals] worshipped at these sanctuaries.

This general view of the Jahveh-Baal religion is borne out by traditions that have transmitted indi-

¹ II Sam. 15:7. So also H. P. Smith, *Int. Crit. Com.*, p. 341: "It is evident as in the case of Baal, that the Jahveh of a particular place seemed a distinct personality in the common apprehension. Although the ark was at Jerusalem, David did not find it strange that Absalom should want to worship at Hebron."

² Gen. 21:33 not only carries the founding of the sanctuary at Beersheba to pre-Israelitic times, but reports a distinctive name for the deity worshipped there.

³ Dt. 9:21 refers to the calf symbol of Jahveh as "your sin."

vidual names for the Jahvehs worshipped at particular sanctuaries. Hagar "called the name of the Jahveh that spake unto her El Roi."¹ A Jahvistic narrator knew that under a sacred tree at Beersheba it still was customary to worship Jahveh as El Olam.² The appropriation of an old Canaanite high place at Ophra is narrated in the Book of Judges, and incidentally we learn how the deity there received the name Jahveh Shalom.³ Analogous religious phenomena require us to assume a similar origin for the names of Jahveh-jireh, El-Bethel, and Jahveh-nissi. They are the original names of local divinities worshipped by the ancient Hebrews. Only at a later, and theologically more refined, period were these names transferred to the altars under which the *numen* was supposed to dwell.⁴ These titular distinctions, that doubtless mark the absorption of various local Baals, are unmistakable evidence of a popular religion which naïvely distinguished between various local Jahvehs.

Passing over the period during which the eighth century prophets, Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, assailed the unethical ceremonial religion of their time, the student finds himself upon the threshold of changes that foreshadow Deuteronomy. Micah alludes to an evidently numerous party opposed to the prophets. The latter had been preaching an impending political calamity, a message to which the new party replied

¹ Gen. 16: 13.

³ Judg. 6: 24.

² Gen. 21: 33.

⁴ Gen. 22: 14; 35: 7; Ex. 17: 15.

with its watchword "Jahveh is among us; no evil can come upon us." ¹ This faction seems to have interpreted the liberation of Jerusalem from the army of Sennacherib, in 701 B.C., as a wonderful demonstration of Jahveh's power, exerted for the protection of his favorite city and temple. Jeremiah draws a lesson of evil omen for Jerusalem from the destruction of the ancient sanctuary of Shiloh where Jahveh "caused his [my] name to dwell at the first." ² But his opponents could point with equal propriety to the fact that the northern sanctuaries had already passed into the hands of the enemy as evidence that Jerusalem was the only inviolable seat of Jahveh. Thus the closing years of the eighth century prepared the way for Deuteronomy and the centralization of worship at the royal sanctuary. The Book of Jeremiah shows how superstitious confidence in the inviolability of the temple and the temple-city as Jahveh's residence had by that time developed into a dogma. ³

There is general agreement now that two different tendencies merged in the reformation of Josiah. If, on the one hand, the restriction of worship to Jerusalem was the result of the prophets' activity, it satisfied, on the other hand, the above-mentioned inviolability party whose views, as the writings of Micah

¹ Micah 3:11. Cf. Jer. 6:14, 17; 7:10. Perhaps Am. 5:14 and Micah 2:6 are pertinent, also, in this connection. The latter verse should be emended to read: "Prophesy ye not," they are ever preaching. "One must not prophesy (i.e., preach) about such things. The house of Jacob will not be put to shame."

² Jer. 7:12-15.

³ Cf. Jer. chaps. 7 and 26.

and Jeremiah prove, were rejected on ethical grounds by the prophets. Isaiah had prophesied that Jahveh would turn Jerusalem into an altar dripping with the blood of the slain,¹ and Micah, that Mount Zion would be visited by the same fate that had turned into ruins so many sanctuaries in East Jordanic territory: "Jerusalem shall become a heap of ruins, and the temple mountain a wooded height."²

The old prophetic party favored the Deuteronomic movement because the restriction of the sacrificial cult to Jerusalem, and the abolition of all other sanctuaries, seemed to be the only effective means of stamping out the Jahveh-Baal worship and some newly introduced Assyrian cults. Their endeavor was to reform the moral character of the people by reforming their religious customs. The outcome was an utter defeat of their purpose.

This was due to the fact that the reform movement also received the zealous support of the inviolability party, which was represented chiefly by the priests of the Jerusalem temple. For them the watchword, one Jahveh, one temple, and one priesthood, attached itself to interests that were decidedly personal. By proclaiming Jerusalem as the only and inviolable residence of Jahveh they were increasing their income and enhancing the importance of their office. By the same act they denied the essence of prophetic religion which had constituted *moral conduct*, not the temple and the

¹ Is. 29:2, 3.

² Micah, 3:12.

cultus, the palladium of the people's safety. They did not even shrink from appealing to the newly found law-book of Deuteronomy in order to give themselves the appearance of orthodoxy in their opposition to Jeremiah.¹ This was probably the first, but not the only, time that an orthodoxy, founded upon ignorant and selfish misinterpretation of Scripture, employed the achievements of braver fellow combatants in order to place them under fire from the rear.

In any case it may be regarded as certain that Deuteronomy did not spring from homogeneous motives either in its origin or in its introduction. Only with this understanding of the situation is it possible to explain the attitude of Jeremiah toward the new book of the law. He is the champion of ethics, his opponents of magic, in religion. Although the leading ideas of the prophets had found expression in Deuteronomy, in a conflict of that kind it was easier to use it in support of the inviolability doctrine of the priests, than of Jeremiah's ethical demands.

This liability to abuse arose naturally out of the original purpose of the book, the restriction of worship to Jerusalem. The purpose of the author is most apparent in the twelfth chapter, which probably formed

¹ Cf. Jer. 7:7-15 and 8:8, 9. The Book of the Covenant, Ex. 20-23, cannot be meant by the "law of Jahveh" in the latter passage, because it knows nothing about Jerusalem as the seat of the only legitimate sanctuary. The oneness of the sanctuary, however, is the central doctrine of Deuteronomy. Jeremiah opposes the unethical use which his enemies make of Deuteronomy in that they heighten the divine appointment of Jerusalem as the only legitimate place of worship into a guarantee of its perpetuity.

the beginning of the original edition of Deuteronomy. In express contradiction of an earlier word of Jahveh¹ even famous old high places like Bethel, Hebron, and Gibeon are by implication declared never to have been legitimate places of worship. In fact all the sanctuaries famed in Hebrew song and story, places where, as Jeremiah said of ill-fated Shiloh, Jahveh "caused his name to dwell at the first," are outlawed and branded as imitations of Canaanite idolatry by reading back the law of the one sanctuary into the time of Moses.

By this means Deuteronomy introduces a radical innovation under the guise of a reform. Worship is concentrated at the chosen sanctuary of Jerusalem and all the others are abolished. Driver pertinently observes that to us the limitation of public worship to Jerusalem may appear "to be a retrograde step, and inconsistent with the author's lofty conception of the Divine nature."² The very nature of the prescription involved a particular emphasis upon place and ritual which the priests who were favored by the new regulation were keen enough to exploit in their own interest. The impulse which this gave to the development of legalism and sacerdotalism in Israel's religion proved it to be indeed a backward step. But, for a people given over to polyjahvism, fostered and in part originated by a multiplicity of sanctuaries, restriction of worship to *one sanctuary* was the most effective method of inculcating belief in *one Jahveh*.

¹ Ex. 20:24.

² *Int. Crit. Com.*, Dt., p. xxix.

We have shown at some length how the absorption of many local deities by Jahveh, and the consequent pilgrimages to many sanctuaries, had fostered a belief in different local Jahvehs. This naïve polyjahvism, however, does not appear to have become self-conscious until its existence was endangered. In a settled mode of life clan-feeling is strengthened by a sense of fond attachment to one's native land. This fondness of man for his surroundings was in Israel, as elsewhere, attributed also to the national God. As in the time of David, so also in later times there was a popular belief that he was inseparable from the land. This explains the readiness with which the inviolability party now asserted that Jerusalem, the only legitimate place of worship, was the particular dwelling-place of Jahveh in Palestine.

But the founding of other sanctuaries, as narrated in Genesis, was equally associated with the belief that their *numina* were accessible within the sacred precincts and that their activity proceeded thence. The Deuteronomic innovation involved so profound a change in the religious life of the nation that many voices must have been raised in protest even though they did no more than to reassert the words of that spokesman of Jahveh who said "in *every place* where I [Jahveh] record my name will I come unto thee and bless thee." The editors and compilers of the Deuteronomic and priestly literature, however, have taken care to silence any such protests.

The best objection that popular religion could bring against the abolition of the high places was, either that different Jahvehs (Baals) were being worshipped at the different sanctuaries, or that the one Jahveh manifested himself in different ways at the various shrines. Both views probably found champions simultaneously, and the hortatory section (Dt. chaps. 6-11) would have proved well adapted to meet both objections. Whether or not these chapters are an addition made soon after 621 B.C. is immaterial in this connection. There can be no doubt that they were intended to inculcate the faithful observance of the regulations devised to secure the concentration of worship at Jerusalem.

The foregoing discussion has made it apparent that a peculiar significance attaches to the Deuteronomic declaration of the oneness of Jahveh. According to Semitic modes of thinking the oneness of the sanctuary involved the oneness of the deity. In order to override all opposition that may or might have come from champions of earlier usages and beliefs the Deuteronomist declares, "Hear, O Israel, Jahveh our God is one Jahveh."

But this declaration of the unity of Jahveh is not equivalent to monotheism, which precludes the existence of other deities. The Deuteronomist still believes in the reality of other gods, although he subordinates them to Jahveh. It is best, therefore, to treat the Deuteronomic stage of development as a thing by itself,

as the reduction of a hazy polyjahvism to an explicit monojahvism, and the depotentiation of other deities in the interest of Jahveh's supremacy.

The correctness of this view is borne out by other considerations which have been ably urged by Budde.¹ A series of Assyrian conquests, begun in the ninth century B.C., gradually led to complete subjugation of the Mediterranean coast lands. After the destruction of the northern kingdom, Judah became thoroughly Assyrianized during the long reign of Manasseh, who is mentioned among the vassals of Assyria in the inscriptions of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal. Zephaniah denounces the adoption of foreign dress and customs, inferentially Assyrian, while the second Book of Kings mentions the introduction of Assyrian forms of cult. The horses of the sun-god Shamash were kept in the chamber of a eunuch at the entrance to the Jerusalem temple, and on the roof were altars erected for the worship of "the host of heaven." From the fact that Deuteronomy particularly proscribes the latter, involving, as it did, the licentious worship of the goddess Ishtar, one may infer that this form of Assyrian idolatry was especially rampant. The act of housing the gods of the Assyrian pantheon within the precincts and under the roof of Jahveh's sanctuary raises the question of the relationship into which they were brought to him. The most plausible supposition is

¹ Budde, *Auf dem Wege zum Monotheismus* (Rektoratsrede), Marburg, 1910.

that the Assyrian deities were brought into subordinate relation to Jahveh as his guests. This involved the assertion of Jahveh's supremacy over the astral world, which was their particular sphere of manifestation. Latent tendencies toward such a development are discernible at an early period in the Song of Deborah, where "from heaven fought the stars, from their courses they fought against Sisera,"¹ and in a fragment of another ancient song in which Jahveh bids sun and moon stand still in order that Joshua may complete his victory.²

At a later period Hebrew poets were especially fond of asserting Jahveh's power over sun, moon, and stars, and he becomes in particular the God of heaven. Whatever the phrase "God of Hosts" may have meant at other times, during the Assyrian period, when "the host of heaven" meant the starry host, it was almost certainly applied to Jahveh as the controller of the heavenly bodies.

In brief, the evidence points to a subordination of the astral divinities of Assyria to Jahveh as the God of heaven. This explains the remarkable reasoning of the Deuteronomist according to which Jahveh has chosen Israel for his own peculiar service, but has assigned to other nations the worship of his subordinates, the astral divinities. "Take heed . . . lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven, thou

¹ Judg. 5:20.

² Josh. 10:12.

be drawn away and worship them, and serve them, which Jahveh thy God hath allotted unto all the peoples under the whole heaven." ¹ It is in keeping with this view that he declares Jahveh to be the one to whom "belongeth heaven and the heaven of heavens the earth and all that is therein." ² He is "God of gods, and Lord of lords, the great God, the mighty and the terrible." ³

This is not the language of monotheism. ⁴ It is an attempt to define Jahveh's relation to other deities. They are his underlings and rule by his sufferance. Foreign nations come within the purview of Jahveh's interest only as servants of his vicegerents. Thus foreigners are servants of servants, while Israelites have been elected to the service of the God of gods.

Were one inclined to take a static view of scripture and to interpret Deuteronomy as did the opponents of Jeremiah, one might fitly argue that the theory set forth above leaves no room for our Christian enter-

¹ Dt. 4:19.

² Dt. 10:14. Marti, HSAT, renders "heaven to its utmost heights."

³ Dt. 10:17.

⁴ Dt. 4:28, and 28:36, 64, refer to heathen gods as mere wood and stone, a characterization that may be taken to imply their unreality. Such an implication would involve the assumption of monotheism. However, these verses occur in exilic additions to Deuteronomy. Cf. Marti, in HSAT, and Steuernagel, *Einleitung*, p. 197. — Dt. 29:17 occurs in a supplementary part of D and may be a redactor's expansion. Dt. 4:35, 39, belong to the same supplementary stratum as 4:19 and, therefore, must be explained in harmony with the latter passage which clearly and decisively precludes monotheism. "There is none else beside him" then must mean there is no other god for Israel. The astral divinities whom Israelites worship beside him in the temple at Jerusalem have been allotted to foreign nations.

prise of foreign missions, since they would be an interference with divine decrees. If God has joined together the heathen and their deities, why should man put them asunder?

It is not surprising that the particularism of Deuteronomy, in legalistic circles, did develop into a kind of Hebrew Monroe doctrine: Israel for Jahveh alone, Jahveh for Israel alone. Deutero-Isaiah and the large-hearted author of the Book of Jonah attempt to check the growing exclusiveness of Jewish orthodoxy, but with indifferent success. Ezra tears his hair when he learns that Jews have married foreign wives and demands that they shall put away both them and their children. The compilers of the Priests' Code do their utmost to make Hebrew history teach that God is interested only in the uncontaminated Jewish stock. By providing these views with divine sanctions they degraded the idea of God and made it more difficult to secure recognition for the great fact of God's universal fatherhood.

A peculiar phenomenon is the survival in exilic and post-exilic literature of modes of speech which continue to imply that Jahveh divides the rule of the world with subordinate deities. In Ps. 82 the gods assemble around Jahveh's throne, and are warned to exercise just judgment unless they expect to die like human beings. In the Book of Daniel ¹ the depotented national deities appear as satraps of the heav-

¹ Dan. 10:13 *f.*

enly King Jahveh, as the patron angels of their respective nations.

Inasmuch as Jeremiah ¹ had already taken the final step beyond Deuteronomy by declaring that heathen divinities were "no-gods," and since in the Psalms ² especially language implying a belief in the real existence of other gods is coupled with declarations of their unreality, it seems safe to assume that some allusions to rival deities in the later literature of the Old Testament are mere figures of speech.

But after every allowance has been made on this score there remain passages which indicate the survival of polytheistic notions long after theoretical monotheism had made its appearance. This is in keeping with experience in other spheres of human progress where one observes the same overlapping of the old and the new, the primitive and the more advanced.

The preceding discussion may be briefly summarized as follows: syncretism of the nomadic religion of the Hebrews with the agricultural religion of the Canaanites led to the adoption of the Canaanite sanctuaries, the fusion of Jahveh with the numerous Baals, and the introduction into the ritual of much that was originally peculiar to the worship of the latter. Among the corrupt practices taken over from Baalism probably are to be reckoned child sacrifice, the maintenance of male and female temple prostitutes, and the worship of Jahveh under the form of a bull-image.

¹ Jer. 2:11; 16:19, 20.

² Ps. 96:4, 5; 97:7, 9.

The Baals being many, and strongly individualized at various local shrines, where they bore proper names, their absorption by Jahveh necessarily led, in popular religion, to polyjahvism, i.e., to the splitting of Jahveh into Jahvehs. The different local priesthoods, each depending for its prosperity upon the popularity of its own particular sanctuary, would naturally encourage belief in the distinctness of rival Jahvehs. The Deuteronomist significantly charges Aaron, the literary symbol of the Hebrew priesthood, with complicity in the establishment of the Baalized Jahvism which he combats.

A prophetic reaction against all that seemed foreign in life and in worship found literary expression in Deuteronomy during the reign of Manasseh. The word of Jahveh through Moses is the form of appeal to the people. Polyjahvism is attacked, doctrinally, by the declaration "Hear, O Israel, Jahveh our God is one Jahveh"; practically, by the centralization of worship at one sanctuary. A patriotic motive may also have been behind the movement toward centralization,¹ because the existence of many sanctuaries had exerted a politically divisive influence. The doctrinal reform of Jahvism, however, is not carried to the point of monotheism, but stops for the time being with monojahvism.

The discovery and promulgation of Deuteronomy, followed by the reformation under Josiah, conferred

¹ Cf. I Kings, 12:25-33.

power and distinction upon the Jerusalem priesthood. The latter, assisted by other elements, appropriated the Deuteronomic movement for their own ends by heightening the divine sanction for the choice of Jerusalem into a guarantee of its perpetuity. Jeremiah came into conflict with this inviolability party because he championed the ethical ideals of the prophets, to which Deuteronomy was intended to give practical enforcement.

That Deuteronomic theology has not advanced to the point of absolute monotheism is proved by the crass particularism of supplementary parts of Deuteronomy, like the fourth chapter. The introduction of the Assyrian astral religion, together with the housing of its symbols, altars, and ministers in the temple of Jerusalem, furnishes occasion for the subjection of rival deities to Jahveh. Their existence, therefore, remains unchallenged. The view is propounded that Jahveh has allotted these gods to be worshipped by foreign nations, and has elected the Israelites for his own service.

Jeremiah is the first to move in the direction of theoretical monotheism by declaring these subordinate deities "no-gods" and "nonentities." But the particularism of Deuteronomy is increasingly and mischievously exploited in the priestly literature of later Old Testament times. It may in part be charged to this particularism that polytheistic ideas and expressions survive to a comparatively late period.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL ETHICS OF DEUTERONOMY

I

CERTAIN fundamental aspects of the Deuteronomic ideas of God, discussed in the preceding chapter, have prepared us to consider the testimony of Deuteronomic legislation to the growth of Israel's moral ideals. Deuteronomy, as it stands, does not attempt to regulate with its precepts the entire life of the people. It takes for granted the existence of an established system of judicature, of ritual, and of social customs and institutions. There doubtless was much in this established order of things which, under the Deuteronomic view of divine requirements, could be either ignored or tacitly approved. With such matters the book does not concern itself. It selects for treatment those parts of the religious and social system which are to be changed. Some of the more fundamental of these changes, made necessary by the law of the central sanctuary, have already been discussed. We may reasonably assume, too, that the codifiers of Deuteronomy restated with special emphasis some old regulations which under the new order had moved from a secondary place to one of primary importance.

In this view of Deuteronomy, its protests and legislative changes, no less than its emphases, acquire

special ethical significance. Our information, it must be confessed, would be more complete if we knew more precisely the nature of the idolatrous practices which are condemned, and the exact character of that pre-Deuteronomic form of popular religion which is to be changed in faith and in practice. Taken as a whole, then, the legislation of Deuteronomy expresses a degree of intention, or deliberation, which makes it a peculiarly reliable witness to the religious faith and social ethics of the seventh century B.C. Being set forth explicitly as *an expression of the will and nature of Jahveh* we possess in Deuteronomy an excellent means of determining the extent to which the Deuteronomists had moralized their idea of God. For the character of Jahveh cannot be dissociated from the character of a law which is claimed to be his utterance.

Inasmuch as in the social ethics of Deuteronomy we are supposed to possess, in the main, the moral teachings of the prophets reduced to a practical system, we are bound to ask whether the ethical defects of Deuteronomy are to be regarded as having been inherent also in the teaching of the prophets from Amos to Zephaniah. The practical rejection by the prophets of that cultus which in Deuteronomy is deemed of sufficient value to be reformed and regulated, and the hostile attitude assumed by Jeremiah toward those who seem to have urged the finality and sufficiency of the new law,¹ warn us against a hasty identification of pro-

¹ Jer. 8:8, 9.

phetic and Deuteronomic religion. But, in most matters pertaining to social institutions and the regulation of the individual's duty as a member of society, the pre-exilic prophets, with the possible exception of Jeremiah, appear not to require more than is set forth in Deuteronomy. This consideration should serve as a check to one who feels tempted to read into the silences and the general statements of the prophets a higher standard of civic or personal morality than is found in Deuteronomy. Generally speaking, the moral limitations of the one were doubtless those of the other. But the most valuable prophetic element in Deuteronomy is its forward look, its moral aspiration. The work and faith of the prophets are to be sought in its spirit, which might have proved capable of bringing ever enlarging areas of the people's moral endeavor under its sway. But Deuteronomy, as we shall show in the chapter on Jeremiah, fell at once into the hands of those who killed the spirit with the letter.

Inquiry into the status of those human rights which we now consider universal and inalienable shows that Deuteronomy, like the earlier codes, has no conscience regarding the institution of slavery. Its right to exist and continue is taken for granted as placidly as the existence of the cultus. To one familiar with Hebrew institutions such a statement must seem superfluous, since the Old Testament never reaches a point where it condemns slavery in itself. But the average reader of Deuteronomy needs to be reminded of the fact, in

order that he may make a just ethical appraisal of Deuteronomic social ethics. Whether slavery in Israel was of a mild or severe form need not concern us here. It doubtless was prevailingly mild. That circumstance, however, should not be urged in excuse of an institution which remains at its best a social crime. The pages of some of the earlier apologists for Old Testament ethics might lead one to suppose that men went about looking for positions as Hebrew slaves. It is sufficient to know that the Hebrews themselves regarded slavery, at least in a foreign land, as one of the worst calamities that could befall them.¹

Deuteronomy provides that a Hebrew slave, who escapes to Palestine from his foreign master, shall not be restored to his owner,² and a Hebrew who kidnaps one of his fellow-countrymen and sells him into slavery is to be punished with death.³ One may observe in these and other Deuteronomic regulations in regard to slavery an accentuation of the tendency to heighten the claims of humanity in the case of Hebrews only. They were believed to be entitled to treatment quite different from that accorded to a foreigner. A late supplemental addition to the Priests' Code prohibits

¹ Dt. 28:32; cf. 15:15, and Ex. 21:16.

² Dt. 23:15, 16. Vs. 16 indicates that an Israelite slave is meant. But it may have applied to all slaves escaped from foreigners. If so, I Kings, 2:39 *ff.*, where Shimei goes to Philistine territory to recover his escaped slaves, shows that Hebrew slaveholders did not expect the same treatment from their foreign neighbors. It may be safely asserted that this regulation was not enforced in regard to runaway slaves among the Hebrews. Cf. secs. 16-20 of the Hammurabi Code.

³ Dt. 24:7. Cf. Gen. 37:27 where Joseph's brother Judah proposes to sell him into slavery among foreigners.

the enslavement of Hebrews, but permits the chosen nation to supply its need of slaves by purchase from "the nations that are round about," or from among the descendants of resident aliens, or clients. Such slaves were not subject to release and could be kept in bondage forever.¹

But Deuteronomy still assumes the presence, in Judah, of Hebrew slaves, who have sold themselves by reason of poverty, or have been sold into bondage by their parents. It greatly ameliorates the condition of these slaves by providing for their liberation, women as well as men, at the end of six years.² Since freedom without means of subsistence would in those times have been a fatal boon, involving immediate relapse into servitude, the Hebrew master is directed not to let a slave go empty-handed, but to supply him liberally from his store. There are weighty reasons for thinking that this law never passed into practice, for after a reluctant release of slaves by citizens of Jerusalem under the pressure of a siege during the time of Jeremiah, they were caught and put into bondage again as soon as the crisis appeared to have passed.³ But even unrealized religious ideals of benevolence have their value, for they keep alive a feeling of dissatisfaction with the average of current morality.

¹ Lev. 25:44-46.

² Dt. 15:12-18. The earlier law decided against the liberation of women; cf. Ex. 21:7.

³ Jer. 34:8-16. Slavery here appears as anything but a semi-benevolent institution.

A late priestly writer¹ considerably reduced the ideality of the law by making the end of the forty-ninth year of servitude one of release for all slaves of Hebrew race, instead of the end of the sixth for each Hebrew-born slave. As far as one can see, this, also, remained a mere paper law, and it was meaningless in any case if the regulation against the enslavement of Hebrews by their fellow-countrymen was observed. If, on the other hand, it was made applicable to Hebrews held in bondage by foreigners in post-exilic times, the law providing for the redemption² of such slaves by their fellow-countrymen was unnecessary.

It is to be noted, further, that Deuteronomy provides for the voluntary choice of permanent slavery³ in those cases where a slave does not wish to leave his master. That there were such, speaks well for some Hebrew masters, but it is also an eloquent comment upon the precariousness of existence in those days. Nor must one overlook the fact that there was a fly in the ointment of this humanitarianism. An unmarried slave frequently was given a wife of foreign origin by his master. Neither such a wife nor her children were subject to release and had to be abandoned by the slave who elected to be free.⁴ Under these circumstances it is conceivable that other emotions than those of contentment with his lot may have led him to prefer permanent servitude.

Slavery being an integral and legally recognized

¹ Lev. 25:10 ² Lev. 25:47 f. ³ Dt. 15:16 f. ⁴ Ex. 21:2-6.

institution of Hebrew society, it is not surprising to find that from the time of Solomon onward a class of foreign slaves, *Nethinim*, was employed to do the menial services in the temple at Jerusalem.¹ The same practice, doubtless, prevailed at other sanctuaries. These temple slaves continued in service after the Deuteronomic reformation. They were prevailingly of foreign origin and not subject to release. A Deuteronomic editor of the Book of Joshua placed his approval upon Joshua's enslavement of the Gibeonites in the words, "Cursed be ye, and for all future time shall ye be slaves for the house of my God."²

We find, therefore, that Deuteronomy countenances slavery in the name of Jahveh, much as the earlier codes do, but attempts to mitigate some of its abuses in practice. It is conceivable that the need of more definite regulations to secure humanitarian treatment arose out of the changing conditions of slavery. In a nomadic or half-nomadic society, governed by patriarchal custom, the lot of the slave is not a hard one. The necessities of an agricultural and urban life make more severe demands, and greatly increase the hardships of slavery. This fact has been overlooked by many writers who have generalized on slavery as practised among the Israelites by means of illustrations derived from the earlier period.

The mitigations of severity applied almost exclu-

¹ Josh. 9:3-27; Ezek. 44:6 ff.; Ezra 2:55 ff.; 8:20.

² Josh. 9:23. "Hewers of wood and drawers of water" is a late gloss, both in this verse and in vs. 27.

sively to Israelitish slaves, who fell into their condition through debt, and who probably never formed a large proportion of the slave population. The great majority were of alien origin and these received little consideration at the hands of the Deuteronomists. Benzinger is quite within the historical facts when he says; "The liberation of a slave of alien race seems rarely to have occurred; no instance of it is recorded anywhere, and the old regulations regarding release applied only to slaves of Israelitish race."¹ This continuing disposition to restrict within racial limits the range of moral obligation both among freedmen and among slaves, is an important datum in a study of this stage of Hebrew moral development.

It is, however, to be noted as a real ethical gain that Deuteronomic religion sanctions the higher moral aspirations and needs of an advancing society, even though it confines their exercise to the national circle of blood-kinship. Within the families and clans, at first, are bred the altruistic virtues whose sphere of exercise is later enlarged to include the tribe, and ultimately the nation. The next step must be the extension of intertribal morality beyond the boundaries of the nation. Evidence looking toward the emergence of an international standard of morality has already been furnished by Amos. But a definite basis for it, in the thought of a God who is more than a national deity and does not confine his interest to Hebrews, is

¹ *Archæologie* (1907), p. 124.

provided for the first time by Jeremiah. Deuteronomy still is narrowly particularistic.

This particularism shows itself most strongly in the treatment accorded to the *gêr* and the foreigner. The former corresponds to the Arabian *jar*,¹ a kind of resident alien. In the English versions of the Bible the Hebrew term is translated "stranger" and "sojourner," but since a technical meaning attaches to the word we shall render it more exactly if we speak of a client. Men outlawed from their own tribes for murder, incest, or other reasons, or who came as traders, or fugitive debtors, customarily sought the protection of another tribe or nation. Occasionally an entire group was taken into dependent alliance with a stronger tribe or nation. Such a relationship conferred upon clients the right of settlement among their protectors, and obligated the latter to exact blood-revenge for any outrage committed against them. It substantially amounted to an agreement on the part of patrons to make the clients' quarrel their own. This, of course, relates chiefly to injuries to which the client might be subjected from without the group into which he has been taken. His status within the same was another matter.

Inasmuch as the Hammurabi Code, ages before the promulgation of Deuteronomy, had wiped out the

¹ Cf. W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (ed. 1903), p. 49 f., for an excellent account of the clients, or protected strangers; German, *Schutzbürger*, or *Beisasse*; Greek, *Xenoi*. Among the Hebrews, as elsewhere, the pure-blooded tribesman, or *ezrāh*, was clearly distinguished from the *gêr*, the slave (*'ebed*), and the foreigner (*nokhrî*).

distinction before the law between natives and foreigners, we must regard the retention of such distinctions in the Hebrew code, as evidence of a society less advanced in culture. The *gêr*, or client, did enjoy a large measure of protection, but he is distinctly a person of the second class before the law. This appears clearly in one of the food taboos,¹ and in the repeated recommendation of charity for the client, along with widows and orphans, who probably could sue only through a patron. Like the country priests whom the Deuteronomic law of centralization deprived of their living, he is treated as a ward of the community and admitted to a share in a sort of voluntary poor-rate instituted by Deuteronomy.² Reiterated warnings against perverting the justice due to the client are also to be regarded as significant.³ The right of intermarriage was denied to him,⁴ and while he had to accommodate himself to a few external observances of Israel's religion and was admitted as a dependent to the sacrificial feasts, he was not counted a full member of the religious community by the Deuteronomist. Food denied to an Israelite on the ground of its ritual uncleanness, and commanded to be thrown to the dogs in the legislation of the E document, may on the authority of Jahveh be given to the client, for the interest of Israel's God is limited strictly to Israelites. "Ye shall not eat anything that dieth of itself," reads

¹ Dt. 14:21; cf. 10:18; 14:29; 24:14, 19 ff.

² Dt. 26:11, 12.

³ Dt. 24:17; 27:19.

⁴ Dt. 7:1 ff.; 23:3.

the passage; "thou mayest give it to the client that is within thy gates, that he may eat it; or thou mayest sell it to a foreigner: for thou art an holy people to Jahveh, thy God." ¹ The Israelite, being the particular object of the deity's regard, is bound by rigid blood taboos, which he must carefully observe in order to remain acceptable to Jahveh.

Elsewhere Deuteronomy characterizes Jahveh as a great God who shows no partiality and takes no bribe; who secures justice to the orphan and the widow, and who loves the client in that he provides him with food and raiment.² Comparison of these two passages illustrates the danger of reading into parts of the Old Testament a degree of morality quite beyond their intention. In the thought of the Deuteronomist, Jahveh's impartiality apparently suffers no impairment by the utterance of laws which make justice obligatory between native tribesmen, but dismiss the client with a recommendation of charity. And what significance can attach to his assertion of Jahveh's love for the client, when the latter is excluded from full membership in the religious community, and may on Jahveh's authority be given for food the carcass of an animal that has succumbed to disease? This permission hardly contemplates anything else than a bargain made with deliberate intention to deceive. The Israelites' Semitic neighbors undoubtedly had the same superstitious abhorrence for meat of that kind, and

¹ Dt. 14:21; cf. Ex. 22:31. Observe that "holy" has only a ritual, no moral, significance here. See pp. 176-7.

² Dt. 10:17, 18.

would not be induced, without deception, to take it. It was on the same principle that the Israelites, on the eve of departure from Egypt, were directed to borrow from the Egyptians, with the concealed intention of keeping what they were able to get. Thus Jacob, deceiving his blind old father, filched the blessing from Esau, who represented the Edomites, Jahveh being assumed as the silent partner in the transaction, inasmuch as he does not withhold the blessing. In such cases, despite falsehood and deception, Jahveh espouses the cause of the Israelite against the foreigner. The above considerations warn us that we are in Deuteronomy still dealing with a rather narrow group morality invested with divine sanctions.

Twenty years after Deuteronomy had been enforced among the people by royal edict, Jeremiah comes into open conflict with those who claim to be the official representatives of Deuteronomic religion. His great temple address opens with the warning plea: "Amend your ways and your doings!" And prominent among the "doings" which he mentions as requiring amendment is that of the oppression of the client (*gêr*).¹ Since Deuteronomy does not mention definite legal rights of the client, is there a difference of opinion between Jeremiah and the custodians of the law-book as to what constitutes the considerate treatment prescribed for the resident alien, or is he appealing to an unwritten prophetic standard of ethics which

¹ Jer. 7:6.

goes beyond Deuteronomy? In view of his denunciation of the "lying pen of the scribes,"¹ one must allow the possibility of the latter. We should like to think that he disapproves also of the Deuteronomic regulations that deal with the out-and-out alien, the *nokhrî*,² for in them clan morality finds especially crass expression. Since Jeremiah does flatly deny divine sanction in the case of the cultus, it seems not improbable that he may have denied the alleged divine sanctions of other backward customs also.

Mere group morality underlies also the Deuteronomic provision that Hebrew creditors shall cancel the obligations of their Hebrew debtors at the end of every seven years. But "of a foreigner," says the Deuteronomic legislator, "thou mayest exact it," i.e., the debt.³ Disregarding for a moment the distinction made between natives and foreigners in the judicial regulation of their affairs, it is pertinent to observe that the Deuteronomist appears to know nothing of a mercantile credit system, nor of wealth employed as a capital for investment, — commercial utilities with which Babylonia had long been familiar. His regulations presuppose a population of agriculturists and herdsmen,

¹ Jer. 8:8, 9.

² Steuernagel, *Einleitung* (1912), p. 199, regards as later additions the few passages that define Israel's relation to the *nokhrî*; Dt. 14:21a; 15:3; 17:15b; 23:20a. The reasons do not seem decisive to the present writer. Even if they were eliminated as post-exilic, the specification of a "brother" and "neighbor" as the one who is to benefit by the release and no-interest ordinances, still implies the same discrimination against the foreigner.

³ Dt. 15:1-3.

who in the matter of their necessities are not far above the plane of nomadism. Hence he assumes that debt is incurred only under stress of poverty, and his regulations are designed to protect the poor man against the rapacity of ancient loan sharks.¹ Considering that the borrowing probably related nearly always to the satisfaction of immediate necessities, it was a humane provision to prohibit the taking of interest, a provision from the benefits of which the foreigner, however, is again expressly excluded.²

In the light of these facts it will be clear that this prohibition relates to a practice which has next to nothing in common with what we now understand by legal interest paid upon loans. It relates to excessively usurious exactions commonly made by creditors in ancient times. Old Babylonian contracts stipulate interest at thirty-three and one third and forty per cent. In Neo-Babylonian times it usually was fixed at twenty per cent.³ This loan system was a fruitful means of recruiting the supply of slaves, for both the debtor and his family could be sold into slavery for non-payment.⁴

Therefore, the exemption of Israelites from the

¹ Is. 5:8; Micah 2:2, 9; 3:1-3.

² Dt. 23:19, 20. The old law of E (Ex. 22:25) reads, "If thou lend money to any of my people with thee that is poor, thou shalt not be to him as a [money] lender (*nosheh*)."³ A glossator, leaning on Deuteronomy, added "Ye shall not lay upon him interest" (*neshekh*), thus indicating that the taking of interest always meant exorbitant interest. Two passages in Ezekiel corroborate this view: Ezek. 18:17; 22:12.

³ Cf. Meissner, *Beitraege zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht*, 10, 23.

⁴ II Kings 4:1; Is. 50:1.

requirement of interest upon loans, and their release from debtor's bondage at the end of a certain period, are not to be regarded as charitable concessions beyond the demands of justice, from which it would be no special grievance to be excluded. On the contrary, they were nothing less than checks upon outrage, mitigations of injustice, from which a large part of the population was excluded. How little the justice of the system was questioned in early times may be seen by a legend told about Elisha.¹ A creditor is about to wrest from a prophet's widow her two sons to be sold into slavery for a trifling debt. Elisha then works a curious miracle to pay the creditor, who was a felon from our ethical point of view, and who even by the humanitarian standards of Deuteronomy, had it been in existence, was an oppressor of the widow and the orphan. Such a miracle as this would have to be rejected on moral grounds, if on no other.

We have no reason to think that the client, so frequently mentioned as entitled equally with widows and orphans to considerate treatment, fared any better than they. His prosperity was watched with jealous eyes, and his possible rise to a degree of affluence in which he might lend to an Israelite instead of borrowing from him was regarded as so disastrous a reversal of the normal relationship that the Deuteronomist includes it among the fearful consequences of disobedience that shall overtake the nation if it

¹ II Kings 4: 1-7.

fails to observe the Deuteronomic law. "The client that is in the midst of thee shall mount up above thee higher and higher; and thou shalt come down lower and lower. He shall lend to thee, and thou shalt not lend to him: he shall be the head and thou shalt be the tail."¹ Evidently a no-interest agreement forms no part of the supposed transaction. This case, in which a reversal of fortune is imagined, shows that the normal status of the client was one of economic inferiority.

In this respect the client apparently is on the same legal footing as the foreigner. If the latter contracts a debt, the exorbitant interest charge of the creditor is binding upon him. Though he has paid it three times over in the payment of interest, there is for him no seventh-year release, as for his Israelite neighbor. And if he and his children are sold into slavery by the creditor, there is for him no release from bondage until he goes "where the wicked cease from troubling . . . and the slave is free from his master."²

One may properly enquire whether this discrimination against the foreigner was ever more than a paper law, like the Deuteronomic command to exterminate the Canaanites, uttered at a time when as a people they were no longer in existence. It is impossible now to ascertain the exact facts. But in all likelihood a good many aliens had found their way into Judah from northern Israel, which the Assyrians had colo-

¹ Dt. 28:43, 44.

² Job. 3:17-19.

nized largely with settlers brought from the East. However that may be, the ethical status of Deuteronomy must, in any case, be determined by the express tenor of its laws, not by the accidents of their observance. And if it is true that unrealized aspirations of benevolence on behalf of Israelites remained in the book as a permanent urge toward a higher intertribal social morality, it is equally true that the written embodiment of its legalized injustice toward those of alien race remained to cast its evil influence far down the centuries. The increasingly fanatical insistence upon purity of race as a correlate to purity of religion, which characterized post-exilic Judaism, received its initial impulse from Deuteronomy. In modern times, during the long struggle for the abolition of slavery, defenders of this inhuman institution drew many an argument from the anti-alien regulations of Deuteronomy to prove that God himself had ordained distinctions in denial of the doctrine that all men are created free and equal.

Let us suppose that Deuteronomy's racial and religious exclusivism was the by-product of a justifiable reaction, the work of men who were thinking back on old mistakes. The friendly absorption of large masses of the native Palestinian population by the incoming Israelites was held responsible for the corruptions of religion. The remedy which the Deuteronomists declare God prescribes is not the moral discipline of the Israelite, but the massacre of the Canaanite.

"Thou shalt consume all the people that Jahveh thy God shall deliver unto thee; thine eyes shall not pity them."¹ "Of the cities of these [Canaanite] peoples thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth; but thou shalt utterly destroy them . . . that they teach you not to do after all their abominations." "Neither shalt thou make marriages with them . . . for they will turn away thy son from following me."² In order that the darling boy of the household may not be ensnared by the wiles of your neighbor's daughter, go and burn down your neighbor's house, and let none of his household escape. That, reduced to tangible form, seems to be the ethical principle involved in such action.

We have here the effect of the national-god-idea upon the sense of moral obligation toward those outside of the political-racial group. Psychologically the Israelite restriction of God's love and interest to themselves was really the reflection of their own unmoral attitude toward non-Israelites. A domestic God is the patron of a domestic morality. Hence the naïve assumption that deception, oppression, and injury are not wrong in Jahveh's eyes if a foreigner is the victim. There are, of course, individual manifestations of a higher morality, and Jeremiah censures those who act the part of Jacob.³ But the general assumption is that,

¹ Dt. 7:16.

² Dt. 20:16-18; 7:3-4. According to Gen. 9:26 the Canaanite was destined to be the slave of the Israelite.

³ Jer. 9:4. The Hebrew words rendered "will utterly supplant"

beyond the pale of hospitality, no foreigner has any rights which an Israelite is bound to respect.

From a historical point of view this is more or less justifiable as a transient condition in a developing process. Seen in the light of the whole course of development, Deuteronomy takes a noble, though subordinate, place in the advancing moral experience of Israel. But to teach its dual standard of justice, one for the Israelite and another for aliens, as the "Word of God," is an affront to common intelligence and unworthy of the Christian idea of God.

II

The disposition to insist upon purity of race as a condition of purity of religion exhibits some curious anomalies and inconsistencies with respect to certain aliens. The Israelites of the Deuteronomist's time are commanded not to "abhor" Egyptians and Edomites.¹ It is stated as a special concession in their case that their children of the third generation may become recognized members of the Hebrew religious community. The reason given for favoring the Egyptians — that the Israelites once upon a time were clients in Egypt — is as inconsequential as the reason for excluding Moabites and Ammonites. It is clearly a case of reasons found after the fact. During the later monarchy there

strongly suggest an allusion to Gen. 27:36. Cornill, following Erbt, renders "*übt Jacobstrug*" — "practices Jacob's tricks." Jeremiah reproves his countrymen for practising such tricks upon each other.

¹ Dt. 23: 7, 8.

was much intercourse with Egypt, and Isaiah's earnest warnings against political alliance with that country are strong evidence of friendly feeling at the royal court and among the people.

In the case of Edomites, the all-powerful bond of blood kinship is urged as the ground of preferential treatment. At the time of the destruction of Jerusalem the feeling toward them changed to one of deep hatred, as may be seen by the little prophecy of Obadiah.¹ Since few pages of the Old Testament are more vindictive than those which paint the vengeance that is to be wreaked upon Edom, it is pleasant to possess this Deuteronomic record of a friendlier period. Indirectly, the case of the Egyptians and Edomites furnishes another means of gauging the anti-alien feeling of Deuteronomy. If the Israelite is not to abhor individuals of these particular nationalities, and yet their descendants may not be admitted to full religious standing until the third generation, what chance of recognition did the average client and foreigner have? What of the morality of this race hatred? Was it right to abhor them as foreigners?

The Deuteronomist furnishes an instructive example in the Ammonites and Moabites, whom he singles out for special reprobation.² "Even to the tenth generation

¹ Cf. Is. 34; Mal. 1:3 f.

² Dt. 23:3-6. Bertholet (*Deuteronomium*, 1899, p. 71; *Stellung d. Isr. zu d. Fremden*, pp. 142-45) regards Dt. 23:1-8 as a post-exilic addition. His reasons are weighty but do not seem to me decisive. But if he is right, Ezra's unscrupulousness is placed in a very bad light, and the anti-alien tendency of Deuteronomy is not greatly lessened. One might,

shall none belonging to them enter into the assembly of Jahveh forever." Strangely enough the reason given for this enactment is that these tribal nationalities showed hostility toward the Israelites when they "came forth out of Egypt." An unfriendly act committed by Ammonite and Moabite ancestors seven centuries before is given as the reason for the injunction: "Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days forever." No single passage could make more strikingly apparent the contrast between Deuteronomy and the teaching of Jesus, or show more conclusively how much of the spirit of the Mosaic Law he nullified and extinguished when he summed up its essence in man's duty to love God with all his heart, and his neighbor, in the sense of any human being, as himself.

It might pertinently be pointed out that Deuteronomy for the first time legalizes departure from the old principle of group responsibility, in providing that "the fathers shall not be put to death for the children, nor the children . . . for the fathers"; that "every man shall be put to death for his own sin."¹ Since the Deuteronomist's judgment against the Ammonites and Moabites is a particularly gross case of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, not merely to the third or fourth remove, but to endless generations, the modern reader of the Bible becomes conscious here of a direct contradiction in principle. One

indeed, argue that Ezra caused the insertion in Deuteronomy of anti-alien regulations, which he then tried to enforce.

¹ Dt. 24:16.

may offer in explanation of the fact: (1) that the Deuteronomist desires to abrogate the principle of group responsibility only in specific cases where capital punishment was involved; (2) that here, as in numerous other cases, the Deuteronomic amelioration of ancient practice is intended to apply only to Israelites; (3) that the cause of exclusion alleged in the text is an addition by a later hand, and that the real reason, assumed, but not given by the legislator, is the supposed incestuous origin of the Moabites and Ammonites.¹

It undoubtedly is true that the Deuteronomists never carry the principle of individual responsibility beyond concrete cases of capital punishment in which Israelites are involved. They never attempt such far-reaching applications of the principle as are later made by Ezekiel, who infers that if in human courts the fathers cannot be justly punished for the sins of the children, nor the children for those of the parents, then God cannot justly follow such a rule in the infliction of his judgments. The old idea of communal liability, so far as the punishments of God are concerned, received its strongest expression in the remarkable twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy. There it is never the individual, but always the nation that is the subject of religion, and the object of divine rewards and penalties. Under such a conception of theodicy it is very natural to suppose that when a calamity overtakes any nation, it is a

¹ Gen. 19:30 *ff.*; cf. Dt. 23:2.

punishment for the accumulated guilt of previous generations.¹

Granting that the third explanation is the most significant, the fact remains that the editor who furnished this later explanation still believed without scruple that God nurses a grudge and makes its satisfaction incumbent upon his votaries to endless generations. But equally serious moral objections must be brought against the view which bases the exclusion of the Moabites and Ammonites upon their alleged incestuous origin. The story told in Genesis about their descent from Lot is obviously etymological, a legend spun out of their names, and informed with the same race hatred that speaks in Deuteronomy.

If the story was believed in priestly circles, prevailing ideas of the transmissibility of ritual uncleanness arising from an incestuous union may have led to the permanent exclusion of the above-mentioned nationalities. This explanation seems the more plausible because the command of exclusion is immediately preceded by another which in the same terms bars a *mamzêr* and his descendants from admission "into the assembly of Jahveh." ² The exact meaning of the word is uncertain, but the translation "bastard" is inexact if "Rabbinical tradition is right in supposing the term to denote not generally one born out of wedlock, but the offspring of an incestuous union, or of a marriage contracted within the prohibited degrees of af-

¹ Cf. Gen. 15:16.

² Dt. 23:2.

finity.”¹ We seem, then, to be dealing in this instance with a species of taboo whose moral aspect demands consideration.

It scarcely is necessary to observe, even to the strictest defender of Biblical traditionalism, that commands which increase the miseries and degradation of innocent unfortunates, can have no valid claim to emanate from God, whatever theory of revelation one may hold. The idea that a moral stain can attach to men out of the circumstances of their birth is a wicked superstition which has done the more harm in the world because it was provided with a divine sanction in the Old Testament. It is difficult to suppose that any of the great prophets who preceded Deuteronomy would have countenanced prescriptions like these, which encourage that invariably disastrous development within a religion whereby ritual purity is substituted for moral purity as the goal of man's striving. The prophets held that acceptability with God was a matter of conduct and character, not of birth and taboos. This fundamental issue was at the very core of Jeremiah's difficulties with the defenders of Deuteronomy in his day.

Closely analogous to that of the Ammonites and Moabites is the case of the Amalekites. The Israelites were charged not to forget to “blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven” because of what

¹ Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. 260. Cf. Lev. 18:6-20; 20:10-21. Cf. chapter on the “Decalogue” in the present work, p. 122.

he "did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of Egypt." Responsibility for a treacherous act, committed centuries before and not otherwise recorded in the Old Testament, was thus, under the prevailing ideal of tribal solidarity, fastened upon the entire nationality and regarded as furnishing justification for a feud of extermination to the last survivor. Probably this injunction was repeated here only for dramatic effect, since the Amalekites had long ceased to be formidable neighbors of the Israelites. As Driver remarks, "In so far as it had been actually carried into effect, the Israelitish reader [of Deuteronomy] would have the satisfaction of feeling that it was a point on which his nation had not failed in responding to the duty laid upon it." But the national and ethical limitations of an idea of God and religion that could still advocate such barbarism as a religious "duty" must not be overlooked.

Historically considered, all these cases fall under the notion of bequeathing a feud. Among the last things which in antiquity rulers enjoined upon their successors, and fathers upon their sons, was the duty of settling accounts with hereditary or personal enemies. David on his death-bed specifies two men whose hoar heads Solomon is to "bring down to Sheol with blood."¹ It could hardly appear an inappropriate representa-

¹ I Kings 2:1-9. While the section is Deuteronomic and cannot be used to establish the historicity of the incident narrated, it indicates familiarity with the idea of bequeathing obligations of feud and of friendship.

tion, therefore, that Moses, at the behest of Jahveh, had left directions for the treatment of national enemies.

The Deuteronomist included in his legislation a unique and curious regulation which is undeniably at variance with his anti-alien policy and regulations. An Israelite is permitted to take to wife any beautiful female captive taken in war, on condition, however, that if at any time he ceases to care for her, he must not sell her as a slave, but permit her to go free. Amid the conditions of primeval Semitic culture this undoubtedly was a humane provision, whose observance is attested also for ancient Arabia. Since Deuteronomy enjoins the utter extermination of the Canaanites,¹ and expressly prohibits intermarriage with them, we have here an instance in which, as Bertholet² remarks, ancient custom was stronger than the will of the law-giver. The month of mourning taboo imposed for the captive's parents, who are assumed to have been slain under the ban, is less a humane concession to her than it is a precaution for her captor. This is

¹ The point made in some commentaries that the regulation refers to female captives taken in wars subsequent to the conquest of Palestine seems to the present writer artificial. The Deuteronomist is, as a matter of course, writing at a time when the Canaanites as such had disappeared, so that as far as his intention is concerned it applies to any female captives taken in war: cf. Dt. 20:13, where only the males of non-Canaanite cities are to be massacred. It is easier to account for the discrepancy between chapters 7 and 21 by assuming that they came from different hands, and that the writer of chapter 21 intended to account for the numerous marriages with Canaanite women, known to Hebrew tradition.

² *Deuteronomium* (1899), p. 66.

clearly seen in the shaving of the head and paring of the nails, wide-spread ancient cathartic rites for warding off dangers arising from the spirits of the dead.

Before dismissing this matter of anti-alien Deuteronomic exclusivism and vendetta, it is proper to indicate some of its evil consequences within the Old Testament period. Although the writer of the Book of Ruth pointed out that David's great-grandmother was a Moabitess, a fact which, according to Deuteronomic law, would have excluded him and his descendants from "the assembly of Jahveh," and although a prophetic reaction against this exclusivism is discernible in Deutero-Isaiah and the Book of Jonah, anti-alien feeling became more and more accentuated in priestly circles until it reached its climax under Ezra and Nehemiah.¹ An earnest protest should be entered against the widespread habit, in theological literature, of excusing this exclusivism on the ground that it was necessary to preserve the identity of Judaism. This assumes that the religion of Deutero-Isaiah and kindred spirits did not have the vitality to survive. Why should the most glaring defects of a certain stage of religious development be treated as a necessary evil without which subsequent good could not have been achieved? Christian apologists who adopt a line of defence by which the survival-values of a religion are assumed to reside in its lower, rather than in its higher,

¹ Cf. Neh. 13:1-3, where the Deuteronomic law is quoted and acted upon. Cf. also Neh. 13:23-27.

qualities, attempt to do their fighting after the articles of capitulation have been signed.

III

At a number of points Deuteronomy sanctions departures from earlier law and custom, thereby softening their rudeness and placing the approval of religion upon the gradual conquest of civilization over barbarism. A common exploit of Israelitic as of Arabic warfare was the destruction of an enemy's palm groves, the stopping of fountains, and ruining of tilled fields. Elisha commanded this to be done in a campaign against Moab.¹ But the Deuteronomist forbids such wanton destruction as far as fruit-trees are concerned.² The motive assigned, however, is the utilitarian one that the Israelite may eat of them.

There is a change in the law of seduction. The seducer must pay the father of the girl what was probably the usual purchase price, fifty shekels of silver, and take her as his wife. He is punished by being deprived of the right ever to divorce her. The legislator does not raise the question whether the seducer has one or several wives already under the current practice of polygamy. In fact, denial of the right to divorce the woman in question would have been a hardship only in those cases in which a man did not have sufficient means to keep more than the customary two wives. While this regulation probably placed a slight

¹ Cf. II Kings, 3:19, 25.

² Dt. 20:19.

hindrance in the way of such outrages, there is no denying of the fact that it constituted but a very slight check upon what from the modern point of view was utter barbarism. The legislator assumes without scruple that divorce is something which men exercise as an inherent right and privilege rather than as an emergency measure.

It must be remembered that women, in all the regulations affecting them, are treated as property. Even the exceptions prove this, for on no other assumption could the old prohibition have been laid upon the husband-master not to *sell* either wives or concubines. But both were inheritable property.¹ The eldest son not infrequently tried to enter upon this part of his inheritance during his father's lifetime.² Absalom proclaims himself the heir and successor of his father David by publicly taking possession of his harem.³

¹ This was old Arabic practice also. The heir had the right to sell her again as a wife for a *mahr* paid to himself. The Koran (4, 23) forbids men to "inherit women against their will"; it also forbids them (vs. 26) to have their stepmothers in marriage "except what has passed"; i.e., existing unions of that kind are not cancelled, but from that time on, the custom is to be considered abrogated. For further details consult W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage* (ed. 1903), p. 104 f. Tabari's commentary on the Koran contains the following illustration of the custom referred to in the above passages. "'In the Jahiliya, when a man's father or brother or son died and left a widow, the dead man's heir, if he came at once and threw his garment over her, had the right to marry her under the dowry (*mahr*) of [i.e., already paid by] her [deceased] lord (*sāhib*), or to give her in marriage and take her dowry. But if she anticipated him and went off to her own people, then the disposal of her hand belonged to herself.' The symbolical act here spoken of is the same that we find in the Book of Ruth (3:9), where the young widow asks her husband's kinsman Boaz 'to spread his skirt over his handmaid,' and so claim her as his wife.'" (Trans. by W. R. S.)

² Gen. 35:22.

³ II Sam. 16:20-22.

Solomon treats Adonijah's request for Abishag of Shunem as an attempt to supplant him upon the throne.¹ His suspicions are aroused the more readily because Adonijah, as the eldest, is really entitled to the succession and to David's harem.

By elevating Solomon to the kingship, David had done the very thing which Deuteronomy forbade in providing that a father, having supposedly two wives, shall not, "when he causeth his sons to inherit that which he hath," "make the son of the beloved the first-born before the son of the hated, who is the first-born."² The ancient custom which Deuteronomy here legalizes still reflects the primitive belief that certain God-given rights and mysterious qualities are inherent in primogeniture. The question may properly be raised whether the first-born's claim to a double share of the inheritance may not originally have been founded in his duty to maintain his father's harem and the continuity of the family cult. The obligation to cherish parents secured to the mother of the first-born a share in whatever material benefits might accrue to him.

In the polygamous Israelitish household the relation of the eldest son to his father's wives and concubines, except his own mother, was that of a stepson to stepmothers. Deuteronomy attacks this barbarous old custom of marital intercourse between stepsons and

¹ I Kings 2:22; cf. also, II Sam. 3:7.

² Dt. 21:15-17; cf. I Kings, I. Rivalries within the harem were so common that the feminine form of the Hebrew word for enemy (*sarah*) became the technical designation of a rival wife in several Semitic dialects.

stepmothers by placing a taboo upon such marriages by inheritance.¹ Sixteen centuries earlier, the Hammurabi Code, under domestic regulations, had provided banishment for a son who, after the death of his father, was caught *flagrante delicto* with his stepmother. But among the Israelites this practice had such weight of ancient tradition behind it, and was so deeply rooted in the property rights of the time, that Ezekiel still complains of the occurrence of such marriages.² Incidentally it may be noted that Deuteronomy lays a curse upon marriage with a half-sister and with a mother-in-law.³ Under the first head falls the marriage of Abraham and Sarah which the early documents regarded as unobjectionable.⁴

While distinctly in the interest of a higher sex morality, the abolition of marriage between stepsons and stepmothers must have simultaneously deprived the latter of that maintenance which as wives by inheritance they had reason to expect from the former. This would be an instance in which the progress of civilization removed from woman the relative advantages of a dependent condition without compensatory betterment of her legal status. There is such a thing as becoming the victim of an advance in morality. The widows, deprived of marital rights, became dependent upon the generosity of their husbands' heirs. In a Semitic oriental environment, where a woman's life was

¹ Dt. 22:30; 27:20.

² Ezek. 22:10.

³ Dt. 27:22, 23.

⁴ Gen. 12:13 (J); 20:12 (E); cf. II Sam. 13:13.

an unenviable one at best, charity was a precarious resource. When the hope of remarriage, or of return to her father's family was gone, the widow's lot was pitiable indeed. The Deuteronomist was quite aware of this fact and his sympathy for her finds expression in appeals, on her behalf, to the fear of God's justice,¹ and in the curse which is to light upon her oppressor.² Her raiment is not to be taken in pledge,³ the gleanings of the grain-fields, olive-yards, and vineyards are to be hers, and she is to be freely invited to share in the sacrificial feasts.⁴ The status of fatherless children was practically identical with that of widows; they are almost always mentioned together.

It will at once occur to a student of these conditions that the case of widows and orphans called for remedial legislation, not recommendations to charity. Isaiah and Micah had championed their cause with the utmost vigor.⁵ But neither their denunciations nor their pleas seem to have been of any avail. Jeremiah's temple address shows that the humane recommendations of Deuteronomy apparently were being flouted by the very ones who sought to justify themselves by appealing to the Deuteronomic law.⁶

The force of age-long social custom may be seen in this otherwise remarkable fact that the Deuteronomist, who did not hesitate to make radical changes in the cultus, did not venture to give widows the right of

¹ Dt. 10:18.

² Dt. 27:19.

³ Dt. 24:17.

⁴ Dt. 26:12, 13; 16:11, 14; 14:29.

⁵ Is. 1:17; 10:2; Micah 2:9.

⁶ Jer. 7:6; cf. 8:8, 9.

inheritance, or even a definite legal claim upon the property of their husbands. Interesting light is thrown upon the status of the Hebrew widow by reference to the customs of the ancient Arabs. Among them, also, the widow of the deceased was, as wife, a part of her husband's estate, and therefore was deemed incapable of inheriting or holding property. When Mohammed introduced the new rule which gave a share of inheritance to a sister or daughter, the men of Medina protested on the ground that none should inherit save warriors. W. Robertson Smith further cites the story of Cais ibn Al-Khatim to show how impossible it was for women to hold property among the Medina Arabs. When Cais goes out to avenge his father's death, he provides for his mother, in the event of his own death, by giving a palm-garden to one of his kinsmen on condition that he is to "nourish this old woman from it all her life."¹ These instances show the sort of customs on which Deuteronomic legislators may have relied in contenting themselves with recommendations of charity on behalf of widows and orphans. Later Judaism at last gave widows some legal claim upon the property of their deceased husbands. In the more advanced society of Babylonia this had been done two thousand years earlier, as shown by the Code of Hammurabi.

If the penalties of criminal law have in all ages and

¹ For these and other data consult W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 117. Mohammed's rule providing inheritance for women is found in the Koran, Sura 4:126.

among all peoples, as Westermarck maintains, substantially expressed the amount of public indignation aroused by an act, we may employ the judicial sentences imposed by the Deuteronomist, also, to obtain a deeper insight into the quality of his social ethics. Besides the case of a man who kidnaps a Hebrew for the purpose of selling him into slavery, Deuteronomy imposes the death penalty in five instances. A man caught in adultery with a married woman is to be put to death with her. The same penalty is imposed if the woman was a virgin betrothed, one for whom the purchase money had already been paid. If the offence was committed in the city, both were to be executed; but if it occurred in the country, the man only, on the assumption that he had used force. Misconduct with a concubine was not a serious offence.

Murder of Hebrews continued to be punishable with death; but the killing of slaves was not considered murder. Since the Deuteronomist does not specify any modification of the earlier law it is to be assumed that it continued in force. If the master killed his own slave he was considered sufficiently punished by the property loss, and if he killed the slave of another he merely paid an indemnity of thirty shekels, which was probably the average purchase price of a slave. In the case of freemen, however, the Deuteronomist distinguishes at some length between intentional and unintentional murder.¹ In the latter case the offender was

¹ Dt. 19: 4-10.

to find refuge from the blood avenger in one of certain specified cities. That the legislator still recognizes the right of private revenge is striking evidence of the looseness of the state's judicial control and of the primitive manner in which justice was administered in murder cases. It amounts to a conditional sanction of murder.

The strong social emphasis which was laid upon obedience to parental authority finds expression in the imposition of the death penalty upon an intractable son. The accusation had to be made by the parents before the natural sheiks, or elders, of the city, and the execution by stoning was to be carried out by "all the men of his city." ¹

Quite characteristic of priestly tendencies in Deuteronomy is the pronouncement of a sentence of death upon "the man that doeth presumptuously in not hearkening unto the priest that standeth to minister there [in Jerusalem] before Jahveh thy God." ² This mode of enforcing priestly decisions certainly was not prompted by any sense of public indignation. It is sacerdotal in origin and springs from the disposition to concentrate civil and religious authority within the Jerusalemite priesthood. We are here at the origin of that priestly despotism which began to assert itself against Jeremiah and proved so fateful to the later religion of Judaism.

Finally, Deuteronomy imposes the death penalty

¹ Dt. 21:18-21.

² Dt. 17:12.

upon Israelites for idolatry,¹ a fact which affords evidence of the intensity of the nationalistic reaction within priestly-prophetic circles against foreign cults. The mere solicitation to idolatry, though it comes from brother, son, daughter, wife, or dearest friend, is to be instantly and ruthlessly resented with death.² Not only are individuals caught in the act of worshipping other gods to be put to death upon the testimony of two or three witnesses, but the inhabitants of entire Israelite cities that have lapsed into idolatry are to be massacred until not a man, woman, child, or animal remains.³ In other words, they are to be placed under a religious ban of complete destruction. The massacre completed, says the legislator, "thou shalt burn the city and all its spoil as a whole-offering to Jahveh." This atrocious barbarity was to the Deuteronomist a solemn religious duty whose performance, he hoped, might cause Jahveh to "turn from the fierceness of his anger." The act of providing this extreme fanaticism with a legal basis by the incorporation of these mandatory ordinances into the civil-religious law-book of the realm became productive of serious ethical consequences to the religion of Israel. The earlier code had provided death penalties for witchcraft and for the act of sacrificing to another god.⁴ But it probably never was more than a priestly *torah*. Now the savage zeal of an Elijah or Jehu in dealing with Tyrian Baalism is

¹ Dt. 17:2-7.

³ Dt. 13:12-18.

² Dt. 13:6-11.

⁴ Ex. 22:18, 20.

made obligatory by state law in dealing with all forms of idolatry.

The very possession of such laws, whether enacted for practical or merely dramatic purposes, was a serious handicap to Israel's higher moral development. The thought of Jahveh's love for his people and the requirement of such vindictive appeasement of his anger, supposedly aroused by ceremonial acts of disloyalty, must have been difficult to reconcile even in those days of elemental passions. But the most serious aspect of the matter lies in the fact that it introduced and legalized *a false standard for determining the gravity of sins*. If for the idolator no less, but rather more, than for the murderer, death was the only befitting sentence in the eyes of God, then acts of ceremonial worship acquired in the eyes of the people an importance out of all proportion to the practice of social morality. This inference was made the more inevitable because the Deuteronomist included under idolatry not only the service of other gods, but also the worship of Jahveh by rites which were traced to Canaanite origin. As a matter of fact, they were not all characteristically Canaanite, any more than they were characteristically Hebraic. They were a part of the primitive Semitism from which both forms of worship arose. Neither were they all foul and immoral; some, apart from their associations, had no moral significance at all. In post-Deuteronomic times all worship of Jahveh outside of Jerusalem was held to have been idolatrous, and the

unanimity with which later writers ascribe the political misfortunes of the nation to this illegitimate worship at the country sanctuaries reveals the profound impression which Deuteronomy made with its conception of a God to whom idolatry is the worst of all sins.

In this *rating of ritual above moral values* Deuteronomy takes a retrograde step. The great prophets of the eighth century had specified justice, kindness, honesty, and truthfulness as Jahveh's supreme requirements, and their opposites were the leading objects of his resentment. With them, as with Jesus and the great majority of thoughtful religious people to-day, the output of religion was in a life, not in a system of ritual doctrine. The prophets no less than the Deuteronomists desired that Israel should be a holy people. But there was undeniably more difference than resemblance between their respective conceptions of what constituted holiness. Isaiah at least had clearly lifted the idea of holiness into the moral sphere. To seek justice, to relieve the oppressed, to judge the fatherless, to plead for the widow — that was the way to acquire holiness! The Deuteronomist conditions the acquisition and preservation of holiness upon the observance of a large number of taboos relating to food, funerary rites, contact with the dead, matters of sex, and of war. Violation of these taboos was believed to communicate a kind of pollution that was physically transmissible. It inhered in things as well as persons and was associated with magical powers and demonic influences.

How utterly physical and concrete the Deuteronomist's idea of holiness, and Jahveh's relation to it, was, may be gathered from his prescriptions for preserving the ritual purity of a military camp. "For Jahveh thy God," he says, "walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thine enemies before thee; therefore shall thy camp be holy, that he may not see anything ritually objectionable in thee and turn away from thee." ¹

The important point in this analysis is that Deuteronomy reintroduces an inextricable mixture of ethics and magic, of spiritual and physical, into the notion of holiness. The interests of the priest begin to overwhelm those of the prophet. That is why Deuteronomy regards idolatry and everything connected with alien rites and customs as a physical rather than a spiritual offence to the deity. They are sources of material contagion to land and people, which must be checked by fire and death.

To the Deuteronomist all foreign peoples were idolators, — an erroneous assumption. The evil consequences of idolatry, he believed, sprang from its polluting qualities, an idea which no longer exists for us, except in the realm of superstition. That there could be anything good in another religion, or God be worshipped without a name, or under any other name than Jahveh, would, with his understanding of the character of heathenism, have been inconceivable. To him such

¹ Dt. 23:9-14.

ideas and worship were idolatrous. This view is at the opposite pole from the one expressed by Paul in his address at Athens, that mankind is a unity under God, and that all the various religions of the world constitute a manifold but real search after Him. Though the Deuteronomist sets forth Jahveh's supremacy over the whole earth, it does not occur to him that other nations have a claim upon Jahveh's care, or that a duty devolves upon Jahveh's people to spread his knowledge beyond the borders of Israel. This idea had to await the coming of the Great Unknown who commonly passes under the name of Deutero-Isaiah.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST GREAT HERETIC

Jeremiah of Anathoth

It is with satisfaction that one turns from Deuteronomy to Jeremiah, who takes more advanced ground, both explicitly and implicitly. Unlike his contemporary Ezekiel he was not a member of the Jerusalem priesthood, but hailed from Anathoth, a little community of priests situated five miles northeast of Jerusalem in the tribal territory of Benjamin. Thither Solomon had banished Abiathar, the last survivor of the once famous priesthood of Shiloh. Since it is through Jeremiah alone that we learn of the destruction of the sanctuary and community of Shiloh by some undescribed awful calamity, a romantic interest attaches to the possibility that he may have been a descendant of Abiathar.

If there was a shrine at Anathoth it must have suffered the same fate of abolition as all others at the time of Josiah's reformation, and Jeremiah's family would then have been among those for whom Deuteronomy provided compensatory maintenance and the right to "minister in the name of Jahveh" at Jerusalem. Being people of property, however, they appear not to have exercised the right of maintenance.

That Jeremiah and his family were possessed of

means is indicated by a number of circumstances. He is able to afford the services of an able amanuensis like Baruch. He exercises the privilege of a kinsman to keep the family estates intact by purchasing a piece of land from his cousin as if it were no great matter. Nor does he anywhere in his writings betray concern about his personal needs, although he is living away from home.

We may think of him, then, at the opening of his career as coming from the country to the city, a very young man, of deeply religious temperament, carefully trained in the Levitical tradition of his family, and possessed of independent means of livelihood. The latter was no inconsiderable advantage when one remembers that Amos once found it necessary to repel the insinuation that he was dependent for his living upon the sacrificial revenues of the priesthood. So far as one can see, no prudential considerations, even if he had been inclined to heed them, prevented Jeremiah from speaking his full conviction about the worthlessness of the sacrificial system. We are inclined, also, to agree with Cornill who finds it almost inconceivable that the prophet's father should at this time have been an officiating priest charged with the administration of the cultus which was to the son both an object of horror and proof of the nation's blackest disgrace.

Whether Jeremiah was a supporter and promoter of Josiah's reformation is not easy to determine. For some time the writer has clung to the belief that a

genuine Jeremianic tradition underlies the much-debated passage about "this covenant" ¹ in Jer. 11: 1-14. If genuine, that passage can refer only to Deuteronomy. Jeremiah, in obeying the divine command to "proclaim all these words in the cities of Judah," ² would have become a kind of circuit rider to assist in the promulgation and enforcement of the newly discovered law.

But it is admittedly difficult to account for such radically different judgments in the mouth of the same person, as are contained in the eleventh and eighth chapters of Jeremiah. In the former the prophet is a vehement partisan of Deuteronomy, in the latter he charges up something to "the lying pen of the scribe." As Cornill very pointedly observes, it is conceivable that Jeremiah might have said: "Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm," ³ but never: "Cursed is the man who heedeth not the words of this covenant [Deuteronomy]." ⁴ The distinction between ritual and ethical requirements, which Deuteronomy fails to make, is the very crux of Jeremiah's preaching. Can we, then, without decisive evidence, assert that this greatest of Hebrew crusaders against ritualism invoked the same curse upon an infringer of a food taboo, as upon a violator of justice, and that he smote one who neglected to sacrifice the firstlings of the flock, with the same judgment as the bearer of false witness?

¹ Cf. II Kings 23: 3.

³ Jer. 17: 5.

² Jer. 11: 6.

⁴ Jer. 11: 3.

Marti long ago maintained that Jeremiah's attitude toward Deuteronomy was one of disapproval from the beginning.¹ Duhm and Cornill, after most exhaustive study of Jeremiah's prophecies, have pronounced positively against the genuineness of II : 1-14, recognizing in it the work of a later hand. Since this is the only Biblical passage on which the prophet's friendly participation in the Deuteronomic reform can be asserted, Marti's judgment appears to have been correct. Jeremiah's public activity began five or six years before the promulgation of Deuteronomy, and covered the whole eventful period during which the new religious program was put into force. It was the greatest religious event of his time and he could not exercise the functions of his office without taking a public attitude toward it. Yet the only reference to the Deuteronomic movement in his writings which can be construed as friendly is contained in a passage which has every appearance of having been written for Jeremiah by a priestly redactor, who missed the sound of Jeremiah's voice in the chorus of approving amens.²

In view of all the facts the safest conclusion seems to be that Jeremiah never gave his unqualified approval to the Deuteronomic program. His preaching shows that he must have been in accord with some aspects of this attempt to reduce prophetic ideals to practice. But when he saw that this "law of Jahveh" was made to play into the hands of the inviolability party; when

¹ *Der Profet Jeremia* (1889), pp. 9-20.

² Jer. 11:5.

its emphasis upon spiritual motives was perverted into excessive regard for ritual observances; when the law of the single sanctuary, intended to emancipate religion from its degrading connection with the former Canaanite high places, was invoked for the protection of priestly pretensions and a superstitious faith in the magic value of the Jerusalem temple, Jeremiah became the critic of Deuteronomy and the legalism which its official expounders read into it. "How can ye say, We are wise and the law of Jahveh is with us," he exclaims. "But behold the lying pen of the scribes hath made of it a falsehood. The wise men are put to shame; they are dismayed and taken; lo, they have rejected the word of Jahveh; and what manner of wisdom is in them?"¹

There is increasing agreement among Old Testament scholars that this severe reprobation is Jeremiah's answer to the book-religionists of his day who claimed that the reform of the cultus on the basis of Deuteronomy was a full discharge of their religious obligations. He sees a clearly drawn issue between the form and the substance of religion, between reform of ceremonial and reform of character. In his opinion Josiah's reformation has brought no real betterment, for it has concerned itself only with the externalities of religion; with physical circumcision and the like, instead of that spiritual rebirth which he calls circumcision of the

¹ Jer. 8: 8, 9. Many see in this passage a direct charge of literary forgery, and it was so understood by the Targum. Must one not reckon, also, with the possibility that Jeremiah is referring to the Deuteronomic redaction of the older historical works which must have begun by this time? See Note B, Appendix.

heart.¹ What the book-men regard as a return to God is to him mere hypocrisy.²

We have pointed out in a previous chapter that Micah attests for his own time the existence of a clique or party, composed of elders, priests, and prophets, who were inclined to rely for protection upon the supposed inviolability of the temple as Jahveh's dwelling-place. "Jahveh is among us," they said, "no evil can befall us."³ It is not difficult to imagine what reinforcement the views of this inviolability party must have received from the Deuteronomic choice of Jerusalem as the only legitimate sanctuary.

In seeking to determine the character and motives of the men who constituted this party one must take account of Micah's charge that "the heads thereof judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money."⁴ Judging by Jeremiah's characterization of their successors in his time they were not a whit better. Inasmuch as these bribe-takers and pious grafters, bent only upon the utmost exploitation of their sacred office for personal gain, claimed to be immune from punishment, because Jahveh could or would not hurl the lightnings of his judgment against the temple and the temple city, ethical religion had indeed come to a serious pass. The reader must bear in mind that sword, famine, pestilence and wild beasts were according to

¹ Jer. 4:4; cf. 9:24.

³ Micah 3:11.

² Jer. 3:10.

⁴ Micah 3:11.

the theology of that day Jahveh's "four grievous punishments."¹ The inviolability dogma, therefore, if true, had the effect of placing the Jerusalemites beyond the reach of Jahveh's instruments of correction.

In placing their reliance upon the temple as a guarantee of safety they claimed to be orthodox defenders of Deuteronomy. Had not Jahveh by the choice of the Jerusalem temple as his "house" shown his intention to dwell there? Had not the reformation been undertaken with the divine assurance that the calamities threatened in the twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy could still be averted? This being so, who could dare to assert that when a god of Jahveh's power had chosen a place "to cause his name to dwell there" he would ever allow Judah's foreign enemies to profane it? Thus the opponents of Jeremiah were enabled to fortify their position with whatever of passion or prejudice could be aroused in the people by an appeal to false orthodoxy and pretended patriotism.

But our fearless prophet saw only too clearly that in making the safety of Judah dependent not upon character, but upon the magic value of the sacred buildings, his enemies were using the reformation itself to create another unmoral faith. The dislodgement of superstitious regard for the many sacred places thus became the unintended means of fostering a worse superstition at Jerusalem. Jeremiah states the issue uncompromisingly: "Trust ye not in lying words,

¹ Ezek. 14:21; cf. Jer. 21:7, 9.

saying, The temple of Jahveh, the temple of Jahveh, the temple of Jahveh, is this! For, if ye thoroughly amend your ways and your doings; if ye thoroughly execute justice between a man and his neighbor; if ye oppress not the sojourner (*gêr*), the fatherless and the widow, and shed not innocent blood in this place, . . . then will I cause you to dwell in this place, in the land that I gave to your fathers, from of old even forevermore."¹

With equal candor he points out the moral consequences of their inviolability doctrine. It made Jahveh the patron and defender of their wickedness in even a more drastic sense than the contemporaries of Amos had claimed when they assumed that Jahveh as their national deity must as a matter of course protect his people. Then it was "the day of Jahveh," the expression of the divine king's tutelary solicitude for the safety of his subjects, that must guarantee immunity from every misfortune; now a later generation claims to be safe from political disaster because Jahveh must hold his chosen and only sanctuary inviolable.

Jeremiah replies that its use as a shield for evil doers would be an incomparably greater violation of its sanctity than its destruction at the hands of political enemies. "Behold ye trust in lying words that cannot profit. Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery . . . and come and stand before me in this house which is called by my name, and say, We are safe; in order that

¹ Jer. 7:4-7.

ye may continue to do all these abominations? Is this house which is called by my name become a den of robbers in your eyes? Verily, I also regard it as such, saith Jahveh."¹

With great aptness he then reminds them of the fate of the ancient sanctuary of Shiloh to whose destruction he alludes as a well-known event, but which no other writer of the Old Testament mentions.² If Shiloh's destruction was the result of a Philistine foray it was not an edifying example of Jahveh's care for his dwelling-place. Jeremiah explains the event by the usual pragmatic standards of the Old Testament as a judgment of Jahveh for the wickedness of Israel, and forecasts the same fate for Jerusalem.

"Go ye now unto my dwelling place which was in Shiloh, where I caused my name to dwell in former times, and see what I did to it for the wickedness of my people Israel. And now because ye have done all these evil deeds, saith Jahveh. . . . Therefore will I do unto the house which is called by my name, wherein ye trust, and unto the place which I gave to you and to your fathers, as I did to Shiloh."³ Jeremiah's opponents considered this a blasphemous utterance, for it was at variance with their understanding of the word of Jahveh as they claimed to possess it, black on white

¹ Jer. 7: 8-11.

² Wellhausen plausibly suggests that Jeremiah must have found an account of the destruction of Shiloh where now stands I Sam. 7. There is good reason to think that Deuteronomic redactors were responsible for its omission.

³ Jer. 7: 12-15.

in Deuteronomy. For such cases the book itself prescribed the penalty: "The prophet who shall presume to speak in my name something which I have not commanded him to speak . . . that prophet shall die."¹ Therefore the embittered priests and prophets accused him before the nobles and the people, saying: "This man is worthy of death; for he hath prophesied against this city as ye have heard."² Jeremiah's simple and courageous defence is, "Jahveh of a truth hath sent me unto you to speak all these words in your ears."³

How did the Deuteronomist propose to distinguish the true prophet from the false? "How shall we know the word which Jahveh hath not spoken?"⁴ It is a purely *external* criterion that he establishes. "When a prophet speaketh in the name of Jahveh, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which Jahveh hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him,"⁵ i.e., have no hesitation in putting him to death. A more utterly futile test could scarcely be imagined. At best it was applicable to prophets of the remote past only —

¹ Dt. 18:20. ² Jer. 26:11. ³ Jer. 26:15. ⁴ Dt. 18:21.

⁵ Dt. 18:22. Bittenwieser (*Prophets of Israel*, p. 29 f.) has suggested that this law was expressly aimed at such prophetic denials of the divine authority of the sacrificial cult as Am. 5:21-25; Hos. 6:6 and Is. 1:11-17; that in view of Dt. 12:32, the text of the law in question should be translated: "If it happen that a prophet pronounceth in the name of Jahveh that which shall not be or occur, that is the word which Jahveh hath not spoken; presumptuously hath the prophet pronounced it: you shall not be afraid of him." Jeremiah then offended against this law by declaring "in the name of Jahveh" that the cultus was not of divine institution, whereas his opponents claimed Deuteronomy in their support with the death penalty.

and they were beyond the reach of penalties. Even in their case it broke down, for Isaiah and Micah uttered predictive prophecies against Jerusalem that had not "come to pass" in Jeremiah's time. By the Deuteronomist's criterion they were false prophets and should have been put to death. Obviously the law did not propose to delay the scrutiny of a prophet's credentials for fifty or a hundred years, otherwise the provision of a death penalty would have been meaningless. Curiously enough the Deuteronomist does not even believe that Jahveh exercises exclusive control over the factors that enter into the proposed test, for those other gods in whose real existence and power he still believes, may give to their own prophets the same endorsement.¹ In any case a prophet was stripped of his influence if he was not to be believed until his predictions had been fulfilled.

It is needless to dwell upon the impracticability of this criterion for the detection of false prophets. It did not even raise the question of moral fitness which Jeremiah considers the only true test. Had the prophets opposed to him "stood in the council of God," he declares, they would "have turned the people from the evil of their doings."² The fruits by which the Deuteronomist proposes to judge them are not those of the spirit, but those of divination. It made of the prophet

¹ Dt. 13:1 ff.; cf. 4:19, 20. According to the ideas of the time no other explanation is possible than that these successful prognostications are due to other divinities who therefore are assumed to possess real though relative power and knowledge.

² Jer. 23:21, 22; cf. Micah 3:7, 8.

a *foreteller* instead of *forthteller*. What is worse, the bookmen now possessed in this false criterion an instrument admirably adapted for the stifling of real prophecy which since the days of Amos had addressed itself not to signs and wonders, but to the moral consciousness of the people. Failure to perceive and take account of this change of base in prophetism is one of the characteristic limitations of Deuteronomy. Jeremiah's enemies constitute themselves the custodians and interpreters of the book, and proceed to silence the living voice of prophecy. The tragic seriousness of the situation is sufficiently indicated in the arrest of Jeremiah by the false prophets who derive their warrant from Deuteronomy, and in the slaying of Uriah who did no more than to prophesy "according to all the words of Jeremiah."¹

Thus the first heresy trial was instituted when the first authoritatively accepted book of the Bible had been in use less than two decades, a period during which it probably had received some additions from "the lying pen of the scribes."² Had it not been for some laymen who pointed out that Micah the Morashite, under precisely similar circumstances a hundred years earlier, had prophesied the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple without being molested, Jeremiah probably would have fallen a victim to the unhallowed fanatical zeal of his priestly enemies.

¹ Jer. 26:20-24.

² Steuernagel, Marti, and others consider Dt. 18:14-22 such an addition.

If we are correct in our estimate of the part which Deuteronomy is made to play in the persecution of Jeremiah, this heresy trial affords the first authentic illustration of what has often taken place in the history of religion. As soon as a given stage of religious development becomes fixed in writing and barnacled with dogmas, the growing moral and intellectual needs of a new age begin to lower the lifeboats. In the necessity of choice which then arises between dogma and ethics, *the orthodox usually take the dogma and the heretics the ethics*. Unfortunately it belongs to the tragedy of religion that this conflict renews itself in every age; for it invariably happens that heretics of one age become the orthodox of the next, who then take their turn in attempting to retard the march of moral progress.

It should be observed that the acceptance of the temple as a palladium by the inviolability party was only an extension of popular confidence in the efficacy of sacrifices to secure the favor of Jahveh. The issue between Jeremiah and his opponents, therefore, relates in the last analysis to the cultus. Deuteronomy takes for granted the existence and continuance of a sacrificial system, but says nothing about its origin or its significance. It merely provides for such modifications as are made necessary by the appointment of a single sanctuary. We have elsewhere sought to show that Deuteronomy apparently knows nothing about a substitutionary or expiatory use of sacrifice. That is a

later product of the developing priestly religion. In the Deuteronomic programme the system appears to have been retained as an institution of social religion and as a means of support for the priesthood.

The priests and false prophets at Jerusalem construed this permissive attitude as a mandatory one, and encouraged the people to think that sacrifices were offered to God as a *quid pro quo*, as a consideration in a contract. Jeremiah faces this issue uncompromisingly by declaring *that Jahveh never gave any commands about sacrifices in the Mosaic period*. Apparently the prophet is living in an atmosphere different from that in which Amos and Isaiah¹ spoke their mind about the cultus. They could take for granted as well known that God had given no commands about sacrifice. Jeremiah speaks as one who is opposing a prevailing opinion to the contrary.

The explanation lies in the fact that Deuteronomy had appeared in the mean time. Among other ostensibly Mosaic legislation it contained regulatory prescriptions regarding sacrifices at the central sanctuary. When these were exploited as mandatory and of divine origin, Jeremiah stigmatizes them as the product of "the lying pen of the scribes." This, he declares, is what God really says about their man-made ritual: "Add your burnt-offerings unto your sacrifices, and eat ye flesh. For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them

¹ Am. 5:25; Is. 1:12.

out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings and sacrifices."¹

It would be difficult to overrate the significance of the prophet's statement which eliminates both the temple and the cultus from the essential uses of religion. Would he have thus contradicted the evidence of the twelfth chapter of Deuteronomy if he had believed sacrifice to be a divinely instituted means of obtaining forgiveness from God? According to his theology, repentance and good works were the sole requirements. His complaint is that "no one repents of his wickedness,"² but that all rely upon the cultus to expiate their sins. If you think, he says, that the eating of a sacrificial meal will sanctify you and render you acceptable to God, why do you not eat the meat of the burnt-offerings besides that of the regular sacrifices? Why not gorge yourselves with holiness? The prophet's contempt has spoken its utmost in these lines!

Of cognate importance is an interesting passage³ about the "ark of the covenant" which one is tempted, with Erbt, to claim for Jeremiah, in spite of its being imbedded in clearly secondary material. The writer covets the time when Hebrew religion will be rid of the ark and no one will worry about it any longer. This may be taken to imply condemnation of the supersti-

¹ Jer. 7:21, 22; 6:20. Jeremiah specifies the period of the Exodus because the legislation of Deuteronomy is put into the mouth of Moses. Later the Priests' Code went a step further than Deuteronomy and attributed even the origin of the sacrificial system to its minutest details to divine commands received by Moses.

² Jer. 8:6.

³ Jer. 3:16.

tious veneration accorded to it in earlier times, and so marks a long advance over primitive ideas reflected in the story of Uzzah's death, a story whose assumptions about God are shockingly crude and false from a Christian point of view. After all it matters little whether Jeremiah uttered these words about the ark. His attitude toward the cultus, and toward the temple as a palladium, necessarily included the ark. It seems almost incredible that later Judaism should have far enough mistaken the spirit of Jeremiah to make him the hero of a legend in which he hides the ark and the altar of incense in a cave on Mount Nebo! Jeremiah's instinctive conviction that religion is a matter of the heart and must express itself practically in conforming conduct to moral law made it impossible for him to encourage faith in such survivals of the beggarly elements of religion. That he continued to objectify the content of the moral law in terms of divine commands and prohibitions is necessarily incidental to the theology of his time.

There is another important respect in which Jeremiah transcends the limitations of Deuteronomy. So far as the evidence of Hebrew literature is concerned this prophet is the first ethical monotheist of Israel. Unlike the Deuteronomist he does not believe that Jahveh shares the rule of the world with other deities. Nor does he expressly limit God's interest to Israel alone, leaving other nations to the tender mercies of the deities which the Deuteronomist had allotted to

them.¹ We have elsewhere ² pointed out that as ethical monotheism such a view of God's relation to mankind is unworthy of the name. It is only a modified henotheism in which the idea of a national God squares itself with a belief in Jahveh's supremacy over other deities whose real existence is not as yet questioned.

Jeremiah takes higher ground. He frankly denies the existence of the Deuteronomist's vicegerent deities by calling them "no-gods," nonentities. The following passage, in fact, seems to contain an allusion to the theory that Jahveh has assigned to foreign nations the subordinate deities which are the objects of their worship: "O Jahveh, my strength and my stronghold, and my refuge in the day of affliction, unto thee shall the nations come from the ends of the earth, and shall say, Our fathers have inherited naught but lies [i.e., false gods], even vanity and things wherein is no profit. Can a man make for himself gods — which yet are no gods?"³

In removing these deities from the category of gods, and in voicing the protest of foreign nations against the partiality and injustice of such a restricted disposition of divine favor, Jeremiah takes the last step that needed to be taken toward ethical as well as theoretical monotheism. When the prophet calls these deities "no-gods," he is by the logic of the situation compelled

¹ Dt. 4: 19, 20.

² Page 210 f.

³ Jer. 16: 19, 20; cf. 2: 10, 11; 5: 7. Duhm regards the passage as secondary, but Cornill maintains its authenticity; cf. also 48: 35, and 49: 2 (LXX) which may be echoes of Jeremiah's teaching. Jer. 32: 27, which contains the expression "God of all flesh," is certainly by a later hand.

to break the bonds of a particularistic conception of God, or to leave all foreign nations without objects of worship — godless in the strict sense. He has too profound and true a conception of Jahveh's character to choose the latter alternative, although he cannot and does not at all points free himself from the trammels of the national-god idea.

In view of the fact that ethical monotheism and universalism naturally go together, one is disposed to expect on the part of Jeremiah a clear recognition of the fact that God sustains a direct relationship to other nations also. But passages which reflect this idea are extremely few and of such a character that they are open to controversy as to their authenticity. There is the parable of the potter who remoulds the vessels that are accidentally marred under his hands.¹ The lesson that so God will spare any nation that repents and turns from evil, even though in his secret counsel he had resolved "to pluck up and destroy," is by many thought to have furnished inspiration for the fine universalism of the Book of Jonah. Unfortunately, there is no reasonable certainty that this potter section of the text came from Jeremiah.

Similar uncertainty attaches to another passage² in which it is stated that God will "return and have compassion" on Judah's "evil neighbours" when the

¹ Jer. 18: 1-10. Both Duhm and Cornill regard verses 5-10 as secondary. The latter accepts verses 1-4, and sees in them an expression of anti-predestinarian views of God and the world.

² Jer. 12: 14-16.

demands of divine justice have been satisfied. This inclusion of the heathen in Jahveh's compassionate purposes ends with the remarkably evangelical forecast of a time when neighboring nations shall learn to worship Jahveh as the Israelites learned to worship Baal.

But even though it were clearly shown that these passages are authentic utterances of Jeremiah, — and there is nothing in them which is inconsistent with the spirit of his teaching, — a candid reader of his book will have to admit that even this great prophet did not rise fully to a conception of Jahveh's indiscriminating and fatherly interest in all mankind. He did not yet clearly see or point out the consequences of his own ethical individualism. In his message the God of Israel still is at times a jealous partisan, and even where he brings Israel into unfavorable comparison with other peoples,¹ he assumes that the Hebrews have an exclusive place in Jahveh's favor.

But the spirit of Jeremiah's utterances, and the significant *nuance* which he gives to his characterizations of Jahveh, show that he is leading prophetic thought in the direction of a broader humanity. It is apparent, for instance, in the very different senses in which Jeremiah and Ezekiel employ the expression "to know Jahveh."² Ezekiel is a man of narrower sympathies who does not get beyond the particularism of Deuteronomy. But Deutero-Isaiah, the Great Un-

¹ Jer. 2: 10.

² Jer. 9: 6, 24; 24: 7, etc.; cf. Ezek. 20: 26; 6: 10; 12: 20, etc.

known of the exile, picks up the smouldering torch of Jeremiah and fans it into a blaze of light.

Jeremiah, like his predecessors, believed in the power of Jahveh's judgments to touch the springs of action and so to bring about a change of conduct. His heroic defence of Jahveh's freedom to punish, as against those who claimed immunity for Jerusalem, indicates how little disposed he was to relinquish the moral leverage of this belief. In his conflict with Hananiah, the prophet of peace, he makes the point that the true Hebrew prophets from time immemorial have "prophesied . . . of war, of evil, and of pestilence."¹ If any one now prophesies national prosperity, the accepted sign of Jahveh's approval, he will not need to wait long for his answer. Jahveh, expressing his moral judgment in the political events of the immediate future, must decide the issue in Jeremiah's favor. For in his opinion there is not a single just or truthful man in Jerusalem.²

Since the growth of ethical ideals in Old Testament times is closely associated with the rise of ethical individualism, it is proper to enquire whether Jeremiah succeeds in breaking away from the group-morality of Deuteronomy and the idea that the nation, rather than the individual, is subject to rewards and punishments. It must be confessed that the most careful scrutiny of Jeremiah's preaching reveals no appreciable departure from the hitherto accepted beliefs. His warnings and his promises are Jahveh's word to the nation, or to

¹ Jer. 28:8, 9.

² Jer. 5:1; 8:6, 13-15.

such divisions of it as have been created by political events, not by the personal worthiness or unworthiness of individuals.¹ Nor does he manifest any scruple about the inclusion of children under the judgments he proclaims, for the allusion² to the proverb about the fathers who have eaten sour grapes has almost certainly been added by some one who was dependent upon Ezekiel. Children are part of the whole, and share the weal or woe, the innocence or the guilt, of that social group, the nation, which is still the subject of religion in the formal categories of his thinking.

But it is a remarkable fact that while he does not enunciate a doctrine of individual responsibility, yet his conception of God and religion, taken as a whole, has served as a powerful stimulus toward the recognition of the moral value of the individual.³ The ritual homage which he disparages was chiefly identified with communal and official religion; but the moral obedience which he advocates points directly to the individual. This is the real bearing of the fine passage in which Jeremiah, or some one who had caught his spirit, contrasts the priestly type of religion with his own hope of a better one: "I will put my law in their inward parts and in their heart will I write it."⁴ Conduct born of the knowledge of a law graven upon the heart is

¹ Jer. chap. 24; 42:7 ff.; 21:8 f.

² Jer. 31:29, 30; cf. 7:18; Dt. 24:16.

³ One of the best discussions of the subject is an article by J. M. P. Smith in AJT, vol. x (1906), entitled "The Rise of Individualism among the Hebrews," now in his book, *The Prophet and his Problems* (1914).

⁴ Jer. 31:33.

not found in the chain-gang of a formal state religion. When Jeremiah characterizes Jahveh as one who searches the heart as the seat of evil passions, and tries the kidneys as the seat of the mind,¹ even his physiological psychology goes in search of the individual. While his conception of the circumcision of the heart, of the facing about which is demanded,² is to be regarded as only an approximation to the New Testament idea of conversion, its implications are necessarily individualistic. Finally, Jeremiah is himself the most conspicuous example in the Old Testament of religion individualized in a person. The revelations he makes of his own religious experience, his assurance of the validity of his call, his testimony to the compulsive power of his conscience, — these carry a strong implied recognition of the moral autonomy of the individual. He stands for an untraditionalized conscience and an open road.

To be able to feel certain that the famous passage about the new covenant³ is from Jeremiah's pen would be a great satisfaction. An appeal from the Deuteronomic law-book to a law graven upon the heart would have been a fitting climax to his long struggle against ritualism and externalism in the religion of his time. A few recent students of the Book of Jeremiah, among them Cornill, as yet see no sufficient reason for abandoning Jeremiah's authorship of the passage. Never-

¹ Jer. 17 : 9, 10; 11 : 20.

² Jer. 8 : 5.

³ Jer. 31 : 31-34.

theless, it is difficult to overlook the fact that it stands in a context of secondary material, and has secondary marks of its own. But whether it be Jeremiah's or not, there can be no doubt that it expresses precisely the spirit and aim of Jeremiah's work.

As in the case of Isaiah, we have made no attempt to present a critical survey of genuine and secondary materials in the Book of Jeremiah. The literary analysis is too intricate and technical for discussion in such a work as this. We must refer the reader to the commentaries of Duhm and Cornill, to the characterizations of Jeremiah by Marti and Erbt, and to the standard works on Introduction. Few great characters of the Old Testament have suffered more through distorting additions by later editors than Jeremiah. We have tried to make him stand forth in his own character, revealed by his own or Baruch's writings, so far as the most careful critical analysis can determine them. The recovery of such a superb personality from under the daubs of supplementers is a task worthy of all the skill that reverent scholarship can bring to it.

CHAPTER X

THE REPUDIATION OF RITUAL RELIGION BY THE PRE-EXILIC PROPHETS

FEW mistakes have introduced greater confusion into the study of Old Testament religion than the hoary assumption that the great prophets and the ritual laws of the Pentateuch agree in their valuation of sacrifice. In Ezekiel, Leviticus and kindred priestly literature God's favor is dependent upon a strict performance of the ritual. The prophets from Amos to Jeremiah denounce and repudiate this view. In the issue which they raise between ethical and ritual purity they make the sanction of God go with the former and deny any intrinsic value to the latter. In our opinion Professor G. B. Gray does not put the case too strongly when he says, "It is not the institution, but the repudiation, of sacrifice, that distinguishes the religion of Israel."¹ It is scarcely necessary to observe that the phrase "ritual purity" is a misnomer of ancient lineage, a legacy from times of magic and superstition. The expression describes a quality of taboo devoid of any inherent connection with moral purity.

Attention has been directed, in previous chapters, to certain well-known passages in which Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, strongly disparage the sacrificial

¹ *Isaiah, Int. Crit. Com.* (1912), p. 17.

cult. The importance attached to it in popular religion, they declare, is not only without warrant of divine authority, but is a menace to acceptable religion, which must consist primarily in the practice of justice and humanity. It will be useful to unite their actual testimony on this point into a single focus.

1. Amos, speaking for Jahveh, declares: "I hate, I despise your sacrificial feasts, and I will not smell [the savor of] your festal assemblies. Yea, though ye offer me your burnt-offerings and meal-offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let justice roll down as waters, and righteousness as an everflowing stream. Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?"¹

The first of the ritual functions denounced by Amos is the pilgrim-feast or *hag*, celebrated with animal sacrifices, processions, feasting, and dancing. According to the early documents it is this particular kind of feast that Moses declares Jahveh has commanded the Israelites to celebrate at Mount Sinai.² There was a cycle of three great pilgrim-feasts which Moses commanded on the authority of Jahveh, and their observance was deemed so important an element of institutional religion that they were incorporated into the

¹ Am. 5:21-25.

² Ex. 5:1; 10:9, etc. Ex. 23:14, represents Jahveh as giving the command "three times shalt thou hold a pilgrim-feast to me in the year."

Jahvistic decalogue of the thirty-fourth chapter of Exodus. The second ritual observance is the *'ašarah*, or festival period during which men observe the ceremonial taboos intended to render them ritually clean (*'ašûr*) for the consumption of the "holy" sacrificial meat. Amos declares these rites and observances disgusting in the eyes of Jahveh, and assumes that during the nomadic period of Israel's religion on the southern steppes such sacrificial functions formed no part of their religion. Let them, he says ironically, come to Bethel and to Gilgal to celebrate their pilgrim-feasts; let them bring their sacrifices every morning, and their tithes every three days. Atonements for sin? Yes, merry additions and multiplication of transgression! Gifts to Jahveh? Observe his return gifts — "cleanness of teeth," drought, pestilence, and the sword! "This [ritual religion] pleaseth *you*, O ye children of Israel, saith the Lord Jahveh!" ¹

2. Hosea's attitude toward the sacrificial cultus is set forth in the classic statement of Jahveh: "I desire goodness, and not sacrifice; the knowledge of God, and not burnt-offerings." ² Another passage, remarkably similar to the one quoted from Amos, charges that the sacrificial altars only furnish occasion for sinning. Instead of observing the real requirements of God, "the ten thousand things of his [my] law," "they delight in the sacrificial feasts, sacrifice flesh and eat it"; there-

¹ Am. 4:4 ff.

² Hos. 6:6. For details about this passage see p. 155, footnote.

fore Jahveh "will remember their iniquity, and punish their sins." ¹

3. Isaiah, in a passage of unsurpassed vigor, declares: "What unto me is the multitude of your sacrifices? saith Jahveh: I have had enough of the burnt-offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats. When ye come to see my face, who hath required this at your hand? Cease from trampling my courts, nor bring me vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; new moon and sabbath, the calling of assemblies — I cannot [abide them]; away with fast and festal assembly (*'aşarah*). Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth; they are a burden unto me; I am weary of bearing them." ² He not only challenges his co-religionists to show where or when God ever instituted the sacrificial cultus; but he expressly declares that their "fear" of Jahveh, their religion, is "a precept of men learned by rote." ³ By this religion, of course, he means nothing else than the sacrificial cultus.

4. Jeremiah was living at a time when the priests in charge of the centralized cultus at Jerusalem were beginning to claim divine authority for it, probably basing their claim upon Deuteronomy. But he denies the divine sanction claimed, and so joins Isaiah in stigmatizing it as a man-made ritual. "Thus saith

¹ Hos. 8:11-13. Cf. Marti, *Dodekapropheton*, p. 69; Guthe, HSAT, II, p. 12.

² Is. 1:11-14; cf. 28:7, 8; 22:12-14.

³ Is. 29:13.

Jahveh of hosts, the God of Israel: Add your burnt-offerings unto your sacrifices, and eat ye flesh. For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings and sacrifices." ¹

Like his predecessors he cherishes a tradition about the religion of the Mosaic period which is the very opposite of that held by those who see in Moses the promulgator of the ritual laws of the Pentateuch: "Thus saith Jahveh, Stand ye in the ways and see and ask for the old paths [of Jahveh], and note which is the good way; and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls: but they said, We will not walk therein. Then I set watchmen over them [saying]: Harken to the sound of the alarm-trumpet; but they said, We will not hearken. . . . To what purpose cometh there to me frankincense from Sheba and calamus from a far country? Your burnt-offerings are not acceptable, nor your sacrifices pleasing unto me." ² The ancient paths of Jahveh, as he has elsewhere indicated, are the paths of morality, preached by Jahveh's watchmen, the prophets. Departure from them cannot be counter-vailed by even the latest and costliest refinements of the cultus.

These solemn declarations of the futility of sacri-

¹ Jer. 7:21, 22.

² Jer. 6:16, 17, 20. Verses 18-19 break the connection and must be an insertion by a later hand. The testimony of the passage is not materially affected, even though one were, on metrical grounds, to regard the reference to burnt-offerings and sacrifices as secondary. For details the student must be referred to the commentaries of Duhm and Cornill.

fices, and the prophets' settled conviction that the introduction of the sacrificial cultus constituted a corruption of an earlier and purer religion, are significant. Amos, for instance, assumed that the religion of Israel's wilderness days was non-sacrificial, and consequently better than that of his contemporaries. If this better religion was Mosaic it was obviously *not* the elaborately ritualistic religion ascribed to Moses in the Pentateuch. *There clearly were two religions, one of the priests, the other of the prophets.* Despite the latter's unequivocal repudiation of all sacrifices as such, the priestly epigones of the legalistic period of Hebrew religion obscured these denunciations with their additions and revisions in order that they might seem to refer only to transgressions of ritual regulations governing the *where*, *how*, and by *whom*; not to the sacrificial system itself. In this way they twisted the prophetic writings into a superficial harmony with their views.

The magnificent peroration of a later prophetic writer, who sums up the points of emphasis in the teaching of Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, shows how completely, for him as for them, the question, "What is pleasing to God?" had passed the stage of speculation. "Will Jahveh be pleased," he asks, "with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" In his classic reply there is no place for sacrifice. What Jahveh re-

quires is "to do justly" (Amos), "and to love kindness" (Hosea), "and to walk humbly with thy God" (Isaiah).¹

The work of the prophets had, in some minds at least, achieved the conviction that God's requirements were of a moral character, and that material sacrifices were not moral. It follows that Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the author of the last passage quoted, could not have believed in a divinely revealed ritual such as that of Leviticus claims to be, even if it had been in existence in their time. Holding sacrifices to be worthless, they necessarily held the sacrificial cultus equally worthless. The contrary view was irreconcilable with their conception of Jahveh's character.

It was in the nature of things to be expected that the more thoughtful religious leaders of Israel would sooner or later become convinced that sacrifices are in themselves an irrational element of religion. The writer of a Psalm,² which unfortunately is not dateable, saw this most clearly, for he ridicules the idea that sacrifices are gifts of food for the deity, a notion which continued to linger in the Levitical phrase "the food of his God."³ "Mine," he makes God say, "are the cattle on a thousand hills . . . the world and the fulness thereof. If I were hungry I would not tell thee." In

¹ Micah 6:6-8. This passage, probably, must be dated after the exile; the writer was kindred in spirit with Deutero-Isaiah, Job, the writer of Jonah, and one or two Psalmists.

² Ps. 50:7-15.

³ Lev. 21:17, 21, 22; cf. Ezek. 41:22. The altar as the table of Jahveh; Mal. 1:12-14; Micah 6:6.

the thought of this writer the gift-theory of sacrifice involves a humiliatingly petty conception of God's person, power, and desires.

It is natural to assume that the view of sacrifice which he ridicules was uppermost among those whom he desired to reach. In that case his failure to allude to sacrifices of atonement is significant. Was the later belief that "apart from shedding of blood there is no remission" of sin really a deep-seated Old Testament idea, as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews asserts, or is it the offspring of that priestly ritual whose authority and presuppositions the prophets so strenuously denied? ¹

The answer to this question would require a treatise by itself. The subject of sacrifice in the Old Testament is complicated, and has too often been treated without appreciation of the complex tendencies and counter-tendencies of thought and practice that have left their record in Israel's literature. For present purposes it

¹ A curious old ceremonial, described in Dt. 21:1-9, has been used to support the idea of penal substitution. But only a precarious argument can be based upon it. The priests, who are mere spectators, have been introduced by a glossator in verse 5. The sacrifice of the heifer, which is *not killed by effusion of blood*, is clearly intended to quiet the vengeful activity of the spirit of the slain. For this reason, the nearest city, which may or may not harbor the murderer, must be ascertained, because it would be the most likely to suffer. If any penal substitution is involved, it is of more interest to the folklorist than to the theologian. Lev. 17:11-13 introduces the idea of atonement by blood, but hardly through penal substitution. Blood, being peculiarly sacred to Jahveh, has mysterious lustral qualities and its use is attended with supernatural dangers. The attempted explanation of the rite in verse 11 b shows how atonement by ritual magic is beginning to be invested with a theological meaning.

is enough to know that at least one Hebrew thinker of deep religious convictions sums up prophetic teaching by explicitly discarding as irrational the thought that human, animal, or vegetable ¹ sacrifices can atone for sins committed. "Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?"

The sacrifice of the first-born, according to ancient notions of divine requirements, was the most propitiatory offering that could be made to the deity. If that was not effectual, how much less so, then, would be the blood of calves and rams. This writer, apparently, is living at a time when official Jahvism had placed human sacrifice of all kinds under severe disapproval. But by heightening the value of the ceremonial offerings to the utmost, he gives point to his conviction that the blood of no sacrifice whatsoever can wash the stain of sin from the human soul. Apparently he knows nothing about the alleged word of Jahveh, "I have given [the blood] to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls." ² Atonement cannot be effected by sacrifice, the performance of a ritual, for that would be to substitute a mechanical act for repentance and reform. The experience of divine forgiveness comes to

¹ Olive oil was anciently used in propitiatory and expiatory libations (Gen. 28:18; Micah 6:7). Lev. 5:11 permits the substitution of fine flour for two turtle doves as a sin offering. Oil and flour, as in domestic use, were mingled in the meal offering.

² Lev. 17:11. In the Law of Holiness (chaps. 17-26) to which this passage belongs, *all blood* of sacrifices still has atoning efficacy; elsewhere in the Priests' Code special sacrifices of atonement are provided.

each soul only through its own moral endeavor, the fruit of repentance.¹

Do the pre-exilic prophets exhibit any tolerance of the cultus at all, or are they opposed to it on principle as a snare and a delusion? This question is raised by the fact that Deuteronomy, which represents a compromise between priestly and prophetic tendencies, retains a place for the sacrificial ritual. If the prophets were uncompromising radicals, bent on eliminating sacrifice altogether, why did they permit its authorization in the Deuteronomic programme of reform? One might reply that Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah were no longer living when Deuteronomy was drawn up, and therefore had no opportunity to approve or reject its provisions; that Deuteronomy only mediately embodies prophetic ideals, but was directly influenced by men of priestly temperament; and that Jeremiah, who continued the anti-ritualistic traditions of the earlier prophets, did remain an uncompromising opponent even of the reformed ritual of Deuteronomy.

Such a reply would undoubtedly contain the substantial truth. One may add further that these prophets never speak of the sacrificial ritual as an obligatory function, and never propose to substitute a new or modified ritual for the one they condemn. Sacrifices have no organic place in the religion of the prophets. Even Hosea, when he mentions the cessation of

¹ Micah 6:8.

sacrifices among the mournful changes which will be consequent upon the deportation of his countrymen, clearly intends to impress them with the fact that what they consider most important has no weight at all with Jahveh.¹

Yet the tone of personal regret in which he speaks, the absence of any organized movement to abolish sacrifices altogether, and the fact that the Deuteronomic reform of the cultus received sympathy and support in prophetic circles, are points that call for explanation. It must be sought in the double character of the system. The sacrificial cultus was a social as well as a religious institution. Divested of its ritual significance, there remained in it much that might contribute to the comfort and happiness of the people. Since all slaughtering of animals was in itself a sacrificial act among the Hebrews, no meat could properly be eaten except in ritual connections. Therefore every sacrifice involved a feast, and no feast could be provided without a sacrifice. On the designated festal days the whole countryside streamed to the sanctuary. Crowds arrayed in gay attire came with music and song, leading the sacrificial victims and bringing with them bread and wine to set forth the feast. With open-handed hospitality guests were made welcome at the

¹ Hos. 3:4 (Guthe, HSAT), and Is. 19:21, are in all probability additions by a later hand and therefore do not figure in this connection. Jer. 17:26, is an editorial addition, like the last two verses of Psalm 51. Jer. 33:18, is part of a section which is missing in the LXX. It certainly did not flow out of the pen or thought of Jeremiah.

banquet where rich and poor made merry together and so "rejoiced before Jahveh."¹

The prophets may well have hesitated before attempting to deprive the people of this source of common joys. Could superstitious faith in the objective efficacy of such sacrifices as means of atonement for sin, or gifts of appeasement, be ethically purified and yet leave the people the social benefits of the institution? Amos and Isaiah must have asked themselves that question even while, as Jahveh's spokesmen, they were saying: "I hate, I despise your [sacrificial] feasts, and will not smell [the appetizing savor of] your festal assemblies." It was the prospective loss, through exile, of Israel's keenest joys, deeply rooted about Jahveh's altars, that stirred the regret of Hosea when he said: "They shall no longer pour out wine for Jahveh, nor prepare their sacrifices for him. Like the bread of mourning shall their food be; all who eat thereof shall be [ritually] defiled; for their bread shall be only for their appetite; it shall not come into the house of Jahveh."² It seems obvious that the prophet is not concerned here with the expiatory uses of sacrifice, but with the profound and mournful changes

¹ Cf. I Sam. 9:11-24; Is. 30:29; 28:7, 8; Hos. 2:13. Cf. also W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 254 f.

² Hos. 9:4. "The bread of mourning" is a reference to an ancient and widespread superstition according to which everything connected with a dead person is taboo for a given period. Cf. Num. 19:14; Jer. 16:7; Dt. 26:14. To the ancient Hebrews all food in a foreign land would have been taboo: (1) because of the presence and rule of foreign gods; (2) because neither meat, nor fruits and cereals, could have the customary sanction of the sacrificial ritual.

which their cessation would effect in the social customs of the people.

But there is another, even more distinctly humanitarian, reason why the prophets may have shrunk from advocating so radical a step as the entire abolition of sacrifices. A considerable percentage of the most influential part of the population, the communities of professional prophets and the priesthood, charged among other things with the administration of civil justice, was in some measure dependent for its living upon the sacrificial system. In modern phrase, out of the worshippers' offerings came the judges' and ministers' salaries.

It seems certain that the firstlings of the flock, which the Jahvist ¹ represents God as claiming for himself, went partly to the support of the priests. The same explanation applies to the command, "The first of the first-fruits of thy ground thou shalt bring unto the house of Jahveh thy God." At first the function of the priest was to attend to the oracle. Heads of families did the sacrificing. Much frequented sanctuaries must have required the priest's services, also, as guardian and overseer. This service naturally became the basis of his claim to support out of the sacrificial offerings. Thus giving to God was in a fair way to become a euphemism for giving to the priest.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find among the earliest ritual regulations, recorded by the Jahvist, one

¹ Ex. 34: 19, 20.

which makes Jahveh say: "None shall appear before me empty. . . . Three times in the year shall all thy males appear before the Lord Jahveh, the God of Israel."¹ To "appear before" God was the popular way of describing a visit to the sanctuary where the ancient Hebrew believed his deity dwelt and gave audience. Since "to serve Jahveh" meant nothing currently except to offer sacrifice,² each was expected to bring his sacrificial offerings. The larger sanctuaries had their priesthoods, and these necessarily had a deep interest in seeing to it that worshippers did not come empty-handed.

Even the best human nature poured into the sacerdotal mould would find it difficult to resist the temptations which such a system presented. The more occasions the priests could find for imposing sacrificial fines the more profit to themselves. Alleged transgressions of ritual regulations probably were favorite pretexts for plucking the people. Hosea bitterly complains: "They *feed* on the sin of my people, and hunger after their iniquity."³

The second chapter of the first book of Samuel gives a graphic account of how the priests of Shiloh disregarded the customary regulations in order to satisfy their greed. "They cared not for Jahveh nor for what was the customary portion of the priest from the people."⁴ Whenever any one sacrificed, the servant of

¹ Ex. 34:20, 23.

² Cf. II Sam. 15:8.

³ Hos. 4:8.

⁴ I Sam. 2:13 *f.* Most Biblical scholars favor this reading.

the priest came, while the flesh was still boiling, with a three-pronged fork in his hand; and he struck it into the kettle, or caldron, or pot; and whatever the fork brought up the priest took for himself. So they did in Shiloh unto all the Israelites that came thither. Even before they burned the fat the priest's servant came, and said to the man that sacrificed, 'Give flesh to roast for the priest; for he will not have boiled flesh of thee, but raw.' And, if the man replied, 'Surely the fat¹ must be burned first, and thereafter thou mayest take whatever thou pleasest,' then he would say, 'Nay, but thou shalt give it to me now; and if not, I will take it by force.'"

Probably every sanctuary had originally its own regulations regarding the portion that belonged to the priests.² The shewbread and cereal offerings seem to have been their portion from the earliest times. But the kinds of offerings which the priests might share increased in number as time went on, and they obtained also larger and larger portions for themselves. The

¹ The fat was regarded as Jahveh's portion. The narrator evidently condemns the practice of the priests at Shiloh because a different custom prevailed in his time. But it is not at all improbable that he is here recording the survival of an old sacerdotal custom at Shiloh which may have been quite in accord with Canaanite law. In later times, at Jerusalem, specified portions of the sacrifice belonged to the priest. Cf. Dt. 18:3; Lev. 7:34.

² Contrary to probability and analogy is the statement of Wellhausen (*Prolegomena*, 6th ed., p. 147) that the priest, when there was one, was allowed to participate in some way in the sacrificial meal, but that he does not seem to have had a legitimate claim to specified perquisites of meat. The proper reading of I Sam. 2:12, 13, according to the Greek and Syriac versions is, "The sons of Eli . . . respected not Jahveh nor the right of the priest from the people." This shows that something was due to the priest from the sacrificer.

question to what extent a serious, though mistaken, religious purpose may have been behind the priesthood's growing demands for dignity and emoluments cannot concern us here. What does concern us is the fact that their maintenance came increasingly from the sacrificial system, and that the prophets charge them with abuse of this prerogative.

The Deuteronomist, we may assume, merely formulated what was substantially ancient practice, when he said that the priests "shall eat the fire-offerings of Jahveh and his inheritance. . . . This shall be the priests' due from the people, from them that offer a sacrifice, whether it be of ox or sheep, that they shall give unto the priest the shoulder and the two cheeks and the maw. The first-fruits of thy grain, of thy new wine, and of thine oil, and the first of the fleece of thy sheep, shalt thou give to him."¹ Ezekiel, himself a priest, expressly included among the sacerdotal perquisites the meal offering, sin offering, trespass offering, and everything that had been put under the ban.²

At a later period the Priests' Code greatly increased these requirements by specifying as the Levites' and priests' portion, the tithes, and the breast and the right hind leg of all sacrificial victims;³ in order to make sure of this as an addition to the Deuteronomic requirement, the latter was explained as referring to the priests' share of all secular slaughter of animals for food. The tendency in all this is revealed by the ultimate exten-

¹ Dt. 18:3, 4

² Ezek. 44:29, 30.

³ Lev. 7:31-34.

sion of sacerdotal demands beyond all reasonable possibility of realization, as when the latest additions of P provide for the imposition of an additional tithe upon flocks and herds, and assign to the hierarchy forty-eight cities with a girdle of pasture-lands half a mile in diameter around each one.¹ "And Jahveh spake unto Moses" is the pious form in which these ritual exactions are levied.

The priestly revenues, therefore, amounted in later times, at least, to a very considerable tax upon the people, levied by means of the sacrificial system. In asserting that God himself instituted the system, and that his favor was dependent upon the scrupulous observance of the ritual ordinances, the priesthood was at the same time enforcing its claims to material support with the alleged authority of a divine command.

The prophets who had denied that God had instituted sacrifices, or could be propitiated by means of them, were condemning an economic abuse as well as a religious superstition. These uncompromising preachers of morality were at the same time undermining the authority of the priests and allied false prophets to rob the people in the name of God. "If they have anything to bite, they proclaim prosperity; but they declare holy war against any one who does not put something into their mouths."² So Micah characterizes those of his own day. Sacerdotal greed had seen its advantage and was pushing it farther by all the means

¹ Lev. 27:32 and Num. 35:1-8.

² Micah 3:5; cf. 3:4.

in its power, chief among them being the profitable delusion that sacrifices possess the magic efficacy of atoning for sin, and securing prosperity. By calling a halt upon the propagation of this doctrine, men like Amos, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah aroused the lasting hatred of the priests and professional prophets — a hatred inspired as much by the bread-instinct as by differences of theological belief.

Although Amos had denounced sacrifices as worthless, Amaziah the priest of Bethel assumes that he, like himself, "eats bread" obtained through the system. "O thou seer," said he, "flee thou away into the land of Judah, and there eat bread, and prophecy there." But the prophet resents the implication that he is a beneficiary of the sacrifices he has denounced; that he is pulling down his own roof-tree. "I am no [professional] prophet," he replies, "neither am I a member of a prophet's guild; but I am a herdsman, and a dresser of sycomore trees." His moral convictions are untainted by fear or self-interest. He is independent of the priestly sources of support.

But it will be granted that, however bad the abuses of the system may have been, there was something to be said for its retention provided it could be purified and ethicized. Then it might continue to cheer the lives of the common people who wished to "rejoice before Jahveh" at the stated sacrificial feasts, and it would continue to provide sustenance for the official representatives of religion who were at the same time

the ministers of justice.¹ May it not have been considerations like these that brought about the compromise between prophetic and priestly ideals by which sacrifice found a place in Deuteronomy?

By restricting the cultus to the sanctuary at Jerusalem the Deuteronomist made it possible and necessary to deprive the slaughter of animals for food of its sacrificial significance. The great reduction of sacrifices which this involved meant a corresponding reduction of opportunities for the exaction of priestly perquisites. The central sanctuary was given the monopoly of priestly revenues, out of which, however, all the dispossessed priests of the abolished sanctuaries were to "have like portions to eat."² This latter provision, being in the nature of a check upon the priests at

¹ The prospective removal of the priests from the local sanctuaries to Jerusalem requires new provision for the administration of justice in the provinces. Hence D provides for the appointment of judges and notaries (Dt. 16:18) to be chosen doubtless from among the "elders" of the cities and country communities (Dt. 19:12; Ex. 18). But difficult cases are still to be adjudicated by the priests at Jerusalem (Dt. 17:8 *ff.*). This explains why Dt. 19:15-21, mentions the presence of judges, but lets the priests discharge the judicial functions. The mention of "the judge" in Dt. 17:9, 12, is shown to be a gloss by its position in the text. Cf. Marti, HSAT, p. 269.

² Cf. Dt. 18:8. This of course refers to the dues received by the priests from the people. According to II Kings 23:9, the dispossessed priests were, in spite of Deuteronomy, not permitted to officiate at Jerusalem. The priests of the latter sanctuary, forming a more or less close corporation, refused to share their privileges. The statement that "the priests of the high places" were permitted a livelihood of "unleavened bread" indicates that they were excluded from all but an insignificant share in the altar dues. Since Plater (Num. 18:19-20; 18:21 *f.*) assigns the altar dues to the Jerusalem priesthood alone, as distinct from the others who now appear merely as "Levites" under the distinction introduced by Ezekiel, we may safely assume that P gives the *ex post facto* recognition of a practice that arose immediately after Josiah's reformation.

Jerusalem and promptly disregarded by them, is best explained as of prophetic origin. Its purpose was to preserve a livelihood for a large and important class of persons in the community. "The Levite that is within thy gates, thou shalt not forsake him,"¹ is the burden of the Deuteronomist's plea. Strange that what was asked in charity for the entire clergy of Israel, was promptly appropriated and enlarged as a legal claim by the local priesthood of the chosen sanctuary! Ezekiel's move to unfrock the priests from the country sanctuaries does not look well in this connection. It disposed of unwelcome competitors.

The retention of the sacrificial ritual in Deuteronomy, may, therefore, be explained on the basis of the humanitarian reasons set forth above. The Deuteronomist's failure to attach any atoning value to sacrifice as such then becomes especially significant. The omission is strong evidence of the prophetic point of view in Deuteronomy. *The repudiation of sacrifice as a divine institution involves repudiation of the theory of atonement by sacrifice.* Let any one compare the ritual portions of Deuteronomy and Leviticus and note the gulf that yawns between their respective conceptions of sacrifice. The former, reflecting the ethical standards of the prophets in its solicitude for the welfare of certain classes of the Hebrew community, makes good

¹ Dt. 14: 27. The Deuteronomist's solicitude on behalf of the "Levite" need not indicate that priests were classed among the poor, but rather a desire to lighten the economic blow which disestablishment will deal them. Possessors of "patrimony" (Dt. 18: 8) are not to be reckoned poor.

works the condition of favor with God, whereas the latter substitutes a system of sacrificial fines and the magic mummery of a supposedly "holy" ritual. But it must be admitted that the very act of providing for a reform of the cultus appeared to attach to the sacrificial system more than social-economic importance. Interested circles immediately drew the inference that the cultus was the vital thing in religion. The incipient rift between prophetic and priestly religion bridged temporarily by Deuteronomy, soon widened into a chasm.

How Deuteronomy was wrested to serve the purposes of the sacerdotal party at Jerusalem and how Jeremiah resisted the legalism which it set on foot is best told in another connection. It must suffice to call attention here only to his utter repudiation of sacrifice as a valid religious function. It was in him that the free moral spirit of the pre-exilic prophets made its last determined stand against the bondage of ritual forms and a written law.

Nothing reveals more clearly the strength of the rising sacerdotalism opposed to Jeremiah than the writings of his contemporary Ezekiel. In him one observes a return to earlier and cruder views of religion in which ceremonial plays the leading part. But the simple cult of earlier days is now subjected to a ritual finesse which *only* the priest can exercise at *one* specified place, and the worshipper is led to believe that scrupulous compliance with ritual requirements is necessary to secure and preserve a state of "holiness."

It is not surprising, therefore, that Ezekiel in his programme of restoration re-attaches to sacrifice the false importance which his illustrious predecessors had denied and denounced. Priestly privileges and ritual acts occupy the foreground in his thoughts of reform. Where Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah had made purity of life the primary religious requirement, Ezekiel so exaggerates Jahveh's interest in the correct performance of the ritual that ethical considerations become markedly secondary. His introduction of a distinction between "the Levites that went far from me" and "the priests the Levites, the sons of Zadok," of whom he was one, had the double effect of making the latter the sole custodians of the sacrificial ritual and the exclusive recipients of the priestly revenues. This act constitutes a transgression both of the letter and of the spirit of Deuteronomy, and shows how lightly the Zadokite priesthood regarded the authority of the new law when it did not minister to their own interests.

We have seen that the abolition of all sanctuaries of Jahveh outside of Jerusalem necessarily involved a distinction between the priests of the proscribed sanctuaries, who lost their livelihood, and those who were attached to the chosen sanctuary. The Deuteronomist tacitly credits them all with equal claims to support by the sacrificial revenues, and so provides for the equal maintenance of all at the central sanctuary. But the brief interval between 621 and 586 B.C. was sufficient

to prove the centralization of the entire Judean priesthood impracticable under the conditions set forth by Deuteronomy. The priests at Jerusalem refused to admit the evicted priests to a share in their enhanced importance and privileges. Ezekiel adds injustice to injury by proposing in his programme of restoration that the latter shall be degraded to the menial services of the new temple as a *penalty for not having observed the Deuteronomic law of the one sanctuary*. This attempt to make out a case against unwelcome competitors, it should be observed, rests upon the false assumption that the Deuteronomic law of the one sanctuary was actually promulgated by Moses, and that it had been obeyed only by the priests at Jerusalem.

But how could Moses lay down a law requiring the Israelites to worship at only one sanctuary when they settled in Palestine, and at the same time make provision for the victims of its enforcement six hundred years later? The fact that Deuteronomy presupposes the *existence* of numerous illegitimate sanctuaries¹ of Jahveh in Palestine, an inconceivable assumption for the time of Moses, when not even the one legitimate sanctuary had been chosen, naïvely betrays the real period and purpose of the writer. The provision for the sale of the evicted priests' patrimony pending their

¹ Local sanctuaries of Jahveh, among others, are meant by "the places where the nations . . . served their gods" (Dt. 12:2). The many local shrines, Bethel, Gibeon, Shechem, etc., mentioned in the historical books are here presented as heathenish. But down to the time of Josiah they were frequented as perfectly legitimate shrines of Jahveh under the rule laid down in Ex. 20:24.

removal to "the place which Jahveh . . . shall choose," and the concession of their right of maintenance there, were not born of a desire to punish a neglect, but to indemnify for an innovation. What is more, the social and religious conditions presupposed by this compensatory legislation are not those of the time of Moses, but of a much later age. In the light of these facts it is deeply significant that Deuteronomy regards as *victims* of a reform those whom Ezekiel treats as *offenders* against a law.

There can be no doubt that Ezekiel violates the facts of history as well as the spirit of Deuteronomy when he penalizes and brands with reproach "the Levites that went far from me [Jahveh]." ¹ That he does it knowingly cannot be asserted. Nevertheless interesting questions are raised by the fact that this unjust judgment, supported by an appeal to a fictitious construction of history, is introduced by "Thus saith the Lord Jahveh." ² What is equally unjustifiable, he and his colleagues of the Jerusalem priesthood claim quite undeserved credit for conformity with a law which, when enacted, found them connected with the sanctuary at Jerusalem just as other priests happened to be attached to other sanctuaries. With equal propriety might a man claim credit for having been born white when he finds himself amid surroundings where it is a disadvantage to be black. Before 621 B.C. it was nothing praiseworthy to be connected with the Jerusalem sanc-

¹ Ezek. 44: 10 f.

² Ezek. 44: 9.

tuary; neither was it a punishable offence to officiate at some other "high place."

For purposes of illustration let us imagine a roughly analogous case. Suppose a law were passed in a given State providing that no man shall be entitled to practise medicine unless his degree has been conferred by the State university. To compensate for the hardship which this would work upon practising holders of degrees from other schools, the law provides that such practitioners shall receive appointments in connection with a great hospital supported by the State. Although the newcomers are to enjoy the same rights and perquisites as the doctors already there, friction arises between them. The latter refuse to concede to the former an equality of privileges and their share of the perquisites.

After a lapse of forty-five years, during which nearly all who were originally affected by the change have died, a great political catastrophe ensues, involving the destruction of the hospital. Anticipating its ultimate reestablishment, one of the university-bred doctors proposes that under the terms of reorganization all who do not hold a medical degree from the university, and their descendants, shall henceforward not be permitted to rise above the rank and work of nurses. The reason he gives for this arbitrary procedure is that they failed to comply with the law which provides that only medical graduates of the State university shall practise medicine. He ignores the fact

that since they obtained their medical education before the law was enacted their choice could not justly be judged by it. Their misfortune, recognized by compensation in the original law, is under the new construction penalized as a misdemeanor, and the beneficiaries of the law make a virtue of the accident that found them university-bred when the law was passed.

There is no good reason for impugning the motives of Ezekiel, but his conception of religion in this respect is fundamentally false. It involves reassertion of the intrinsic value of sacrifices, long ago denied by the greater pre-exilic prophets. He claims divine authority for what they had vehemently denounced by the same token. For when he alleges a "Thus saith the Lord" for the exclusion of the "Levites" from the higher ritual functions and makes Jahveh say that Zadokite priests alone "shall stand before me to offer unto me the fat and the blood," he implies on the part of God a vital interest in sacrifice and ceremonial. In so far, at least, he degraded the conception of God set forth by Jeremiah and his predecessors, and initiated that priestly misdevelopment of Hebrew religion which became completely dominant under Ezra, and later proved a serious obstacle in the path of Jesus.

One may fitly make the point, also, that the above-mentioned religious ideals of Ezekiel are morally discredited by the means he employed to realize them. Sincerity alone does not make right. There doubtless were many besides Ezekiel in the growing priestly

party who sincerely believed that Israel's political downfall was a divine punishment for failure to confine worship to one sanctuary and to guard the "holiness," i.e., ceremonial purity, of the ritual and the temple. It lay in the nature of the Deuteronomic reform, and the importance it attached to legitimacy of place and ritual, to foster such views. But the fact remains that Ezekiel indicted and penalized the "Levites" on a charge framed out of a historical fiction; that their degradation to menial rank enhanced the power and income of the Zadokite priesthood; and that he gave a set-back to the best prophetic traditions by depicting Jahveh as a jealous guardian of the sanctity of the sacrificial cult. By uniting a false view of Hebrew history with a misconception of the essential elements of Hebrew religion he conjured up, in this view of sacrifice, an idea of God which, however true he may have believed it to be, was profoundly and banefully erroneous.

If this judgment seems harsh, it is necessary only to point to the evils of legalism and Levitical formalism which, for centuries, found their stronghold in his thought, and filled with bitter conflict the days of Jesus. Fortunately there were other aspects of his activity that were more admirable. But we must postpone to a later volume a complete consideration of his work and that of the great leaders whose beacon-fires lit up the troubled times between Cyrus and Augustus.

We have now reached that great crisis in Israel's history and religion which was brought about by the destruction of Jerusalem and by the Babylonian exile. A new environment, new social forces, new ideas, a re-valuation of the past, a re-furnishment of the future with the lure of more spiritual ideals — all these bring about the dissolution of the old order. But the great prophetic ideas lived on and became the dynamic of a new order.

If we have succeeded at all in giving the reader an idea of the great development of ideas and customs in Israel during the centuries that lie between Samuel and the exile, it is not necessary to point out that the dogmatic view of the Bible, quoted at the beginning of the volume, is impaired beyond recovery. In the face of such evidence the assertion that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are without error or misstatement in their moral and spiritual teachings and record of historical facts," is to create that serious situation in which *faith and truth part company*.

However, the faith which is abandoned on these terms is no longer faith, but superstition. What is more, it is a very harmful superstition, for in the minds of many it creates the mistaken impression that they must choose between their religious faith and their loyalty to the truth. The saddest aspect of the matter is that armies of young people, trained in schools and colleges to think true to evidence, resolve the fictitious

dilemma in favor of unbelief. And yet their choice is a moral choice, because they prefer truth to dogma. Their loss to the Church is the penalty which must be paid for the defence of truth by untruth.

There is nothing in the spiritual history of mankind that is comparable to the passion for righteousness which the Bible represents in the true progress of the world. The new interest which historical criticism is arousing in its study may be the means of freeing it from the abuses of ignorance and superstition, that it may, under God, serve the new age even better than the past. And those who are dreading the new light will find, as thousands have already found, that textual and historical criticism take their charter from Christ himself, and are only instruments for the furtherance of his mission.

Bible study on the factual and historical side has become a science and has taken its place in the brotherhood of sciences. For though on the surface they differ as the waves, in the depths they are one as the sea. In every department of knowledge the wide-awake student hears "deep calling unto deep": "All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos, or Cephas or the world, or life or death, or things present or things to come; all are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."

Will men in face of the tremendous, thrilling sweep of development, which we have tried to delineate, go on teaching the Old Testament in the foolish patch-

work way of four square inches here and four square inches there? Without recognition of the gradual growth of moral standards? Without recognition of Hebrew methods of historiography by which literary documents dating centuries apart were interwoven or placed side by side in contiguous chapters? Without historical criticism of conflicting sets of facts? Without the slightest attempt to interpret folk-lore as folk-lore, and each form of literature in accordance with the demands of its type? Will they, like amiable tourists of religion, continue to carry home bottles from the Jordan, when full rivers of knowledge, eager to shape new channels and refresh a virgin soil, are rolling for the baptism of eager-eyed new generations? The better, larger day must come to gladden the eyes of those

“ . . . who, rowing hard upstream,
See distant gates of Eden gleam,
And do not deem it all a dream.”

THE END

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

"JEHOVAH" AND "JAHVEH"

THE name "Jehovah" is a word of recent origin. It was quite unknown in antiquity. As G. F. Moore has shown (OTSS, 1), it occurs for the first time sporadically in the fourteenth century. After the appearance of Petrus Galatinus' *De arcanis*, in 1518, its use became general. The word arose in a peculiar way. Until some centuries after the Christian era, the text of the Hebrew Scriptures was written with consonants only. The name of the deity, therefore, was written with the four consonants "JHVH." As Hebrew ceased to be a spoken tongue, words written consonantly began to present difficulties to readers. This fact led to the invention of systems of vowel points which were written under and above the consonants.

Long before the invention of vowel points it had become customary, on account of superstitious dread of the name of the deity, to read "Adonay" (Lord) wherever "JHVH" occurred. To indicate this fact the vowels of Adonay were connected with the consonants "JHVH," the short "A" of "Adonay" by a regular change becoming "e" when connected with the consonant J. Persons ignorant of the purpose of the vowels began to read them with the consonants and thus the preposterous hybrid "JeHoVaH" arose.

To illustrate what happened, let us suppose that the English language had formerly been written only with consonants, and that the name of London, consequently, appeared as "LNDN." Let us suppose further that the name became taboo, and that it was customary to read in its place the word "capital." To indicate this to the reader the vowels of the word ("a," "i," "a,") were associated with "LNDN," after vowels began to be employed. But persons came along who did not know this fact, and who, by stuffing the skin of the word "London" with the bones of the word "capital," produced the monstrosity "LaNiDaN." Since the name "Jehovah" is an equally absurd misadventure, there is no reason why it should be perpetuated any longer, especially since we now know with practical certainty that the word was pronounced "Jahveh," and was sometimes shortened to "Jahu," and "Jah."

The meaning of the name is of little consequence, for even if its original significance could be ascertained, it would bear testimony not to the beginnings of Israel's religion, but to a much more primitive period of Semitic religion in general. Therefore, the search for etymological origins of "El," "Elohim," "El Shaddai," and "Jahveh" is a negligible matter in this connection. The possession of any name for the deity is now a hindrance rather than a help.

APPENDIX B

DUHM ON JER. 8 : 8 (p. 262)

DUHM's comment on Jer. 8 : 8, is so illuminating that I venture to give a translation of the main portion:¹ "The word *sopherim*, scribes, . . . does not in any case denote mere copyists in this connection, but authors, men of the book, such as reduce the Torah [law] to writing, or concern themselves with written Torah. But this wonderfully wise, new law must be connected in some way with Deuteronomy; is with one reservation to be regarded as identical with it. A reservation is necessary because we are not at all informed about the precise appearance of Deuteronomy at the time when Jeremiah wrote these strophes; because we do not know to what extent its contents coincided with the book that we possess to-day. For our Deuteronomy, it must be remembered, is not a book of one piece; some parts of its present contents were not added until after the time of Jeremiah; other parts may subsequently have been rejected, and among them, perhaps, just such parts as may have occasioned Jeremiah's caustic utterance about the lying pen of the scribes. One must leave room, of course, for the possibility that Jeremiah here enters protest against some Deuteronomic productions and contentions which are

¹ *Das Buch Jeremia*, pp. 88-89.

still to be read in Deuteronomy or outside of it. The bookmen, as we know, soon engaged in the task of dragging other books into the circle of their redactional activity in order to provide them with their additions. That old mirror of justice, for instance, which we now find in Ex. 20 : 23—23 : 33, Jeremiah may still have known in its original condition, and may have seen personally how these bibliographers incorporated it into their own productions and turned it into a law given at Mount Sinai. Furthermore, being the son of a priest and conversant with earlier conditions, he could not be ignorant of the fact that the Deuteronomists, as soon as they had transferred their theory of the cultus and of the single sanctuary to ancient times, did violence to the latter by indiscriminately placing under the ban things both good and bad, and hoary customs hallowed by the names of the patriarchs and the great prophets of former days. One point, in particular, . . . is worthy of emphasis. Even before Deuteronomy made its appearance, Jeremiah had made war, in the spirit of the older prophets, against the thoroughly degraded cults of the local sanctuaries. But he nowhere expressed the opinion that Jahveh had forbidden worship at the local sanctuaries as such, or had commanded the offering of worship at the temple only. What kind of an impression must it have made upon him when Deuteronomy suddenly appeared? Did he see in it, without reservation, the word of Jahveh? The messengers of the King did not apply to

Jeremiah when they were looking for a prophetic endorsement of the divine character of the new book! And how extraordinarily rarely Jeremiah mentions the book or the reformation! Were it not for this passage one might suppose, either that he had known nothing about it, or that he had purposely ignored it. Besides, this single reference is a hostile one. There is only one explanation for this: the idea that the cults practiced at the local sanctuaries were alienating men from the religion of Jahveh had been abroad for a long time. The literary prophets of the eighth century had strongly expressed their conviction on that point, and Jeremiah as a young man was deeply imbued with the same idea. In any case Amos, Isaiah, and others of the prophetic succession, did not look upon the sacrificial system with any more favor than Jeremiah. They believed that the people would either have to return to Jahveh through an inward reform, or he would dash them to utter destruction. Now some men came forward with a law which had for its object the forcible abolishment of the local cults and the institution of the sacrificial cultus in their stead at the temple. They remained anonymous, and, perhaps because they were familiar with the views of Jeremiah, Uriah, and some kindred minds, they took refuge behind the mighty authority of Moses. To all appearance they aimed at the same thing as Jeremiah, namely the purification of the religion of Jahveh. But they actually were men of a very different stamp. Whereas Jeremiah understood

by the *mishpat Jahveh* [law of Jahveh] the supreme authority of morality, they soon arrived at a system of *mishpatim* [ordinances] which in part had a very different purpose, namely to serve as precepts for the regulation of the sacrificial ritual. Was that anything essentially new? Could a man like Jeremiah see in that an adequate remedy for the hurt of his time? Was not that a 'sowing among the thorns'? Marti may have gone a little too far in maintaining that Jeremiah was no adherent of the Deuteronomic reform, but in the last analysis he is right. Jeremiah lives in another world, and is informed by a spirit very different from that of these theologians. He can only characterize it as a falsehood when these 'wise men' rave about the saving value of the 'temple of Jahveh' — perhaps even connecting the safety of the nation with the vessels of the temple (28 : 3) — and declare that since the achievement of the reform, 'peace' may be expected of Jahveh. But Jahveh himself had vouchsafed to Jeremiah a glimpse of the dark future. The putting to sleep of the conscience of the people was to him a more grievous falsification than all the violence done to Hebrew history by Deuteronomic pens."

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